Pension reform in China - a case study by Hu, YW
 1
Current version: 2nd  February 2006 
 
Pension reform in China - a case 
study 
 
 
Yu-Wei Hu 
 
Brunel University, London 
 
Abstract: 
 
China is a relatively young country now, but about to undergo a remarkable 
demographic transformation in the near future. Despite foreseeable dramatic 
demographic changes, the current retirement system in China is badly structured, and 
not able to cope with the rapid ageing population in this century. The purpose of this 
study is threefold. First, we seek to provide a comprehensive historical review and 
detailed analysis of the Chinese pension system with an ultimate ambition of finding 
solutions to China’s pension crisis. Second, we place the analysis of pension reform in 
the broader economic context, in order to identify the interaction between pension 
reform, economic growth and financial development. One purpose is to assess the 
reform conditions in China. Third, with particular reference to a simulation model, 
policy alternatives are proposed that could help make the Chinese pension system 
sustainable in the long run. Based on our critical analysis and empirical work, we find 
that first, China meet the basic requirement to start pension reform, second, in order to 
improve the current Chinese pension system, a range of institutional and practical 
changes need to be undertaken. They include unifying the system across the country 
to reduce the transaction costs, redesigning the system so it is fair to the current 
working population, diversifying pension fund portfolios to achieve a high and stable 
return, preserving traditional family support to serve as an income provision cushion 
in the short and medium term, and maintaining a stable macro-economy to protect the 
real value of pension assets.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Since initiating the economic reform and open-door policy in the late 1970s, China 
has witnessed a tremendous transformation. A once centrally-planned and 
impoverished country was gradually transformed into a market-oriented economy, 
and has become one of world’s strongest economic powers. The latest joint report by 
the World Bank, United Nations and Morgan Stanley (ICXO 2005) gave estimates 
showing that China is turning into the “world factory”: one of every two digital 
cameras sold in the world was manufactured in China, five of every six skiing clothes 
sold in Europe were made in China, and the increased electricity capacity in the 
Chinese power market in 2004 approximated the whole UK electricity capacity in the 
same year, etc.  
 
The impressive economic expansion is also shown by socio-economic statistics in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that as of 2003, the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita was 9.29% in China compared to 2.83% at the world level, 6.92% in low 
income economies, 5.69% in lower middle income economies, and 1.72% in high 
come OECD countries. Using 5-year average time series data, the trend is also quite 
clear. As revealed in Table 2, in all periods (but 1961 to 1965) during the past 4 
decades, China performed much better than most other countries. This is particularly a 
case since the late 1970s, when China started her economic reform and opening-up 
policy. The average growth ratio between 1981 and 2004 was 8.3%, much higher than 
that in most other economies, e.g. 2% average in OECD countries, as shown in Table 
2. When turning to the level of GDP per capita, China performed relatively well 
compared to other low income economies. For example, as of 2003 GDP per capita at 
constant 2000 prices was US$1067 in China, while it was US$432 on average in low 
income economies, as given in Table 1. When using PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), 
Chinese GDP per capita rose to US$4,7261, higher than that in low income 
economies, comparable to that in lower middle income economies, and still lower 
than the world average level.  
 
In terms of education indicators, compared to all other but OECD economies, China 
was also in a more favourable position, as indicated by higher literacy rates. 
Meanwhile, China witnessed improvements in health and demographic indicators as 
well: as of 2003 life expectancy at birth was 70.80 years in China, and 58.08 years in 
low income economies. As regards demographic structure, China was younger than 
OECD countries, highlighted by a lower old-age dependency ratio. The population 
growth rates for both regions, however, were at similar levels in 2003.  
 
Against the background of impressive growth, however, the Chinese economy is still 
associated with a number of key problems which remain to be solved (Yueh 2003; 
Feldstein 2003; OECD 2005a). Among others are a fragile banking sector (Lardy 
1999; Park 2001; Allen et al 2003, 2005; Hu 2005a), widening income inequality 
                                                
1
 Different estimates of GDP per capita arise from different exchange rates used, given the fact that 
price for same or similar goods and services might vary significantly across countries (OECD 2005b). 
The former, i.e. US$1,067, was calculated by using nominal US Dollar to Chinese RMB exchange 
rates, while the large value, i.e. US$4,726, was calculated by using assumed real exchange rates, based 
on PPP. The nominal exchange rate was much larger than the real rate.  
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between regions and sections of the society (Yao et al 2004, MOLSS 20052) and a 
weak pension system (Feldstein 1998; James 2001; Asher and Newman 2002; Jackson 
and Howe 2004). Failure to tackle any of these problems may well have a devastating 
impact on the Chinese economy. In this paper we focus on and investigate the issue of 
the Chinese pension system.  
 
China was a young country in the quite recent past. Table 3 reveals that in 1960 the 
ratio of the population aged 65 and above to the total population was 4.84%, while it 
increased to only 7.30% in 2003. China, however, is about to undergo a dramatic 
demographic transformation in this century. Forecasting statistics (UN 2004) estimate 
that the 65+/total population ratio will be 16% in 2030 and 24% in 2050. Similar to 
other countries (Hu 2005b) the rise in old age dependency ratios in China is mainly 
due to two factors, i.e. an increasing life expectancy and a decreasing fertility rate 
(Munnell 2004). Over the past four decades, the Chinese life expectancy has risen 
from 36 years in 1960 to 71 years in 2003. In addition, on average each woman had 
1.88 babies in 20033, as compared to 3.39 in 1960. The large drop in the fertility rate 
can be largely explained by the “one child per couple” family planning policy which 
commenced in the late 1970s, although lower fertility also usually accompanies 
higher GDP per capita. In passing, as of 2003 China had a population of 1.29bn, 
around one fifth of the world population.  
 
The introductory information above clearly shows that China is ageing. The major 
question, however, is how to respond to the rapidly ageing population in terms of old 
age income provision. The paper seeks to address this issue, and the purpose is 
threefold. First, we seek to provide a comprehensive historical review and updated 
investigation of the Chinese pension system, with an ultimate ambition of finding 
solutions to China’s pension crisis. In particular, by drawing on current literature and 
analysis we conceptualise and present our solutions while also highlighting some 
points which appeared in the past literature but have been dismissed by many current 
Chinese pension experts. Second, we believe that a successful pension reform largely 
depends on the economic and financial environment in which the reform is 
undergoing, and also an improved economic and financial environment can facilitate 
pension reform. To meet this end, we conduct a detailed and comprehensive analysis 
of the interaction between pension reform, financial development, economic growth 
and other necessary institutional factors in China. Third, with particular reference to a 
simulation model, policy alternatives are proposed for the purpose of making the 
Chinese pension system sustainable in the long run. Particularly, we present the 
quantitative impacts on the replacement rates of diversifying pension fund investment 
and reducing administration costs.  
 
                                                
2
 The latest statistics from Ministry of Labour and Social Security of China (MOLSS 2005) estimate 
that as of 2004 the richest 4% of the population in China controlled 45% of the national wealth, and the 
poorest 10% population controls only 0.4% of the national wealth. In addition the average wage 
difference between that in urban and rural areas was at the ratio of 3.3. It notes that if such a trend 
continues, in 10 years time there will be a risk of social unrest. 
3
 Despite the adoption of the one-child policy in the late 1970s, many Chinese, mainly those in rural 
areas have managed to have more than one child. It is partly due to the relaxation of the policy in the 
countryside, and partly due to many Chinese family’s willingness to pay the penalty as long as they can 
have more children. In addition the one-child policy does not apply to the national minorities in China. 
All these explain why as of 2003 on average each woman had more than one baby.  
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The structure of the remaining part of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review 
the Chinese pension system from 1949 when old age provision was first introduced 
till 2005. In Section 3 we identify those problems associated with the current pension 
system. Based on the analyses in both Sections 2 and 3, we propose some solutions to 
the flawed Chinese pension system in Section 4. Section 5 provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the economic and financial environment in which pension reform is 
undergoing, and the benefits of undertaking pension reform as well as an assessment 
of the preconditions. In Section 6, we present a simulation model and its empirical 
results; the purpose is to find alternative reform polices which could shift China 
towards a more sustainable pension system. Section 7 proposes some policy 
recommendations by combining both previous analysis and empirical work in Section 
6. Section 8 concludes the paper by summarising our main findings and policy 
suggestions.  
2 Historical review of the Chinese pension system 
 
Since establishment of the first pension system 50 years ago, the Chinese pension 
system has undergone a continuous process of evolution. In this section we review 
what has happened, and is happening to Chinese pension system, in order to facilitate 
our critical analysis in next two sections.  
2.1 The period 1949-1979 
 
2.1.1 1949 to 1966 
 
After socialist new China’s establishment in 1949, the authorities promulgated 
Regulations on Labour Insurance in 1951. The Regulations, as the first labour social 
security law, served as the framework for the provision of cradle-to-grave benefits to 
urban employees. The urban population covered under this law included SOEs (state 
owned enterprises) and large COEs (collectively owned enterprises) employees4, civil 
servants and those people working in other public institutions, e.g. universities, 
hospitals, etc (Song and Chu 1997). The system was run on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis, and solely funded by enterprises at a rate of 3% of the wages payroll; a 3% 
contribution rate was very low but feasible given the young population. Pension funds 
were administered by local trade unions at the municipal level. In 1954, the All China 
Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU) was set up by the central government, and took 
the responsibility for pension fund administration at the national level. In other words, 
pension funds were pooled across the country and thus pension provisions could be 
optimised across regions with different demographic features by involving intra-
national transfers. Ironically, the first established formal pension system in China was 
quite advanced in terms of pooling risk; the system, however, was abandoned when 
the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966 (see next section).  
 
The Regulation was under continuous amendment throughout this period as shown in 
Table 4. For example, the initial requirement in terms of minimum years of working 
at the current place of work for a basic pension was 10 years, and it was decreased to 
5 years in 1953. Meanwhile, men/women needed 25/20 qualifying years to get a full 
pension in 1951, while in 1958 the requirement was reduced to 20/15 years. The 
                                                
4
 For both SOE and COE the required minimum number of employees under the Regulations was 100.  
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retirement age was constant over the period, i.e. 60 for men and 50 for women. But 
those women in managerial positions were allowed to retire at 55. In addition, those 
workers employed in hazardous industries, e.g. mining, were allowed to retire five 
years earlier than normal, e.g. at the age of 55 for men and 45 for women. As shown 
by low life expectancy in the 1950s, e.g. 45 years in 1958, the relatively high 
retirement ages at 60/55 were not appropriate.   
 
2.1.2 1967 to 1976 (Cultural Revolution) 
 
Given the youthful age structure of Chinese population at that time, the pay-as-you go 
system worked well. But it only lasted 15 years until 1966 when the Cultural 
Revolution started. This unforgettable disaster in Chinese contemporary history 
stopped economic growth, and threw the whole country into ceaseless political battle 
and social chaos. Under these circumstances, trades unions – which once were 
responsible for pension administration and provisions - were abandoned and 
dismantled. In consequence, pension fund surpluses accumulated at both local and 
national levels during the past years were eroded and embezzled for other purposes.  
 
Given the disorder of government at all levels during the so-called Ten Year 
Catastrophe in China, enterprises instead of the state had to take full responsibility for 
employees’ benefits. In this context, all risk, demographic and investment if any, was 
confined within individual enterprises. Therefore, there was no cross-subsidization 
and risk sharing across enterprises and regions, like the pre-1977 pension system. The 
SOEs-based social security system continued even after the Cultural Revolution 
ended in 1976. The system was very generous by international standards and also 
known as the “iron rice bowl” in China. The “iron rice bowl” is a Chinese term 
referring to an occupation with the guaranteed lifetime employment, as well as stable 
income, and other benefits. The generous benefits include pensions, health care, 
children’s education, housing allowances, etc. All expenses were mainly financed 
from enterprise revenues/contributions, and there was not any requirement for 
employees’ contributions.  
 
2.1.2 1977 to 1979 
 
During this period, the SOEs sponsored “iron rice bowl” policy continued to be 
adopted across the country, although the pension accessibility became easier. In 1978, 
pension regulations were subjected to several amendments again, and the new rules 
allowed people who worked continuously for 10 years to be eligible for a pension 
rather than waiting 25/20 years. Meanwhile the replacement rate was raised to 60 
percent for 10-15 years employment and to 75 percent for 20 years employment. In 
addition to the above changes towards an easier eligibility for a pension, many other 
favourable policies were introduced; for example a worker was not only guaranteed a 
lifetime employment, but also one of his/her children was allowed to take the same 
job when that worker retires (see Table 4 for a comparison of policy changes over the 
period 1949-1979). The new regulations of the 1970s towards a higher benefit and 
easier accessibility were clearly designed to encourage early retirement in order to 
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accommodate the influx of millions of migrants from rural to urban areas5 in China at 
that time.   
 
Last, it is worth noting that the old system we reviewed in this section was limited to 
people living in cities and towns only, and mainly relevant to workers in the state 
owned enterprises and collectively owned enterprises. For the rest of the Chinese 
population - principally the rural population, there was not any formal pension 
system. In the 1970s the rural population accounted for around 80% of the whole 
population in China. Regarding people living in rural areas, family support plays a 
pivotal role. In this context it is very likely that three or four generations live in a big 
house, pooling all resources and sharing risks. There is a moral responsibility for 
sharing between generations. Normally, older generations help raise their 
grandchildren and do housework, while the middle generation works outside and 
generates income to support the family members - including both older generations 
and children who are too young to work. Such family support, as a complement to the 
established formal pension system, is also very common in cities.   
2.2 The period: 1981-1989 
 
During the period up to the 1980s, eligibility for a pension was relaxed in China. As 
revealed in Table 4, in 1951 the qualifying period for men was 25 years, while it was 
reduced to 20 years in 1958 and further to 10 years in 1978. Combined with 
population ageing, this meant that both the number of pensioners and pension 
expenditures increased significantly during the 10-year period from 1978 to 1988. For 
example, Table 5 reveals that the number of pensioners increased from 2.14 million in 
1978 to 21.20 in 1988. Pension expenditures rose around 20 times in nominal terms 
over the same period, although growth was slightly smaller if inflation was considered 
(the average inflation rate during this period was 5%). In addition, the dependency 
ratio – the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of workers - increased 
from 3.3% in 1978 to 15.6% in 1988.  
 
Aware of the increasing pressure from old age provisions and the ageing population, 
the Chinese government implemented major reforms. In 1986, the authorities 
published provisional regulations, which required SOEs employees to contribute up to 
3 percent of their wages towards their pension schemes. Along with the employees’ 
contributions, enterprises contributed 15 per cent of payroll. The regulation was 
promising as it recognised the need of individual employees to prepare their 
retirement by making contributions. Therefore it was the first step towards a multi-
pillar pension system involving contributions from both employees and employers. In 
addition, it helped to reduce the pension burden for enterprises, which could be 
viewed as part of the government’s wider efforts to make SOEs more commercially 
oriented.  
 
Meanwhile, the authorities set up a new agency i.e. the Social Insurance Agency. It 
served as the supervisory body of pension system in China, and was mainly 
                                                
5
 Chinese economic reform started in rural areas in the late 1970s, marking the start of dis-
collectionisation, i.e. de facto privatisation or capitalism in nature. One consequence was the creation 
of large labour surplus released from the farming work. A significant portion of those released from the 
rural labour force has moved to cities and towns, seeking job opportunities. We will discuss it in more 
detail in Section 3.1. 
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responsible for the general administration and supervision of pension provisions, as 
well as the drafting and implementation of relevant regulations. During this period, 
pension provisions were still run on the enterprise basis, and pension assets pooled 
and distributed in each individual enterprise. In my view, it was like the defined-
benefit (DB) pension plans which have long implemented in many countries. It was 
employer-sponsored, benefits were pre-determined, and increased commensurate with 
years of service with current employers. If pension payment was larger than 
contribution received, the difference was met by using company profits. If sponsors 
went into bankruptcy, the state stepped in, via the Social Insurance Agency.  
2.3 The period: 1990 - 1999 
 
2.3.1 1991 reform 
 
After several years’ trial in the late 1980s, the Chinese government decided to deepen 
its reform with the aim of establishing a multi-pillar system which is more able to 
cope with the ageing population. It was marked by the passage of No. 33 State 
Council Resolution on Pension Reform for Enterprise Employees (MOLSS 1991), a 
legal formalisation of several provisional regulations mentioned in previous sections. 
The No. 33 Resolution called for contributions from individual workers. Previously 
the pension burden mainly relied on contributions from enterprises, with the pension 
deficits met up by the state. It was stipulated that employees should make 
contributions of not more than 3 per cent of their wages to the first pillar, and such 
contribution was expected to move along with wage growth given that the 
contribution rate is a percentage of the wages. The pillar was managed on a PAYG 
basis since the No. 33 Resolution noted that the amount of pension asset collection in 
a single year should be based on the estimated pension payout of the same year. The 
intended replacement rate was in the range of 60% and 75%, depending on different 
types of employment.  
 
Besides the first pillar above, the Resolution encouraged the establishment of second 
and third pillars. The second pillar was enterprise based and required contributions 
from both employers and employees, and the third pillar served as a complementary 
saving account with contributions from employees only. Both pillars were fully 
funded and all contributions credited to individual accounts. Both pillars two and 
three, however, were not compulsory and the decision whether to participate 
depended on enterprise profitability and employees’ willingness. In reality, however, 
no enterprise set up a pillar two and very few individuals had pillar three during the 
period.  
 
As for the 1991 reform, like many other Chinese reforms, the central government only 
issued directives/guidance on how to reform the pension system. In consequence, it 
left much room to manoeuvre for municipal and provincial governments. On the one 
hand, the practice was appropriate, since it allowed local authorities to adapt the 
reform to specific local conditions. On the other hand, it led to great differences and 
fragmentation during the reform process, an important feature of the Chinese pension 
system (Wang 1995). In addition, a number of powerful industry-related ministries, 
e.g. the Ministry of Railways provided separate pension schemes, which further 
increased the system’s fragmentation and confusion.  
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2.3.2 1995 reform 
 
In 1995 the government released Circular No. 6 State Council Resolution on 
Deepening Pension Reform for Enterprise Employees. The Circular No 6 was viewed 
as the starting point for another round of reform towards the multi-pillar pension 
system, which combined both social pooling and individual accounts. As we 
mentioned earlier, the 1991 reform was problematic in that it only provided guidance 
in respect of reform, and regulation details were not specified. In order to ameliorate 
the problem and unify pension operations, the Circular No. 6 introduced two 
initiatives to municipal authorities, but the implementation of either initiative needed 
permission from provincial governments. Both initiatives were related to the first 
pillar of the pension system.  
 
Initiative one specified that employees should contribute at least 3 per cent of wages 
to their accounts, and the contribution should increase by one per cent every two years 
until it reached 5 per cent. In addition, enterprises were expected to contribute 11 
percent of payroll. Regarding Initiative two, specifications of the contribution sharing 
between individuals and enterprises were not made and left with the local authorities 
to decide. Another distinction between Initiatives one and two was about the relative 
size of the individual account. Based on Initiative one, the individual account 
consisted of all contributions, i.e. 5 per cent employee contribution and 11 per cent 
enterprise contribution. Under the proposed Initiative two, the individual account may 
only consist of part of the combined contributions, and the relative size of the 
individual account depended on the local/enterprise variation. The coexistence of two 
initiatives created many problems and further fragmentation. The original intention of 
allowing municipalities to choose these two or to mix them was justified, but in 
practice it led to the creation of hundreds of incompatible schemes across China 
(World Bank 1997). This was largely due to local government’s attempt to 
differentiate its scheme from others in order to maximise their own benefits.  
 
2.3.3 1997 reform 
 
In 1997 a milestone pension regulation, i.e. State Council Document No. 26 
Establishment of a Unified Basic Pension System for Enterprise Employees, was 
published. The regulation - largely influenced by recommendations from the World 
Bank (Friedman et al 1996 and World Bank 1997) required the establishment of a 
multi-pillar system. Based on the new model, China should establish a unified pension 
system by 2000 on a national basis. The system should cover all employees working 
in cities and towns, regardless of ownership of enterprises or organisations to which 
employees were affiliated. Previously, pension reform mainly covered the SOEs and 
COE workers in addition to those workers in other pubic sectors.  
 
The detailed structure of the 1997 model is given in Table 6. Pillar one comprises two 
components, i.e. 1A and 1B. Pillar 1A is run on a PAYG basis. The contribution is 
17% of wages and wholly from enterprises. The replacement rate is 20%. Pillar 1B, 
managed as individual accounts, is financed 8% contribution via enterprises and 3% 
from individuals. Individual contributions, however, were planned to increase by 1 
per cent every 2 years until they reach 8 per cent. With a target replacement rate at 
38%, the monthly payout from pillar 1B is calculated by dividing the account balance 
by 120. Both components are mandatory, and the collective target replacement rate is 
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58%, i.e. 20% from pillar 1A and 38% from pillar 1B. Reform of pillar one was the 
focus of the Document No. 26 and most of the government’s efforts have been put 
into its implementation. Both components are operational, but pillar 1B is just in 
name, as the individual accounts are always empty (Hussain 2001). Funds 
accumulated in the pillar 1B’s individual accounts are frequently used to pay current 
retirees’ pensions (details will be discussed in next section).   
 
Besides pillar one, the Document No. 26 encourages the establishment of two other 
pillars. Pillar two as shown in Table 6 is similar to occupation pensions in western 
countries, e.g. the UK and the US, but it is voluntary. The pillar is designed to receive 
contributions from both employees and employers. In reality only those enterprises 
which are very profitable are willing to provide occupation plans to employees (Hu 
2005e), since most other firms view such contribution as a tax. Currently the number 
of participating enterprises is quite small in China, partly due to the lack of tax 
exemption benefits (see Clark and Hu 2005a for historical figures related to foregone 
tax revenues for contributions on occupational pensions in the UK and the US). Pillar 
3 serves as the complementary individual saving account. It is designed for those 
people who want to save more money for their post-retirement lives. Partly due to the 
lack of income tax incentives for saving money via pillar three, there is virtually no 
take-up of this option.  
 
The qualifying years for a full basic pension (pillar one) is 15 years. If a person has a 
contribution history of less than 15 years, he/she only is entitled to payment from 
individual accounts - pillar 1B. In other words, he/she can only have a replacement 
rate of up to 38%. In addition, regarding investments, the Document makes it very 
clear that all surpluses in pillar 1A and the balance in pillar 1B should be invested in 
bank deposits and government bonds only. Pension funds should be restrained from 
investing in any other financial instrument, e.g. stocks. Last, it is worth noting that all 
these pension reforms initiated in China, as we discussed above, superseded each 
other, i.e. the old reform is always replaced by the new ones once the authorities 
introduce the latter.  Meanwhile, regarding the three pillars of the Chinese pension 
system as given in Table 6, workers have to participate in them in order from pillar 1. 
In principle, workers were allowed to move from one scheme to another. Due to the 
fragmentation of the Chinese pension system, such movement always results in a 
sizable loss of pension benefits (see Section 3 for details).  
2.4 The period: 2000 onwards 
 
2.4.1 Liaoning reform  
 
One important part of the 1997 reform is the establishment of individual accounts, i.e. 
pillar 1B. The change is in the right direction towards a more appropriate multi-pillar 
model after recognising the un-sustainability of the previous unfunded system. In 
reality, however, pillar 1B is largely notional. The main reason is that, as noted, assets 
accumulated in the pillar are always used to pay current retiree’ pensions. In 
consequence, pillar 1B, which is supposed to be a funded pillar, becomes a PAYG 
account again.  
 
Aware of the issue, the Chinese government in 2001 started experimenting with a 
experimental pension reform in Liaoning province. Liaoning, located in north China 
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and once a heavy industry hub, has recently witnessed a sharp increase in retirees and 
pensioners (OECD 2005a). For example as of 1999 Liaoning housed 678,000 laid-off 
workers from the SOEs (NBS 2001), which accounted for 11% of national laid-off 
workers. Since many of them were approaching their retirement age, they were 
allowed to have a full pension in order to pacify them. In consequence, in 2000 
Liaoning, a province with a 3% of the total population in China, hosted 7% of the 
total pensioners in China.  
 
Given the grave picture of pension operations in Liaoing, the Chinese government 
believed that if Liaoning could be freed from pension difficulties, the experience 
should be very useful for other provinces, and the task should be easier since other 
provinces are likely to have a younger population and a lesser number of pensioners. 
In 2001 with generous support from the central government, not least to the 
significant budget transfer, a pension reform commenced in Liaoning. There are some 
key features relating to the Liaoning reform:  
 
First, pillar 1A is financed by a 20% contribution from enterprises only, and pillar 1B 
by an 8% contribution from employees. The individual account is solely financed by 
pillar 1B and funds accumulated in pillar 1A are for social pooling purpose only.  
 
Second, there is a separation between fund management of pillar 1A and that of pillar 
1B. The main purpose is to avoid the fund transfer from pillar 1B to pillar 1A when 
the latter gets into deficit. In order to facilitate the separation, the central government 
uses budget transfer to meet any demand from the deficits in pillar 1A.  
 
Third, with the purpose of encouraging the development of supplementary pensions, 
i.e. occupation pensions, contributions to pillar 2 are tax deductible, but the limit is 4 
per cent of pre-tax wage bills. As of 2003 1,124 enterprises in Liaoning participated in 
the scheme, 60,000 people were covered, and the amount of accumulated assets was 
around RMB1.4bn  (TPPension 2005).  
 
Fourth, in order to achieve higher returns, pension assets accumulated in 
supplementary pension are encouraged to invest in high-risk-high-return financial 
products, e.g. equities. In this context, investment normally is outsourced to specialist 
fund managers. Pension assets in pillars 1A and 1B, however, should still be invested 
in bank deposits and government bonds.  
 
The Liaoning reform is promising in that it recognises the need of separating PAYG 
and funded accounts, which therefore makes the fund transfer from the former to the 
latter impossible. In addition, other investment opportunities, e.g. equities, are 
allowed to be considered, which can potentially increase investment returns in the 
long run. There are, however, three concerns as follows.  
 
Firstly, a 20% contribution rate to the system’s social pooling component, as we will 
discuss in Sections 3 and 4, is too high, which thus motivates evasion. Secondly, 4% 
tax exemption for employer contributions is quite low, when compared to practices in 
other countries, e.g. no any restriction about the maximum amount of tax relief an 
employer can receive when making pension contributions, based on current UK 
pension policies (HMRC 2005). Thirdly, tax benefits only are relevant to employer 
contributions, which might hinder the would-be rapid growth of pension assets if 
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contributions from both employers and employees are tax exempted, as well as 
people’s willingness to participate (Hu 2005e).  
 
2.4.2 National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
 
In 2000 the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was created in China. At the same 
time, the National Council of the Social Security Fund, as the supervisory and 
management body of the NSSF, was established. In nature, the Chinese NSSF is 
similar to the national pension reserve funds in some western countries, e.g. Norway’s 
Government Petroleum Fund (GPF) and the Irish National Pensions Reserve Fund, 
but different from provident funds established in Singapore and Malaysia. The 
principal objective is to prepare for the ageing population in China and the subsequent 
large pension deficits by setting up a strategic reserve fund.  
 
The NSSF assets mainly come from four sources. There are fiscal transfers from the 
central government budget, equity asset transfers from state share sales in SOEs, 
national lottery income and investment income. As shown in Table 7, the principal 
asset source is the central government transfer. For example, in 2000 there was a 
RMB 20bn transfer, and in 2004 it rose to 114.8bn. For all four years, the central 
government transfer accounted for well above 75% of total assets. The second largest 
source is the transfer of revenues from state share sales in SOEs. Based on the 
experience on Chilean and Polish pension reforms6, in order to build up the NSSF, 
China decided in 2001 to transfer a portion of the State shares7 in SOEs to the NSSF. 
Specifically during the IPOs in both domestic and overseas stock exchanges, 10 per 
cent of the State shares in SOEs should be sold in the markets, and resulting revenues 
transferred to the NSSF (See Section 5.1.2 for details).  
 
Regarding fund management, it is stipulated that NSSF can be invested by in-house 
teams or outsourced to specialist fund managers. Investments by in-house mangers is 
limited to bank deposits, government bonds and other financial instruments with high 
liquidity and security. For those funds invested by outsourced fund managers, a 
number of quantitative investment restrictions apply. The minimum investment limit 
on bank deposits and government bonds is 50%, among which at least 10% should be 
invested in bank deposits. Investments in non-government bonds, i.e. corporate bonds 
and other financial bonds should not exceed 10% of the total assets. In addition, the 
limit on shares and investment securities is the maximum of 40%. It is worth noting 
that all investment should be within Chinese borders, and all other investment options, 
e.g. hedge funds, real estate and overseas assets are either unavailable due to the 
thinness of the Chinese financial markets, nor allowed due to the foreign exchange 
controls.  
 
2.4.3 Occupational (employer sponsored) pensions 
 
Over the past two years, the Chinese pension system has witnessed new developments 
as the pension reform gathers pace. One of those developments is related to the 
growth of the supplementary pillar, i.e. occupational pensions. Table 6 shows that in 
1997 details about the supplementary occupational pensions, i.e. pillar two, were not 
                                                
6
 There were a variety of ways of financing the pension deficits in Chile, one of which was the sale of 
assets through privatisation (Acuna and Iglesias 2001). 
7
 See Appendix A for the classification of the Chinese equity shares.  
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finalised, although there were experiments in many provinces. In 2004, however, the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security of China (MOLSS 2004a) published and 
implemented the Provisional Regulations on Occupational Pensions. Learning from 
experiences of earlier pension reforms, including the Liaoning reform, the Regulation 
details operational coverage, fund resources etc. For example, based on the 
Regulation, enterprise contributions should not exceed 1/12 of the total wages bill, 
and collectively enterprises and individuals should not contribute over 1/6 of the total 
wages bill. All contributions are to be credited to individual accounts and these 
accounts are to be fully funded. In addition, sponsoring enterprises should set up a 
committee overseeing the operation of pension funds and the committees have 
representatives from employees and/or plan participants. In addition, employers are 
allowed to deduct up to 4% of the total wage bill from gross income for pension 
contributions. Regarding employee contributions, there is no relevant taxation 
incentive. We believe, however, that in order to stimulate pension asset growth, it is 
better to allow employees to deduct a pre-determined portion of their incomes before 
tax, like the 401(K) scheme in the US. 
  
Given the importance of pension fund management and regulation (MOLSS 2004b), 
another regulation specifically focused on the occupational pension funds was 
released in 2004. It specifies the minimum requirements for qualified asset managers. 
For example, registered capital should not be less than RMB 10bn, and during the past 
three years there should not be any malpractice or illegal behaviour. Regarding 
investment regulations, quantitative restrictions apply, and are slightly different from 
those imposed on the NSSF as we discussed in the previous section. Specifically the 
upper limit on investment in bank deposits and fixed-income securities is 50% of total 
assets, but the lower limit on government bond investment is 20%. The investment 
limit on shares is 20% of the total assets. Like regulations on the NSSF funds, 
investment in foreign assets and alternative assets, e.g. hedge funds is not allowed. In 
general, China’s occupational pensions adopt the quantitative restriction investment 
approach, rather than prudent person rules (Davis 2002a; Hu 2005c) (see Section 3.3 
for a comparison of investment regulations between China and other countries).  
 
In addition, the provisional regulations note that pension assets should be fully 
funded, and assets accumulated in the account belong to the beneficiaries. The choice 
of DC and DB schemes, however, is left with the individual employers to decide. 
Extensive research has been conducted on the differences between DC and DB plans 
(Baker 2005; Clark and Hu 2005b). In line with the global trend of declining DB 
occupational plans, e.g. the US (Munnell 2006), and the UK (Clark and Hu 2005a), 
employers in China mainly provide DC plans to their members (Tuo and Zhu 2005). 
This popularity of DC plans is largely due to the low risk of DC plans from the point 
of view of employers. In other words, any risk, principally investment risk, is borne 
by the DC plan members, and employers have no further obligations beyond their 
periodic contributions.  
 
As we will discuss in Section 5.1.2, however, the stock market in China is very 
volatile, therefore there is a concern that if a large volume of pension and post-
retirement annuities assets are invested in domestic equities, the plan members might 
end up with taking on excessive risk. Meanwhile, under the DC regime, sponsors have 
low incentives to optimise returns and may seek to be over-cautious (Davis 2004a). 
To solve this issue, one way is to encourage employers to provide DB plans. In this 
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case, most risk is transferred to sponsors, and the members are guaranteed a certain 
level of benefits. Another way is to allow pension assets to be invested abroad, so as 
to diversify investment risk and achieve a more stable return (see Sections 4 and 6 for 
details). Last, note that occupational pension assets in China are not protected by any 
formal or systemic arrangements except the state, in case of sponsors’ bankruptcy. As 
a result, any shortfall might have to be met by the state if the occupational schemes 
cannot deliver sufficient supplementary income to avoid pensioner poverty and 
income inequality (Clark and Hu 2005a). 
3 Problems of the Chinese pension system 
 
In the previous section, we outlined the evolution and development of the Chinese 
retirement system, from 1949 when socialist new China was founded to the latest 
2004 regulations on occupational pensions. With reference to the above description, 
we analyse current problems relating to the Chinese pension system in this section.  
3.1 Poor coverage in rural areas 
 
Pension coverage in China is largely limited to urban employees working in the public 
sector of the economy. In principal, people in rural areas are covered by another 
pension system, called the Provisional rural pension system (MOLSS 1992). The 
system was especially designed for rural areas and quite different from and much less 
generous than that operating in urban areas. Pension participation is voluntary, and the 
practical issues, e.g. how to make contributions to the pension system is left to the 
local government. In practice, only a very small portion of the rural population 
participates in such a pension system.  
 
For example, statistics in Table 8 reveal that during the period 1999-2003, in addition 
to a small declining trend the rural pension coverage rate in China was in the range of 
9-11 per cent8. Specifically in 2003 the number of participants in any formal 
retirement system in rural areas was 54.3 million, which only accounts for 9 per cent 
of the total rural population. In other words, as of 2003 for every 11 people above age 
15 only one person was either lucky enough to receive benefits from the government 
or need not to worry about his/her future retirement life to the extent he/she 
participated the system. As a result, post-retirement lives for the remaining 10 people 
are deemed to be very hard if lacking traditional family support. Other statistics 
present an ever more grim picture. Pang et al (2003) give estimates that only 3% of 
the old in rural areas were covered by any pension system in China, and the average 
pension was only RMB100 ($12) per month.  
 
Current poor pension coverage in rural areas is just one side of the story. The other 
side, which is ever more worrying, is that looking forward, the authorities have not 
really realised and are not seriously taking steps in tackling the pension crisis in the 
countryside. For example, a rough comparison of the number of regulations relating to 
pension provisions in the past reveals that the Chinese government has spent and is 
spending much more efforts and energy on urban reform. During the period 1991-
2004, there were at least five major regulations directly linked to urban pension 
                                                
8
 The pension coverage ratio was calculated by dividing the number of year-end participants by the 
rural population aged above 15.  
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reform and ten supplementary regulations; the latest one was in 2004. In comparison, 
only two regulations - whatever major or supplementary - were focused on rural 
pension reform, and the latest one was issued 10 years ago in 1995. More ironically, 
the latest work commissioned by the Development and Research Centre of the State 
Council9 (Li and Gao 2005) outlines 23 options for Chinese pension reform, but of 
these options, only 2 are aimed to address the rural pension crisis.  
 
As we briefly mentioned in Section 2.1.3, the traditional culture of raising children 
and supporting the old is very strong in China, particularly in the countryside. Indeed 
for those 90 per cent of the rural population who are not covered by any formal 
pension system, the majority, if not all of them, must depend on informal family 
support to survive. The main reason why the Chinese authorities have given the 
priority to the urban pension reform is related to the means of production, although 
this argument is becoming less strong following China’s mass industrialization 
(Leisering et al 2002). To clarify, in China, it is widely recognized that the last resort 
of living or the means of production for the peasants is the land for which they have 
the right of usage, although the land is state owned. For those people living in urban 
areas, simply speaking, they have to sell their labour to entrepreneurs in order to earn 
incomes; with such income they can buy food sold by the peasants. During this 
process, the urban workers are disadvantaged to the extent that it is likely that they 
end up with no resources to support themselves when they retire, if we abstract from 
family support. Under this reasoning, it is preferable for the government to consider 
the old-age provision for those citizens living in urban areas first. In addition, the 
Chinese authorities argue that if the Chinese industrialisation process continues its 
rapid pace in this century, it is very likely that the majority of the population will live 
in urban areas some point in the future (World Bank 1997). In that context, if current 
urban pension reform works well, most of the Chinese population will be eventually 
covered by the formal pension system.  
 
Given the lack of any formal pension system in rural areas, the informal arrangement 
of family support plays a crucial role. The informal system worked well in the past 
when peasants were bound to the land, and the job mobility between regions, i.e. from 
rural to urban areas was very limited. The arrangement is facing increasing pressures 
now. The main reason is that the extended family is breaking down, as more and more 
young people move to cities and/or towns, looking for job opportunities. Statistics 
(NSB 2005) give estimates that as of 2004 the number of peasant migrants in China 
was around 150 million, among which, half moved between provinces. Meanwhile, 
80% of rural households had family member(s) working in the non-farming 
occupation.  
 
Despite the significant presence of migrant workers in urban areas10 and their large 
contributions to recent high economic growth in China11, however, they benefit little 
                                                
9
 The Development and Research Centre of the State Council, as the most influential think tank of 
Chinese top policy makers, plays a central role in initiating any economic reform in China.  
10
 An earlier report (CRER 1996) shows that as of the mid-1990s rural migrants accounted for 18% of 
the total rural labour or 34% of the total urban labour force.  
11
 It was estimated that a quarter of world’s clothing production is produced from the Pearl River Delta, 
southeast China. Thousands of joint ventures and foreign firms settle down in that region and most 
workers are very young rural-urban migrants, i.e. the average age was 25.4 for females and 28.3 for 
males (Fan 2004). Those young and unskilled workers are always engaged in labour intensive work but 
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if any from the urban pension system. This is mainly due to “isolated economies” 
between rural and urban areas12 (Meng and Zhang 2001). Thus, rural migrants are still 
closely attached to the place where they are from, i.e. countryside, although they are 
free to work and live in cities. As we mentioned earlier, however, there is not an 
adequate rural pension system in China. So, there will be problem of poverty in old 
age if migrant workers cannot earn enough money to support their post-retirement 
lives, when returning from cities to home countryside. As regards those migrant 
workers who participate in the urban pension system - thanks to the government’s 
efforts to extend pension coverage, most of them find the system inconvenient, in that 
it is not easy to transfer accumulated pension assets between jobs without suffering a 
significant loss. Therefore, they choose either to evade participation in the first place, 
or drop out the system when changing jobs or returning back to countryside (see the 
next section for details about latest developments of rural workers’ pensions in urban 
areas). 
3.2 Insufficient pension provision in urban areas 
 
We have noted a couple of times throughout the paper that the Chinese pension 
system vastly favours urban workers. For example, many more state resources have 
been used in urban areas with an attempt to reform the fragile system, which is to 
some extent reflected by the various regulations released over the course of the last 10 
years (See Section 2.3 for details). There are a number of reasons why urban areas 
have been given more emphasis during the process of China’s pension reform. The 
first is related to the means of production, as discussed in Section 3.1. Another reason 
is the pressure arising from the large volume of laid-off workers following the SOEs 
reform in the late 1990s13, as discussed in Section 2.4.1. It is worth noting that, 
informal family support, serving as an important backup for old people, is widely 
recognised in urban areas as in rural areas. In this section, we discuss some key 
shortcomings associated with the Chinese urban pension system.  
 
3.2.1 Low overall coverage rate 
 
Firstly, overall coverage is quite low. As revealed in Table 9, the urban coverage ratio 
was 26% in 1989 and increased to 40% in 2003. The low ratio is not satisfactory since 
it means for every 10 working people in China’s urban areas, only 4 are covered by 
any formal pension system. For the remaining people who are not covered, the only 
                                                                                                                                       
paid poorly in terms of both salary and pension provision. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of those 
export-oriented factories in China contributed to high economic growth in the past decades.  
12
 China had separated rural and urban economies for decades until 1980s when the reform and “open 
up” policy was deepened. Until then, labour and resources flows between these two regions were very 
rare. The separation policy was made possible due to the implementation of strict household 
registration system (HRS) (Meng and Zhang 2001). The system requires individuals to register with 
local police stations. In addition to the HRS, China established food rationing system (FRS) which 
allowed people to buy food in regions where the registration was held with the allocated food coupons. 
If a person moved from one area to another he/she would find life in the new place very difficult, as 
without allocated food coupons, buying food was not possible except in the black-market. Now, the 
FRS no longer exists any more, while the HRS is not viewed as a hurdle in terms of restricting labour 
movements across regions. These changes, to a large extent, are conductive to current “migrant tide”, 
i.e. influx of rural workers to cities.  
13
 There have been recent reports of social unrest in China, directly linked to the issue of unpaid 
pensions (Asian Labour 2004; Asher and Newman 2002).  
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backstop against a destitute old age is the family (Jackson and Howe 2004). In 
addition, when compared to other emerging market economies, the coverage rate in 
China was very low. Table 10 shows that the average national coverage rate within 
eleven other countries was 46% as of 2002, while in China it was just 30%14. Among 
these countries, four countries, i.e. Bolivia, Peru, Philippines and Thailand had 
slightly lower rates than China.  
 
There are a number of impediments to achieving full coverage. One of them is the 
high contribution rate15. Table 11 gives contribution rates for public unfunded 
pensions (social security pensions) across 26 countries, including both OECD 
countries and emerging market economies (EMEs); such contributions are collected to 
cover old age, disability and survivors pensions (OLDS) for the purpose of social 
pooling or redistribution rather than towards individual accounts of any kind. All data 
are from the US SSA (Social Security Administration 2004). As revealed in Table 11, 
for some countries, e.g. Australia and South Africa, all costs related to OLDS benefits 
are borne by the state16, and there is no contribution requirement for employers and 
employees. Of the 26 selected countries, Singapore and China registered the highest 
contribution rates at the order of over 30%. 0 to 20% of the Singaporean 
contributions, however, are used to finance the purpose of home and education (SSA 
2004). Therefore, if this effect is considered, the actual contribution rate for Singapore 
is lower than that for China.  
 
The average contribution rate across all countries was 16%, equal to about half of 
China’s rate. The Chinese picture will be much more serious if we consider all other 
contributions employees and employers have to make in China. Table 12 shows that 
the overall contribution to social welfare programmes in China could be as high as 
58% of wages, among which 39% is from employers and 19% from employees. 
Lower overall rates were reported in Jackson and Howe (2004) and OECD (2005a), 
which is mainly due to the exclusion of housing provident funds in their analysis. This 
58% is very high by international standards (Chen 2004; World Bank 1997), thus 
leading to evasion. In fact, such a heavy burden on the previous SOEs-based system 
serves as an important contributing factor behind the several pension reforms initiated 
in the l990s (see Section 2 for details).  
 
The government appears to have deliberate intention of requiring employers to 
contribute to pensions at a rate which is unnecessarily high. According to the World 
Bank simulation results for China’s pension reform (1997), in order to achieve a 59% 
replacement rate employers should contribute 9% of payroll (pillar 1A, see Table 5) 
and employees 8% (pillar 1B, see Table 6); the estimated replacement rates are 24% 
and 35% respectively. As of 2004, however, the actual average contribution rate from 
                                                
14
 Separate coverage rates between urban and rural regions are not available, so we use national 
coverage rates to compare China and other countries. 30% for China was aggregated national coverage 
rate, which was calculated by weighting coverage rates by regions, i.e. urban and rural areas (also 
Section 4.2). 
15
 In the current Chinese labour market, high contribution rates means high labour costs, which is a 
burden from the employer’s perspective. It is largely owning to the downward rigidity of wages (Fehr 
and Goette 2005), i.e. it is much harder to lower wages than increase them. Therefore, in response to 
higher contributions, employers can only transfer such costs to consumers by charging a higher price, 
rather than to employees by lowering wages.  
16
 It is worth to note in some countries, e.g. Australia and Malaysia, there are compulsory funded 
private pension schemes.  
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enterprises was 20%, and that from employees 8%; the target replacement rate still 
approximated 59%. Therefore, enterprises in China are contributing at a rate 11 
percentage points higher than that recommended by the World Bank (1997). The main 
reason of requiring enterprises to contribute more is the government’s intention of 
siphoning the fund surplus from pillar 1A to cover the deficits inherited from the 
previous PAYG system or transition costs (Wang 2001, Holzmann et al 2004). During 
the process of policy implementation, however, it has encountered strong resistance, 
and subsequent low coverage, largely due to the presence of de facto extra corporate 
tax.  
One issue closely linked to low pension coverage in urban areas is the unfair pension 
arrangement for migrant workers. As we mentioned in the previous section, there are 
around 150 million rural workers working in cities and towns across the country. For 
historical reasons, i.e. the traditional separation between rural and urban economies, it 
was not possible for this group of workers to participate in the urban pension system. 
Having realised the problem and also intending to take advantage of the young age 
structure of those migrant workers17, the Chinese government in recent years has tried 
to extend to rural-urban workers the urban system which was previously a privilege to 
urban employees in SOEs and COEs. Such efforts, however, have not been 
successful. Statistics (CALSS 2005) show that as of 2004 only 15% of migrant 
workers participated in the urban pension system.  
 
Besides the two points we mentioned above, e.g. high overall contribution rate and the 
government’s intention to overcharge employers in terms of pension contribution, two 
other factors specific to migrant workers contribute to the low participation rate of 
rural-urban workers. First, the qualifying years required for a full basic pension is 15 
years, and in some prefectures and municipalities, another eligibility criterion requires 
that the worker should stay in the locality at least five years before retirement. Such 
restrictions in fact exclude most rural workers from the urban system, in that those 
rural migrants change jobs very frequently. Based on a 1995 labour survey, it was 
reported that the average time staying in one job was 3 years for a typical rural 
migrant, and it was 15 years for a normal urban worker (Meng and Zhang 2001).  
 
In addition, the main reason why rural workers move to urban areas is saving, and 
most of them have a long-term plan to go back to their villages, typically when they 
earn enough money to build a house at home and/or are able to support their 
dependants (old parents and young children), so they wish to avoid pension saving to 
some extent. A second reason why rural migrants show less interest in the urban 
pension system is that when changing jobs, job changers or migrant workers are likely 
to lose much of their contributed funds. According to current regulations, migrant 
workers are allowed to take the amount accumulated in their individual accounts with 
them. The amount, however, is often very small, and typically 5% of payroll; the rest, 
i.e. 15% is always kept and used by local governments to pay those deficits related to 
the PAYG part of the system. Hence, the incentives for evasion are high. Meanwhile, 
the decentralised administrative environment in China brings a very fragmented 
pension system (World Bank 1997, Sin 2005) (See Section 3.4). Given that migrant 
workers move frequently between regions or provinces, they find that it is very 
difficult for them to really obtain future benefits from such a system.  
                                                
17
 It was estimated that the average age of migrant workers was 25.4 for female and 28.3 for male (Fan 
2004).  
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Before moving to the next section, it is worth noting that even when migrants work in 
cities and towns, most of them still share the responsibility for supporting their old 
parents in countryside. The most common way is to remit money back to their elderly 
parents regularly, typically on a quarterly basis. Given the low living costs in most of 
the countryside, even a small portion of wages earned in cities could meet the basic 
demand from migrants’ parents.  
 
3.2.2 A system favouring the state sector 
 
In addition to the low overall coverage rate among urban and rural migrant workers, 
another point relevant here is that the current pension system largely favours the state 
sector of the economy, particularly employees in SOEs and COEs. Table 13 gives the 
numbers of retirees by enterprise ownership in China. In 1997 there were 33 million 
retirees, and the number rose to 45 million in 2003. In percentage, it is revealed in 
Table 14 that SOEs accounted for more than half of national retirees; it was 57% in 
1997 and 53% in 2003. The second and third largest institutions where retirees came 
from were COEs and public institutions. Collectively both SOEs and COEs had 67% 
of all retirees in 2003. HK (Hong Kong), Macau (MA) and Taiwan firms had the 
smallest number of retirees in China. In 2003 the HK, MA and TW firms housed 
166,000 retirees, which accounted for just 3% of the national retirees. The picture was 
the same for foreign firms, where there were only 175,000 retirees in 2003. Our 
statistics are consistent with the findings in Fan (2004) where it was found that the 
average age of migrant workers was 25 for female and 28 for male. Given a 
significant proportion of migrant workers in China were employed by the HK, MA 
and TW firms and foreign firms, it is not surprising to see the small number of retirees 
in those firms.  
 
Besides the number of retirees in China, we collected data on pension payment by 
enterprise ownership. Table 15 shows that in 1997 total pension payments were RMB 
161bn (US$ 20bn), while it increased to RMB 390bn (US$ 48bn) in 2003. In terms of 
payment allocation between different institutions, Table 16 indicates that most were 
consumed by retirees from the state sector of the economy, and the percentage was 
55.8% in 1997 and 47.2% in 2003. COEs and public institutions were the second and 
third groups in this case. If SOEs, COEs and the public institutions were combined 
together, they accounted for over 90% of the total pension payment in China. 
Enterprises with other ownership, e.g. private small ownership, only accounted for 
less than 10% of the total amount.  
 
In addition, as regards Chinese pension provision, there is a special group of people, 
who do not need to make pension contributions but have a relatively high replacement 
rate. They are the civil servants, who work for the government at all levels. As we will 
discuss in Section 3.4, pensions for these people are unfunded, and the payments are 
from the government’ budgets. Table 14 shows that around 6-7% of national retirees 
fall in this category.  
3.3 Poor pension fund investment and returns 
 
Above, we talked about the pension coverage problem associated with the rural and 
urban systems respectively. In this section, we analyse another important issue, i.e. 
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pension fund investment, making reference to relevant historical data. In China, 
pension fund assets are accumulated through five different channels, which 
corresponds to the structure of the Chinese pension system. The first three channels 
correspond to the three pillars of the urban pension system, i.e. pillars 1A, 1B and 
pillar 2 as shown in Table 6. The remaining two are the rural pension system and the 
reserve pension system, i.e. the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). We talk about 
them in three separate sections as follows.  
 
3.3.1 Investment of urban pension funds 
 
As we discussed in Section 2.3.3, the Chinese pension system is characterised by the 
multi-pillar arrangement. For pillar 1A as shown in Table 6, there is very little, if any, 
pension asset accumulation. It is because this pillar is administered on a PAYG basis, 
and by definition all assets accumulated are used for current pension payment. If there 
is any surplus18, pension assets are allowed only to invest in bank deposits and 
government bonds so as to meet the high liquidity requirement. Returns on bank 
deposits and government bonds in China, however, are not satisfactory. Table 17 
shows that the average nominal return on bank deposits during the period 1993-2004 
was 5.2%, while the return was 6.8% for government bonds and 10.3% for equities. 
When it was calculated in real terms by taking off inflation rates, the average return 
on bank deposits became negative at the level of –0.6, and the real return on 
government bonds was 1%, much lower than the returns on equities (4.5%). When 
using the observation period 1997-2004 (low inflation period), the real returns on both 
bonds and equities were 3.2%, but the latter was much more risky. The low returns on 
equities could be explained by the bear market in 2001-2004. Among these three 
assets, band deposits were safe (1.9% standard deviation), but returned little (2.1% 
real return). 
 
As noted in Table 6, the next pillar along the line is pillar 1B. Given the funded nature 
of this pillar, how to invest accumulated assets properly and hence earn high returns is 
an important issue. Table 18 gives the volume of asset accumulation by five different 
social insurance systems, i.e. pensions, unemployment insurance, medical insurance, 
work injury insurance and maternity insurance. Some are contributed by employers 
only, e.g. work injury insurance, while others are contributed by both employers and 
employees (see Table 12 for details). Aggregated pension fund assets within both 
pillars 1A and 1B are given in the third column of Table 18, and separate statistics for 
the pillars 1A and 1B are not available.  
 
Despite the large amount of pension assets accumulated, investment regulations 
regarding pillar 1B account are far from satisfactory. Based on current regulations 
(Sin 2005; Li and Gao 2005), the majority of these accumulated assets should be 
invested in bank deposits and government bonds. For such pension schemes19 which 
consistently have surplus funds, actual investment allocations are not available. The 
                                                
18
 It is most likely to happen in such areas where the population is young, i.e. areas where the there are 
relatively more contributors and less pensioners. In China some coastal municipalities and/or 
prefectures, e.g. Guangdong often have pension surplus in the pillar 1A account.  These areas are also 
featured by high economic growth and influx of millions of young migrant workers.  
19
 As we mentioned before, Chinese pension funds regarding pillars 1A and 1B are pooled and 
administered at the levels of municipalities or prefectures. Therefore, there are thousands of pension 
schemes operating in China, due to such high fragmentation.  
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investment practice, however, could be to a large extent reflected by the investment 
strategy of National Social Security Fund (NSSF) in 2001/2. Table 19 shows that in 
2001, 98.4% of the NSSF were invested in bank deposits, government bonds and 
other similar low risk assets. The asset allocation of pension assets accumulated in 
pillar 1B should not differ significantly from that of the NSSF in 2001, since the 
NSSF was established in 2001 and investment procedures should be very similar 
between these two institutions. It was indeed the case in that many investment staff at 
the SSF – the administrator of the NSSF, were from the MOF (Ministry of Finance) 
and/or the MOLSS (Ministry of Labour and Social Security).  
 
In addition, pillar 1B is designed to be fully funded. In practice, however, as we 
noted, accumulated assets are always diverted to meet cash shortfalls in the PAYG 
component of the pension system as we discussed earlier. Therefore the pillar 1B 
account is actually managed on a notional basis, i.e. the account is funded in name but 
empty in reality. Aware of this issue, in most cases, local authorities credit the 
individual accounts annually with a return equal to that on government bonds. 
Unfortunately, however, real returns on government bonds in China were traditionally 
low. As shown in Table 17, the average real return on government bonds was only 
1%.  
 
Moving further along the pension system in China, the next pillar is pillar 2, i.e. the 
voluntary occupational pension scheme (See Section 2.4.3). The establishment of 
pillar 2 - as a supplementary component to the pillars 1A and 1B – took place in the 
1997 Pension Reform as revealed in Section 2.3.3. Public attention, however, had not 
been focused on the importance of the pillar until very recently, e.g. 2004. It was 
estimated (CALSS 2005) that the occupational pension industry was very small at the 
moment; the total amount of assets as of 2004 was around RMB30bn-40bn 
(US$3.7bn-4.9bn). The growth, however, is forecast to be very fast. It has been 
anticipated that the assets will reach RMB100bn (US$12.3bn) in a few years. 
Regarding the investment issue of occupational pensions, the asset allocation and 
returns data are very limited given its short history. Nevertheless, the first investment 
regulation on occupational pensions (MOLSS 2004b) mandates that the upper limit on 
bank deposits and fixed-income securities investment is 50% of the total assets, while 
the lower limit on government bond investment is 20% (See Section 2.4.3).  
 
3.3.2 Investment of rural pension funds 
 
In addition to urban pension funds, another channel by which a large volume of 
pension funds are accumulated is through the rural pension system. Table 20 gives 
historical statistics related to aggregated rural pension funds. Over the past few years 
from 1999 to 2003 the total amount of pension fund assets accumulated in rural areas 
registered a steady upwards trend. For example the amount was RMB18.4bn 
(US$2.3bn) in 1999, RMB21.6bn (US$10.3bn) in 2001, and RMB26.0bn (US$3.2bn) 
in 2003. Bank deposits was the most important investment instrument in this case, as 
they accounted for around half of total assets over the period, i.e. 49.9% in 1999 and 
42.5% in 2003. The investment in government bonds was also considerable. In 1999 
RMB3.5bn was directed to government bonds, which was equal to 17.8% of the total 
assets. The combined investment in bank deposits and government bonds was in the 
range of 50-70%. The heavy investment in them was consistent with investment 
regulations on rural pension funds. According to the Provisional regulations on rural 
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pension insurance (1995), fund investment of rural pension funds should mainly focus 
on government bonds and bank deposits, and local authorities are not allowed to 
conduct in-house pension investment.  
 
Besides bank deposits and government bonds, another main means of investment was 
“management by government”. It refers to the case where funds are not invested on a 
commercial basis, but borrowed by local finance bureaus to meet any short term 
finance deficit. In this case, local authorities view such funds as the same as tax 
revenues under their discretion. The only difference is that borrowed pension funds 
will be repaid with a pre-determined return in the future. Based on the nature of their 
borrowing, the rate of return is determined by local governments and may show 
heterogeneity between regions. It is worth noting that this practice in principle is not 
permitted in the Provisional regulations on the rural pension insurance (1995). In 
reality, however, due to the highly fragmented and decentralised pension management 
and administration in China, such malpractice is quite common. Statistics in the lower 
panel of Table 20 show that the proportion of total pension fund assets under the 
management by government in rural areas was in the range between 15% in 2000 and 
25% in 2003. Besides bank deposits, government bonds and the management by 
government, the rest of rural pension funds were invested in other assets, but the exact 
breakdown of these investment is not available.  
 
Despite the heavy asset allocation to bank deposits and government bonds, returns of 
rural pension funds were relatively high. Table 21 shows that the average nominal 
return between 1999 and 2003 was 3.31%, and real return 3.37%. Particularly in 1999 
the real return was 6.23%. It might be partly due to the negative inflation rate, i.e. 
minus 1.41%. In addition, as we mentioned earlier, up to a quarter of the rural pension 
funds in China was managed and/or borrowed by local governments, and a pre-
determined return was credited to the borrowings. As a result, it was very likely that 
local officials in rural areas purposely promised a high return in order to make them 
look good20. This is possible in China given the high level of discretion enjoyed by 
the local officials in their regions.  
 
3.3.3 Investment of National Social Security Fund  (NSSF) 
 
As noted at the outset of Section 3.3, there are five channels through which large 
amounts of pension funds are accumulated in China. The last one is concerned with 
the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The NSSF, established in 2001 and similar 
to Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund (GPF), serves as the future reserve fund in 
China. Such fund assets were RMB80.5bn (US$9.9bn) in 2001, and increased to 
RMB170.8bn (US$21.1bn) in 2004. According to investment mandates of NSSF (SSF 
2001), asset security and liquidity is the top priority; therefore the asset allocation is 
quite conservative. In the first year of the NSSF’s establishment, all but 1.6% of total 
assets were invested in low risk assets, i.e. bank deposits and government bonds.  
 
Over the past four years, investment in deposits has dropped gradually, and that in 
government bonds and other bonds has picked up steadily. Nevertheless, the majority 
of the NSSF is invested in very low and low risk assets. It is consistent with relevant 
                                                
20
 In China an official’s performance evaluation from senior officials is closely linked to a range of 
economic indicators. Therefore, if one wants to be promoted, he/she might have the intention to make 
up or create important economic figures.  
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regulations (see Section 2.4.2). For example, the investment limit on bank deposits 
and government bonds is minimum 50% of total assets, and at least 10% should be 
directed to deposits and other very low-risk assets. In order to benefit from investment 
diversification and professional management, starting from 2003, around 10% of the 
NSSF assets have been outsourced to specialist fund managers (NSSF 2003). They are 
allowed to invest up to 40% of the total assets in stocks. Partly due to government 
efforts to achieve such diversification, in 2004 10.8% of the total NSSF assets were 
invested in high-risk assets, e.g. stocks and equity funds.  
 
Regarding asset returns, the results were not satisfactory. Table 22 shows that the 
average real return between 2002 and 2004 was 1.65% and the return in 2004 was -
0.80%. Such low returns were in line with the asset allocation as shown in Table 18; 
over 82% of the NSSF assets were invested in bank deposits and bonds. Therefore, 
given return statistics in Table 16 – the average returns of bank deposits (-0.6%) and 
government bonds (1.0%) -, it is not surprising to see poor returns attained by the 
NSSF over the past three years. One main purpose for the outsourcing noted above is 
to realise the better return earned from investing in stocks through professional fund 
managers (see Section 5.1.3 for details).  
 
A relevant comparison here is the Central Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore. The 
superficial fact is that the assets accumulated in the CPF are only allowed to be 
invested in non-tradable government bonds and liquid bank deposits. In fact, they are 
converted to investment in risky assets, e.g. foreign assets, through the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) (Davis 2002b). Therefore, there is political risk that the Singaporean 
government deliberately claims and pays a low return on pension members’ accounts, 
but in fact obtains a higher return on their actual investment, e.g. profitable foreign 
investment (Asher 1999; Asher and Newman 2003), although we do not rule out the 
practice where fund managers’ good performance is still recognised and rewarded. In 
my opinion, such a risk is less likely to materialise in the current Chinese context, 
since most Chinese officials have a natural and strong intention to demonstrate their 
competence and capability by achieving high performance, as noted in Section 3.3.2. 
In consequence, it is not surprising to see an official make up a good performance, but 
should be very surprising to see any Chinese official intentionally deny their 
accomplishment.  
 
By collecting Chinese pension fund data together, Table 23 shows volumes of pension 
assets by type as of 2003. Pension assets accumulated in Pillars 1A and 1B accounted 
for half of total assets, i.e. RMB220.7bn. The second largest component was those 
assets within the NSSF (National Social Security Fund), accounting for 30% of total 
assets. The remaining two were related to occupational and rural pensions funds, 
respectively. By weighting returns by capitalisation of assets, we calculated the 
estimated real return for Chinese pension funds in 2003, which was 1.6/1.7%, 
depending on estimates of returns on occupational pension funds. In comparison, the 
real returns for pension funds in other countries were much higher, as revealed in 
Table 24. For example, for Australian pension funds, the return in 2003 was 26%, 
which was mainly due to high performance achieved by equity investment (Hu 
2005c). Other advanced countries, i.e. Canada and the UK, also witnessed high 
returns on their pension funds. Comparatively, pension funds in emerging markets 
performed much worse, e.g. 8.8% in Philippine, 3.9% in Mexico, and 3.6% in 
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Malaysia. One reason is that pension funds in those countries could not take 
advantage of the pick-up of international equity markets in 2003, owning to foreign 
investment restrictions (Davis 2002b; Hu 2005c). The worse return obtained by 
China’s pension funds in 2003, was related to narrow investment opportunities, as 
well as significant reliance on bank deposits and government bonds (see Sections 4 
and 6 for benefits of investment diversification).  
 
3.3.4 Investment practice in other countries 
 
Above we discussed the issue of pension fund investment and regulations related to 
the urban pension funds, the rural pension funds and the NSSF. In consequence, one 
might be interested in the investment practice in other countries. Table 25 gives the 
statistics summarising the investment regulations across both major OECD countries 
and emerging market economies (EMEs). Not surprisingly, regulations vary across 
countries, but the general trend is that there are few concrete restrictions on the 
pension fund investment in most OECD countries, and many more restrictions in 
EMEs (emerging market economies). Among the seven classified assets in Table 25, 
foreign assets are the most restricted asset. For example, in all countries with available 
data, except Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, UK and USA, there are some forms of 
restrictions on foreign asset investment. The magnitude varies from forbidding foreign 
investment completely in Mexico to the maximum 30% of the total assets in Canada. 
One major rationale behind the foreign investment restriction is that the accumulated 
pension fund assets are an engine for the economic growth (World Bank 1994; Davis 
2004b; Davis and Hu 2005), for example through the channel of compulsory and 
voluntary savings (Hu 2005c; Davis and Hu 2006).  
 
In comparison, the investment restrictions on other assets are more lenient. In general, 
low risk assets, e.g. bonds and bank deposits, are subject to less constraints, while 
high risk assets are subject to more constraints, except those countries adopting the 
PPR (prudent person rules) (Davis 2002b). For example, for equities, in the UK and 
the US, there are no quantitative restrictions, while in Denmark, the upper limit is 
70% of the total assets. As regards bank deposits, in most countries there is not any 
limit, except in a few countries, e.g. Czech Republic and Turkey (10% limit).  
3.4 Large variation in pension provision across the country 
 
The Chinese pension system is characterised by vast variation and fragmentation 
between regions and sectors. First, pension administration at the national level is 
fragmented (Li and Gao 2005). In China, a number of different governmental 
ministries are in charge of pension administration. The principal government agency 
involved in retirement policy formation and pension supervision is the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security (MOLSS). Pension issues related to the majority of the 
national labour force are under its jurisdiction. Besides the MOLSS, the Ministry of 
Personnel (MOP) is in charge of pension regulations and provisions for civil servants 
and any other individuals working for government organisations and public 
institutions. Pensions for this group of people are unfunded and payments are entirely 
from the budget. In addition, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) is responsible for 
pension provisions for those old people who are neither covered by any formal 
pension coverage, nor have informal family support.  
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Second, China’s pension pooling shows heterogeneity across the country. One main 
benefit of pension pooling is to spread risk among the population. In principle, in 
order to achieve a full realisation of risk sharing, the size of the basic pooling unit 
should be as large as possible. Indeed in many countries the whole national population 
serves as the pooling base. In China, however, the pooling unit is quite small, at best 
at the provincial level. It is typical and still common now that pension pooling is 
arranged within a county or city. With the purpose of increasing risk sharing within 
the population, the 1997 reform required that all pooling at the county or lower levels 
should be gradually elevated to the provincial level. As of 2002, however, provincial 
pooling was achieved only in four provincial municipalities, i.e. Beijing, Chongqing, 
Shanghai, Tianjing and one province, i.e. Hainan (Chen 2004). All the remaining 26 
provinces are still operating the pension pooling at the county or city level. The latest 
census statistics in 2000 (NBS 2003) show that the combined population of these four 
provincial municipalities and one province accounted for just 6.2% of the national 
population. Therefore, current provincial pooling in five prefectures, although a small 
success, is far from satisfactory.  
 
Third, the detailed design of pension provisions varies between regions (Wang 1995). 
The variation is partly due to the central government’s willingness to allow for 
regional differences, which in turn is expected to be able to increase participation 
incentives. In China, there is no national legislation, e.g. social security law, which 
provides a consistent and coherent legal framework of pension provisions on a 
national basis. In contrast, the central government, through its relevant ministries - 
principally the MOLSS – issues directives or operational guidelines, and makes 
changes in policy from time to time. Pension reforms in the 1990s, as discussed in 
Section 2.3, share this feature.  
 
The nature of the directives is such that only rough guidance is provided. In this 
context, policy implementation is left to lower levels of the government, and local 
governments are allowed to adapt the general guidance to their specific local 
conditions. The underlying logic is justifiable in that it meets local demands for 
flexibility. In practice, however, it creates a large variation. For example, as of 
October 2001 employers in different regions contributed to the basic pension at 
different rates (Hewitt 2002), i.e. 19% of payroll in Beijing, 22.5% in Shanghai and 
13% in Shenzhen21. The main reason why different contribution rates apply between 
regions is the difference in dependency ratios. During the industrialisation process in 
China, a large number of migrant workers move frequently between provinces, 
looking for jobs. In consequence, it leads to a sizable difference in demographic 
structures across regions.  
4 Solutions to the Chinese pension crisis 
 
Above, we discussed the main shortcomings relating to the Chinese pension system. 
Combining the above discussion and the facts presented in Section 2, the message is 
                                                
21
 Shenzhen, on the border of Hong Kong, is a very young city. 90% of the population are young 
migrants from other parts of China. Therefore the local government can adopt a lower contribution rate. 
By doing this, the benefit from the employer’s point of view is low production cost, besides many other 
preferential pro-investment policies and regulations, e.g. low business taxes. Hence, more investment is 
attracted  to this city.  
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very clear, i.e. China is very poorly prepared to cope with its rapidly ageing 
population. Any further delay in solving the Chinese pension crisis will jeopardize its 
ambition to become one of the richest countries around the middle of this century, by 
hindering the achievements of many positive economic and financial benefits, e.g. a 
larger and more efficient equity market and less distorted labour market (see Section 5 
for details). It can also cause a major negative impact on the budget, leading to high 
interest rates and a large tax burden, as well as political unrest. Therefore, how to 
tackle this difficult task turns into an imperative issue. In this section, based on 
previous analyses and discussions, we seek to highlight a number of solutions. It is 
worth noting at the outset, that in this part we seek to conceptualise and present those 
solutions in a systemic manner; in addition, we elaborate and also re-emphasize the 
importance of points which appeared in the past literature (McCarthy and Zhang 
1996) but have been dismissed by many present Chinese pension experts.  
4.1 Unification 
 
A highly fragmented pension system is economically inefficient since it leads to 
undesirable results, e.g. unnecessary administration expenses and labour immobility. 
As a result, a unified system is needed in China. We discuss the unification issue by 
two dimensions; one horizontal between different geographical regions, the other 
vertical between central and local governments.  
 
4.1.1 Horizontal unification 
 
The first and major horizontal separation in China is that between rural and urban 
areas. As we mentioned earlier, the pension system in rural areas is quite different 
from that in urban areas. Inter alia, the system in the former is voluntary and receives 
very little financial support from governments at all levels. In addition, the 150 
million migrant rural workers who work in urban areas, in many cases, are covered by 
a system different from and also less generous than the urban pension systems; in 
other cases, they do not take part in the urban pension system at all. One way to get 
around the issue is to unify pension regulations between rural and urban areas. The 
underlying justification is that any pension system should not discriminate against any 
particular group of the population for such reasons as origin, background etc. If the 
subsequent unification leads to a simpler system and also treats different sections of 
the population in a fair manner, it might reduce administration costs and increase 
participation incentives (See following sections).  
 
The second horizontal reform needed is related to the pension system between 
regions, i.e. provinces. In China, based on the current pension model, local authorities, 
particularly at the provincial level, are very powerful, in that they are the executive 
agencies, i.e. how to implement pension policies in their localities totally depends on 
their political will. Local authorities always have natural incentives to differentiate 
their systems from others so as to maximise their own benefits but at the expense of 
national interest (World Bank 1997). Therefore, a reform towards a unified system 
across provinces is imperative. For example, the contribution rates should be 
standardized into one rate, which is the same across the whole country. In this case, 
the cash surplus generated in those young provinces by using the single contribution 
rate could be transferred to the national reserve fund to meet any future pension 
deficits. 
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 4.1.2 Vertical unification  
 
Pension administration in China is unique in that the central government, via the 
ministries, is in charge of the drafting of pension regulations, but policies are in fact 
made in effect by the local authorities. When central ministries, e.g. the MOLSS in 
Beijing, issue a guideline, labour and social security bureaus at the provincial and 
lower levels are responsible of executing the policies. When implementing this task, 
however, they need cooperation from other local bureaus, e.g. the taxation authority. 
Given that all local bureaus are under the leadership of the head of local government, 
local branches of the MOLSS in fact are ultimately subject to control by provincial 
and municipal governments rather than their highest administrative officials in 
Beijing. In this context, given the conflicts between central and local governments, the 
local authorities have incentives to modify the original plans to meet local-specific 
conditions. Consequences of this vertical fragmentation between different levels of 
governments include high administration costs and disputes regarding pension 
provisions between regions. In order to solve this issue, a more unified system in the 
vertical direction is desirable. In other words, all levels of the MOLSS should have 
more consistent and coherent power. In addition, local branches of the MOLSS should 
be granted more authority so as to be able to overcome political influences from local 
government.  
4.2 Improve incentives 
 
As of 2003 only 9% of the rural population aged 15+ were covered by any formal 
pension system, and in urban areas the corresponding coverage rate was 30%. Given 
the urbanisation rate of 38%, the approximate coverage rate for the national 
population above 15+ was just 21%. The coverage rate is very low by any standard, 
since it implies that for every 10 people aged 15+ on average just less than 2 persons 
are covered by the pension system. Therefore, increasing the coverage rate and 
pension participation is the prime issue for the success of the Chinese pension reform. 
When designing new systems and encouraging participation, however, the crucial 
issue is how to improve people’s incentives. It is particularly relevant in China where 
the pension system is associated with high evasion and a low compliance rate.  
 
One main reason why many employers and employees evade the pension system is 
that they find the contribution rate very high - as high as 58% of payroll (See Section 
3.2). Therefore, more people would voluntarily join the pension system if the 
contribution rate is lowered. A lower contribution rate is financially justified. First, as 
we mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the Chinese government deliberately charges 
employers at a contribution rate 20% in excess of the normal need of replacement 
rate, just in order to siphon the surplus to pay off the cash shortfalls elsewhere in the 
PYAG, which inherited from the old systems. Another similar case is the low 
participation rate of migrant workers in cities and towns, despite government’s recent 
massive efforts to extend the pension system to cover them. Again given that migrant 
workers are very young (the average age between 20-30), one main purpose of the 
authorities is to collect the cash surplus from these young workers. Therefore, a lower 
contribution rate, which applies to all workers regardless origin and background, is 
desirable and feasible, if all young non-participants are covered. In addition, reducing 
the current contribution rate to a lower level is justified, if general taxation is 
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employed to cover deficits, and higher pension fund returns are achieved by following 
a more professional management (see Sections 4.3 and 5). 
 
Another interesting policy alternative is the NDC (notional defined contribution) 
scheme. As reviewed in Hu (2005b), some countries, e.g. Sweden and Poland, have 
implemented the NDC system, which is designed to combine the defined contribution 
scheme and the PAYG system. In this case, plan members have private accounts, 
linking benefits closely with contributions, and the accounts are credited with a 
notional interest rate. Although Li and Gao (2005) support the establishment of the 
NDC in China, we argue that it is not the best choice, since the NDC, by definition, is 
unfunded. In consequence, many beneficial effects of the funded systems cannot be 
realised (see Section 5 for details).  
4.3 Pension fund investment diversification 
 
Pension fund investment has received a great deal of attention from academics, policy 
makers etc. In comparison to international standards or norms (OECD 2005b; Davis 
2002), Chinese pension funds are heavily invested in bank deposits and government 
bonds. This is for two reasons. One is the investment mandate of pension funds where 
low risk assets are always recommended to be the main investment vehicles, the other 
is underdeveloped financial markets. In China, the stock market has a 14 year history 
(see Section 5.1.2 for details), bond market 20 years (see Section 5.1.4), and the 
mutual fund industry emerged in the mid 1990s (see Section 5.1.3). A range of 
financial instruments which are common in western markets are currently not 
available in China, e.g. options and futures. In order to increase pension fund returns, 
the investment portfolio has to be diversified.  
 
This could be achieved in two phrases. In the short term, pension funds should be 
allowed to invest in international markets as soon as possible, since the longer the 
funds stay in domestic markets, the riskier and lower the returns achieved (see Section 
6 for empirical results). By conducting international diversification, the risk would be 
lowered and returns increased. At the same time, the quantitative restrictions on low 
risk assets, i.e. bank deposits and government bonds, should be gradually eased. But 
an investment limit on domestic stocks and other high risk assets is still justified in 
that the current stock market in China is very risky and once described as “a big 
casino” by a renowned economist (Wu 2001). The process of developing an efficient 
equity might take a long time given the structural weaknesses associated with Chinese 
stock markets (Liu 2005; Green 2003a), e.g. lack of corporate governance and non-
floating of state shares (see Section 5 for details). In addition, as noted in Vittas 
(2000) and Hu (2005c), in the early stage of pension reform in emerging markets, 
macro conditions might not be ready to implement the prudent person rules (PPR); 
reasons include inexperienced financial regulators, thin capital markets and poor 
accounting practices. In the long term, however, when Chinese financial markets 
become more developed, the final objective is to apply the prudent person rules in the 
Chinese pension fund investment industry, i.e. no quantitative investment restriction, 
and fund mangers invest those funds as they would their own personal assets (Davis 
2002a). The benefits of adopting the prudent person rules have been found in a 
number of empirical studies (Davis 2002b; Hu 2005c).  
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4.4 Social security law 
 
In many countries, there are national laws which set out details of how to manage 
PAYG pension provisions, for example, the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 
in the UK and the Social Security Act 1935 in the US. In China, however, such 
legislation is absent. All previous and current pension reforms in China were initiated 
by the government with the help of some provisional regulations, which were 
designed and released by relevant agencies and changed from time to time. On one 
hand, it reflects the government’s experimentalism during the economic reform 
process; on the other hand, it creates many problems, e.g. the difficulty in enforcing 
participation. Under current conditions in China, the most efficient way to achieve a 
satisfactory compliance rate and subsequent high participation and coverage rates, in 
our opinion, is to pass a social security law, with efficient enforcement.   
 
One benefit of having such a law is that it would provide a legal framework upon 
which pension provisions are based, thus making political intervention in the system 
less feasible. With such a law it would also be easier to enforce pension participation, 
since any evasion from the pension system is against the law. Another beneficial 
effect is that it enhances the government’s credibility and public confidence in the 
system. The issue is crucial in that the public’s confidence about the government’s 
capability to provide pension benefits has been weakened in the past, partly due to 
frequent changes in pension regulations since the 1990s. For example, people are not 
sure when the authorities will increase the number of qualifying years or simply 
change the benefit formula again. Such problems of political risk have been identified 
in many emerging market economies (Hu 2005b), and also some advanced countries 
as well, for example, the UK (Whitehouse 2000a). Therefore, if a national social 
security law covering all citizens were available, there would be relatively less 
uncertainty and ambiguity from the point of view of employers and employees. In 
consequence, more people would be willing to participate in the pension system. It 
could also benefit labour mobility, since under a unified social security law, people’s 
pension benefits would not lose too much by moving between different regions. Last, 
it is worth noting that beneficial impacts from a unified national social security law in 
China will be significantly greater if changes mentioned in previous three sections are 
realised, i.e. unification of the administration, incentive improvement and pension 
fund investment diversification.  
4.5 Preserve traditional values: family support 
 
A large proportion of people in developing countries are not covered by any formal 
system, and mainly rely on family support to care for the old, e.g. India (Pal 2005). 
China, as the largest developing country, is no exception. Indeed most of those people 
who are not covered by any social security system in China are supported by younger 
generations in the family. With rapid social changes and economic growth in China, 
however, the extended family network is breaking down. Then is the traditional 
family support outdated and not appropriate any more in a more modernized society 
(Leisering et al 2002)?  
 
My answer is no, at least in the short and medium terms. The reason is that in some 
respects family “insurance” is less costly and more efficient than a formal pension 
system. For example to ensure smooth running of a formal pension system incurs 
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nontrivial transaction costs. At the very beginning, the government need to design a 
set of rules or regulations after rounds of consultation with public and professionals 
etc; local governments are then required to implement these regulations; if they find 
some particular rules or regulations inappropriate, a feedback mechanism between 
central and local governments is needed; last a supervisory team or committee need to 
be set up to oversee implementation of those regulations. In addition, record keeping 
and treatment of receipts and payments are also an essential component of the social 
pension system (Mitchell 2000). These are not free and costs associated could be very 
significant (Gent 2001; also see Section 6 for empirical evidence). Comparatively, a 
family support mechanism is largely freed from the above transaction costs, since the 
operating unit is a family which is much smaller than a country. Therefore, the 
implicit inter-generational contracts are more sustainable.  
 
 In addition, raising children for the retirement and caring for the aged parents are a 
norm and deeply rooted in the Chinese culture, i.e. Confucianism. By learning from a 
wide range of sources, e.g. TV programme, personal experience etc, young 
generations feel that it is a moral duty to take care of their parents when they are too 
old to work. Any behaviour by the young of leaving their parents alone or destitute is 
badly regarded in China. Meanwhile, this informal mechanism is strengthened by the 
passage of Family Support Law (1981), which gives younger generations the legal 
obligation to support their parents if their parents are not able to live by themselves 
alone.  
 
An offsetting argument maintains that family support is a feature of developing 
countries, so when China continues its high economic growth and becomes a wealthy 
country in the future, family support will be outdated. It sounds reasonable, but 
traditional values in my view are so strong in China that it is not easy to dispense with 
them in a short time period. For example in some rich Asian regions where Chinese 
dominate, e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, family support still plays a very 
important role. Li (1999) shows that as of 1995 for those elderly aged above 65 in 
Taiwan, 52.3% depended on their children and only 14.8% depended on social 
insurance, i.e. pensions. These statistics provide a simple illustration of the role family 
support will play when mainland China reaches the same level of development as that 
in Taiwan of 1995.  
 
Therefore, the informal family support system should still continue its important role 
in providing old age support in China. It is understandable that in the long term 
pension provisions through the social network will become the norm given experience 
elsewhere (Hu 2005b; Davis 2004b). In the short or medium term, however, it is 
particularly vital to preserve traditional values, since during the transition process 
some particular groups of the population are likely to be disadvantaged, e.g. rural 
population in China, who have no formal pension coverage.   
 
5 Preconditions and benefits of pension reform 
 
In this section, we first introduce the pension reform’s external environment in China, 
with particular focus on current development of the financial structure in China, and 
then present the pension reform benefits, arising from the shift from the previous 
PAYG system to the current multi-funded system. These issues are closely 
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interlinked, since a more developed financial market will facilitate pension reform 
(Davis 1998; Hu 2005b), while a shift from the pension reform toward a funded 
system can have a positive effect on financial development (Walker and Lefort 2002; 
Davis 2004b, 2005; Hu 2005b, 2005d). In addition, the macro-economic structure, or 
the general external environment, is also important during the reform process (Davis 
1998, 2005a; Vittas 2000; Mitchell 2000; Blake 2003). An analysis of this kind, i.e. 
“preconditions”, is useful and justified, in that it deepens our understanding of the 
Chinese pension reform, to the extent that the pension analysis herein is not conducted 
in isolation from the external economic and financial environment which is expected 
to be of crucial importance.  
5.1 Pension reform’s preconditions and benefits on the financial structure side 
 
The maturity of the financial structure plays an important role when the PAYG system 
moves towards the funded pension system, and to a large extent serves as a 
contributing factor to the success of the pension reform. Figure 1 depicts the structure 
of China’s financial system, which mainly comprises the banking industry and 
intermediation sector, and the financial markets. Traditionally, China’s financial 
system consisted solely of the state-owned banks (Allen et al 2003, 2005; Hu 2005a), 
but has witnessed a great change since the late 1970s.  
 
In what follows, we first review section by section these financial preconditions 
required for pension reform and the benefits arsing from pension reform towards 
funded systems. Then, we discuss current development of China’s financial system, 
making reference to historical data. Last, we comment on whether these preconditions 
exist in China, and what benefits and/or costs pension reform might bring to China. 
The analysis is conducted for a variety of different financial sectors.      
 
5.1.1 Banking industry 
 
5.1.1.1 Preconditions 
 
A sound banking system is an essential precondition22 required to initiate pension 
reform toward funded systems (Vittas 2000). The banking industry is important in that 
on the one hand, pension funds hold a large amount of their assets in bonds issued by 
banks (Mitchell 2000), on the other hand, bank deposits are an indispensable 
component in pension funds’ portfolios, particularly in developing countries (Hu 
2005b). In this context, insolvency of the banking system would put at risk pension 
asset investment. Banks are also of crucial importance in maintaining the smooth 
running of the financial markets, by serving as providers of key financial services, e.g. 
collateral, clearing and settlement (Davis 1998; 2005a), efficiency of which directly 
links to equity markets and others. In consequence, pension funds are affected 
indirectly through these channels (see Figure 5). Meanwhile, commercial banks in 
many countries, including China, serve as custodians of pension funds (ADB 2003), 
the main purpose of which is to safeguard pension assets from misconduct and 
irregularity by separating asset management from fund accounts’ management. In this 
                                                
22
 Pension researchers have identified other preconditions, i.e. stock market (see the following sections 
for details).  
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context, to adopt a funded pension system, there is a basic requirement for having 
reliable and safe fund guardians, i.e. banks.  
 
5.1.1.2 Benefits of pension reform  
 
The literature linking pension reform to the banking industry is well discussed (Hu 
2005b). So we will not describe that in this section, except presenting some key 
points. First, pension fund growth might increase the efficiency of the banking 
industry through market competition. This argument is proved by a panel study by 
Impavido et al (2002), who used a dataset covering 30 countries. In addition, 
competition from institutions, e.g. mutual funds and pension funds, puts downward 
pressures on bank spreads and profits (Davis and Steil 2001). In this context, 
however, there may be the problem of taking excessive risk by banks, e.g. lending to 
risky borrowers, seeking to open new line of business and generating fee-based 
incomes (Allen and Santomero 2001; Schuermann 2004). Development of 
institutional investors, as highlighted by rapid pension fund growth, might also help to 
facilitate the shift from bank based financial systems to market based financial 
systems (Davis 2005), although the question of which system is better is still under 
debate and might depend on country specific factors. In addition, Hu (2005b) tests the 
relationship between pension fund asset growth and the banking industry from both 
the short run and long run. For example, the CREDIT indicator (credit provided by 
banks) shows the negative impacts of pension assets on the banking sector for both 
OECD countries and EMEs, as shown in Table 26. It might owe to strong competition 
from pension funds. In addition, regarding the DMBTFA indicator (domestic 
monetary bank assets to total financial assets), the long run impacts frequently 
become positive, and are particularly strong for EMEs, indicating a more favourable 
effect.   
 
5.1.1.3 Current situation in China 
 
China’s financial system is characterised by a dominant and inefficient banking sector 
(Xie 1999; Allen et al 2003; Hu 2005a). Allen et al (2005) compare China’s system 
with other countries which have English, French, German and Scandinavian legal 
origins23, respectively. As shown in Table 27, relative to other countries, China’s ratio 
of bank credit/GDP was 111% as of 1999, which was partly owning to the large 
volume of loans accumulated via lending by state owned banks (Lardy 1999), while 
the average ratio for other countries was 73%, and the figure was 62% for English 
origin countries. In contrast, China’s stock market was small in terms of both size 
(market capitalisation/GDP) and efficiency (total value traded/GDP). This issue is 
also observable if we look at the data in Table 28, where it is shown that China’s 
banking industry was much larger than that in less developed countries; for example, 
the bank credit to GDP ratio was 167% for China, while it was 47% for low income 
countries, and 76% for middle income countries. It is admitted, however, that China 
still had a small banking industry relative to high-income OECD countries and the 
world average level. In all, the relatively large size of China’s banking industry, 
compared to other countries and its own stock market, indicates the early state of 
                                                
23
 As we noted in Hu (2005b), in the law and finance literature (La Porta et al 1998; Beck et al 2003a), 
it is believed that the legal origins have an important impact on the banking development. Generally, 
the legal systems of the company law and legal code are traced back to four origins, i.e. English origin, 
French origin, German origin and Scandinavian origin.  
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China’s financial development, i.e. the financial system is dominated by the banking 
sector (OECD 2005). 
 
Besides the large size of the banking industry in China’s financial system, Chinese 
banks also suffer from poor performance. Allen et al (2005) show that, in Table 27, 
the overhead cost relative to bank total assets was 12% for China, while it was 4% for 
those countries with English and German origins, 3% for Scandinavian origin and 
French origin. In addition, Hu (2005a) compares the banking industry of China with 
the US, the UK and Germany. By following the categorized banking indicators 
recommended by the BIS (Bank for International Settlement) (1998), the author finds 
that the Chinese state-owned banks performed worse than the western banks. For 
example, the average ratio of the ROAA (return on average assets) was 0.17 for the 
largest four state-owned banks in China as of 2001, while the average ratio for the 
HSBC, Citicorp and Deutsche Bank was 3.15. Similar results are found by Herrero 
and Santabarbara (2005) and Allen et al (2005).   
 
Table 29 shows the latest statistics of the central bank’s balance sheet in China. As of 
July 2005, the total assets were RMB 9,506bn (equivalent to US$ 1,174bn, and 70% 
of GDP). Among them, the foreign exchange accounted for 60% of the total assets, 
which were at the level of RMB 5,635bn (US$ 700bn, and 41% of GDP). As regards 
the total liabilities, reserve money accounted for 61% of the total amount, and the next 
largest component was the bond issue at the order of RMB 1,619bn (US$ 200bn, and 
12% of GDP). Given that around 30-40% of foreign reserves in China was used to 
purchase US treasury bonds (Yu 2004), and the subsequent criticism from American 
politicians about Chinese government’s manipulation of its exchange rate (see Section 
5.2.5 for more detail), pension funds might help in this case, i.e. an outflow of 
portions of foreign reserves, particularly US dollar reserves, to foreign markets 
through pension fund investment (Davis 2005; SFRC 2005). On the one hand, it 
mitigates the inflationary pressures in domestic markets; on the other hand, it 
diversifies pension funds’ portfolio risk. 
 
Table 30 gives the statistical summary of assets held by the Chinese monetary 
financial institutions. The dominant position of the SOBs (state-owned banks) is clear, 
since more than 60% of the total assets were held by them. Relative to other 
institutions, the importance of the SOBs, however, has been steadily declining over 
the past 10 years. The RCCs (rural credit cooperatives) has held around 10% of the 
total assets. Other commercial banks, including those with solely and partially private 
ownerships, have grown rapidly during the past. Their share in terms of assets 
increased from 7% in 1995 to 14% in 2002, which largely resulted from the 
authorities’ efforts of the financial liberalisation and deregulation in the 1990s (Liu 
1999; Liu 2002). Foreign banks are still insignificant in China, but they are expected 
to grow rapidly after 2006 when the foreign banks are treated as the same as the 
domestic banks without any geographical and business restriction (Herrero and 
Santabarbarra 2005); these new regulations were introduced in late 2001, when China 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Therefore, China’s WTO commitments 
of gradually opening domestic markets to foreign banks will have large impacts on 
Chinese development (Green and Wall 2000; Yueh 2003), including the industrial 
structure of China’ banking sector, which is characterised by monopolistic 
competition.  
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5.1.1.4 Comparison between China and Chile 
 
In order to consolidate our analysis, we compare China and Chile in terms of the 
banking industry. Chile is selected to be the comparison country, in that it is the most 
common reference in pension studies. Since Chile started its pension system’s 
privatisation in 1981, it has received a great deal of attention from international 
pension experts, and served as a real-world test-bed for the benefits of introducing 
funded elements into the traditional public systems (Holzmann 1997; Acuna and 
Iglesias 2005).  
 
Table 31 gives the comparison data between China and Chile in terms of both 
financial intermediary24 and banking industry indicators. The first indicator is liquid 
liability/GDP, which measures financial depth on the liability side, and thus the 
overall size of the financial sector (Beck et al 1999). Looking at the data from 1980 to 
2003, it is shown that China had a much larger financial sector than Chile. For 
example, in 2003, the ratio of liquid liability to GDP was 37% for Chile, and 176% 
for China. The higher ratio for China might be due to the massive amount of credits 
lent to SOEs in the past decades, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1. It is consistent with 
our another statistic, i.e. private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions/GDP. In 2000, the ratios were 59% and 119% for Chile and China, 
respectively. In addition, the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP for China was 
much higher than that for Chile in most years, although it is the opposite case when 
the ratio of central bank assets to GDP is concerned. The last indicator within the 
financial intermediary group is financial system deposits/GDP. Consistent with high 
saving rates in China (OECD 2005a), the ratios were more than 3 times higher for 
China than Chile in most years.  
 
In addition to the above same-year comparison, we also compare Chilean 1980 data 
with Chinese 2003 data. It is worth to note that Chile started its pension reform in 
1981. The underlying reasoning is to test the question “whether the current banking 
system in China is strong enough to support pension reform”. As shown in Table 31, 
for all but central bank/GDP indicators, China had much larger values. On the one 
hand, it implies a larger financial sector in China, on the other hand, it indicates the 
dominant position of the banking sector in China’s financial system.  
 
5.1.1.5 Conclusions on preconditions 
 
Above, we reviewed and analysed China’s banking industry by drawing on macro 
data. It is revealed that although the Chinese banking system is weak by international 
standards, e.g. in terms of overhead cost, basic conditions have been established, and 
this current banking sector is sufficient to start a pension reform towards funded 
systems. This conclusion is consolidated by the comparison between China and Chile. 
Despite this encouraging sign, however, further improvement needs to be done to 
banks if the government wants to maximise the benefits of pension reform (see next 
section). For example, capital base needs to be strengthened, so as to reduce financial 
risk (Mitchell 2000). Recent efforts to reform the largest state-owned banks in China 
by the authorities are in the right direction (Hu 2005a). In addition, the banking 
                                                
24
 Financial intermediary indicators are included, given its close link to the banking sector, particularly 
in the developing countries.  
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industry is unproportionally large relative to other market components. Therefore, the 
government needs to enhance the development of other sectors, e.g. securities 
markets. Compared to a more balanced financial system, excessive reliance on the 
banking sector is risky and inefficient, which in turn would jeopardise the benefits of 
pension reform.   
 
5.1.1.6 Conclusions on benefits 
 
Pension reform towards a funded system is an inevitable choice for the Chinese 
government, and this reform would have far reaching implications for China’s 
banking industry. Similar to those identified in other countries, e.g. Chile, pension 
fund asset growth would provoke competition, thus increasing banks’ efficiency. This 
benefit is much needed in China, in that Chinese commercial banks, e.g. the state 
owned banks, are notorious for bad performance. This improvement in the 
performance of China’s banks is beneficial to pension reform through the two-way 
transmission process, in that in many cases banks serve as custodians of pension funds 
in China (ADB 2003). In addition, recent regulations (CBRC 2005) allow commercial 
banks to set up their own asset management companies, which brings further 
competition to the fund manager industry (see Section 5.1.3) and has wider impacts 
on the whole financial markets. In this context, however, caution needs to be taken to 
look at the potential negative impacts of increasingly intensified market competition, 
e.g. whether banks lend to risky projects, after facing strong competition from 
institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, and whether banks open new line of 
business with lack of good financial justification etc (see Section 5.1.1).  
 
5.1.2 Stock Market 
 
5.1.2.1 Preconditions 
 
To introduce a funded-component based pension system, one prerequisite is a 
rudimentarily developed stock market (Davis 1998 and Mitchell 2000). This point is 
of crucial importance, given the close linkage between the stock market and pension 
reform. For example, experiences elsewhere show that a large amount of pension 
assets are invested in equities (OECD 2005b; Clark and Hu 2005a), for their potential 
to earn returns higher than inflation in the long term. The traditional investment 
strategy of only bank deposits and/or bonds, commonly in many developing countries, 
is not enough to generate sufficient incomes to meet long-term liabilities. It is worth 
noting, however, that pension reform could be still initiated, as long as there are a 
certain amount of securities traded in the market, and the market can to some extent 
help fund managers to diversify their portfolios. It points out another main benefit of 
having a stock market, i.e. risk diversification, given the less correlation between 
different assets. In this context, however, the stock market is not required to be as 
efficient and deep as that in developed countries, although it is admitted that a more 
developed stock market facilitates pension reform. In addition, given the fact that the 
stock markets in many developing countries are very volatile, a way to get around this 
problem is to invest a portion of pension assets abroad, if regulations are permitted.  
 
5.1.2.2 Benefits of pension reform 
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The relationship between pension reform and the stock market has been studied 
extensively over the past decades (Davis 1995 2000 and 2005a; Holzmann 1997; 
Walker and Leford 2002). It is widely believed that pension reform can stimulate the 
development of the stock market. For example, the functions played by the financial 
systems (Merton and Bodie 1995), e.g. pooling and transferring sources, can be 
improved following the growth of pension funds due to their professional risk 
management and longer investment horizon (Hu 2005b). In addition, pension asset 
growth contributes to a larger and more efficient stock market. It is the experience 
demonstrated in some reforming countries, e.g. Chile (Holzmann 1997; Acuna and 
Iglesias 2001). In addition, by using a dataset of panel countries, Hu (2005b) finds 
that pension fund asset growth leads to an increase in STKCAP (stock capitalisation 
to GDP) in both the long run and short run, as shown in Table 26. When turning to the 
stock traded indicator, the coefficients frequently show a positive sign in the long run, 
albeit the aggregate equation gives insignificant results. Concerning the stock turnover 
indicator, results are mixed but there is still evidence of positive influence of pension 
fund assets. Another important issue linking pension funds to the stock market relates 
to market volatility. It is argued that pension funds are long-term investors, and 
concerned about fundamentals, therefore their growth can dampen stock market 
volatility. By using data covering 33 emerging markets, Walker and Leford (2002) 
find that the security price is less volatile, following pension asset growth.  
 
5.1.2.3 Current situation in China 
 
Traditionally, the stock market was viewed as one characteristic of the capitalist 
society in China, therefore was initially ignored by the policy makers. The authorities, 
however, began to realise the importance of the equity market in the late 1980s, i.e. 
after 10 years economic reform. The milestone was the establishment of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in December 
1990. Over the past 15 years, the Chinese stock market has grown rapidly. Table 32 
shows that as of 2003, China was the 13th largest stock market in the world. Its 
market capitalisation, combining both the SHSE and the SZSE, was US$ 513bn. In 
terms of capitalisation of those tradable shares (around 1/3 of the total shares), 
however, it stood as the 20th largest market. The historical data regarding China’s 
stock market is provided in Table 33. The number of listed firms grew from 8 in 1990 
to 1,377 in 2004, a 172 time-fold increase within 15 years. The total number of 
investors rose from 0.4 millions in 1990s to 72.1 millions in 2004. Along with these 
developments, the market capitalisation of the total shares increased from RMB 1.2bn 
to RMB 3,706bn, while the market capitalisation of the tradable shares grew to RMB 
1,169bn in 2004 accordingly. In addition, the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP 
increased from 0.1% in 1990 to the peak level at 54% in 2000, then decreased to 30% 
in 2004.  
 
Despite the rapid growth of the Chinese stock market over the past 15 years, there are 
many problems (Cheng 2005). Whether these issues could be solved have 
implications for the development of the Chinese financial markets in general, and the 
pension reform in particular. We briefly introduce these issues as follows: 
 
Firstly, the Chinese stock market is still small relative to the economy. As shown in 
Table 28, as of 2004, the market capitalisation to GDP ratio for China was 39%, 
which was smaller than that in other four groups, and three times smaller than that for 
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OECD countries. In addition, statistics in Table 33 show that the actual size of 
China’s stock market is not as large as what common people think. If we use market 
capitalisation of tradable shares only, the combined size of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges become the 20th largest market in the world. In terms of liquidity, 
the ratio of total value traded to GDP was 45% for China, while it was also 45% for 
low income countries, and 113% for OECD countries. This low ratio to some extent 
reflects illiquidity of China’s stock market, which was partly due to the lack of 
investors’ confidence (Chen et al 2003), as well as large volume of non-tradable 
shares in China (see below). When turning to efficiency, as highlighted by the stock 
turnover ratio, all groups, except middle income countries, had the same level of 
performance.  
 
Secondly, the share holding structure is extremely biased toward the state (Shirai 
2004). This is mainly for historical reasons. When the Chinese authorities first 
introduced the stock market in 1990, the principal motivation behind this was to find 
another financing method for the ailing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Green 
2005b), besides the loans from the state-owned banks. But it was very difficult for the 
authorities, under a socialist regime, to allow most shares of the SOEs to be controlled 
by the individuals or private investors. To circumvent this problem, around 2/3 of the 
shares of each listed company are not allowed to trade in the market (Green and Wall 
2000). These shares comprise all State shares and most legal person shares, which 
belongs to the Chinese government (see Appendix A for a classification of the 
Chinese equity shares). Largely due to the state’s share holding advantage, the 
majority of the listed firms in China are controlled by the state. Based on the ultimate 
ownership principle proposed in La Porta et al (1999), Liu (2005) found that, as of 
2001, around 85% of Chinese companies were ultimately controlled by the Chinese 
government, despite the 67% direct share holding.  
 
As a result, most of listed firms in China view the stock market as a “cash machine”, 
to finance the deficits of their mother companies, which in most cases are ailing or 
cash-constrained SOEs (Tenev et al 2002). At the same time, few listed SOEs firms 
care about the issue of corporate governance and profitability. Chen et al (2005) find 
that after the IPOs, listed firms under the control of the state experienced a decline in 
profitability, while those without state control performed better. Given the important 
role pension funds play in stock markets, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Davis and Steil 2001; Clark and Hebb 2004a), a strong pension industry in China can 
benefit Chinese firms’ corporate governance, which is really needed in China. For 
example, pension funds can raise their concerns in the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM), or engage directly in corporate management. Zhou (2004), governor of the 
PBC (China’s central bank), mentioned that the development to China’s capital 
market is, to a large extent, determined by the quality of listed companies, which then 
is closely linked to corporate governance.  
 
Thirdly, shares in China are traded at a large premium. It is because of the fact that 
2/3 of the shares are not tradable, as we mentioned above. Hence, shares are priced 
less based on the fundamental values, but much on the investors’ enthusiasm and the 
excessive demand (Fan et al 2003). In consequence, the Chinese stock market has one 
of the highest P/E (price/earnings) ratios in the world (Green 2005a). Table 32 shows 
that the P/E ratio for SHSE/SZSE was 36.5/36.2 times, which was the second largest 
among the world top 15 stock markets. The figure was 18.3 times for the LSE 
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(London Stock Exchange) and 19 times for HKSE (Hong Kong Stock Exchange). In 
this context, most Chinese investors, including both individuals and institutions, are 
speculators; they do not care about the fundamentals, since fundamentally, the 
underlying share price should have been much less that current market prices, given 
the 2/3 non-tradable shares (Chan et al 2004). Therefore, most investors head into the 
stock markets, intending to achieve short-term capital gains rather than dividend 
payments (Cheng 2005). For example, a survey shows that 78.6% of Chinese 
individual investors were motivated to buy stocks by potential capital gains, while 
only 11.7% were motivated by the regular dividend payments (Chen et al 2003). The 
authorities have realised this issue, and tried to solve it by selling the state-controlled 
non-tradable shares, thus aiming to trade all shares in the market (ADB 2005).   
 
On 12th June 2001, the State Council of China published the “provisional regulations 
on raising the national social security fund (NSSF) by selling the state-owned shares” 
(CSRC 2001). It stipulates that when the state-owned enterprises go to the IPOs in 
both the domestic and the international stock exchanges, 10% of the State shares 
should be sold simultaneously, and the revenues raised should be credited to the 
accounts of the NSSF (see Section 2.4.2 for details). But the investors viewed this 
regulation as a negative message, since they feared that more State shares would be 
sold in the market, in light of the large pension deficit in China. Far from the 
expectation of the regulators, within the few days of the regulation’s announcement, 
the stock market price fell by more than 30% (Asher and Newman 2002). In 
consequence, the authorities admitted this policy’s failure, and decided to temporarily 
terminate the implementation of the regulation on 22nd October 200125, four months 
after the first announcement (NCSSF 2004). Such a drop in share prices could be 
viewed as a correction of the over-valuation to some extent. The negative impacts of 
allowing prices back to their fundamentals, i.e. around 1/3 of market prevailing prices, 
however, were so significant, that it was decided to put the new regulation above on 
hold, unless the authorities find an appropriate way to trade those 2/3 non-tradable 
shares in the market.   
 
The fourth major problem associated with the Chinese stock market is high volatility. 
Table 34 gives comparative data between China and other regions regarding volatility, 
which is calculated as a standard deviation of monthly total stock returns (capital 
gains plus dividends). Over the period 1994-200526, China’s stock market registered a 
high level of volatility, i.e. 0.104. In comparison, the average value was 0.064 for 
emerging markets, 0.042 for EAFE27, and only 0.039 for all developed countries. 
Among these years, China’s stock volatility was frequently higher than 0.1, e.g. from 
1996 until 2000. Since then, volatility has dropped gradually, albeit showing a slight 
pick-up in 2004. In addition, Du and Wei (2004) show that China has one of the 
highest stock market volatilities in the world. Based on their statistics, China’s stock 
market volatility28 (0.146) is 2.5 times higher than the UK’s market volatility (0.056). 
The authors argue that insider trading plays a role in contributing to the cross-country 
differences in the stock market volatility. Generally, the more prevalent is insider 
trading, the higher stock market volatility. This finding is particularly relevant for the 
                                                
25
 Such policy still applies to the firms going to the IPO on the international stock markets.  
26
 2005 is related to the period from January 2005 to October 2005.  
27
 EAFE refers to Europe, Australia, and Far East.  
28
 Stock market volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly returns in US dollars over 
1984.12-1998.12. 
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China case, since insider trading is very common. For example, Wu (2001), a 
renowned economist in China, once criticized the Chinese stock market as a “big 
casino”, which mainly arises from the prevalence of the market control by the large 
institutions as well as insider trading. During the years around 2001, the stock market 
in China was very volatile, where the large institutions – mainly securities companies 
and mutual funds, frequently manipulated the prices at their will, but at the peril of the 
individual investors.  
 
In consequence, following the deteriorating confidence in the market from the 
individual investors (Chen et al 2003), China’s stock market has witnessed a 
significant downturn since 2001. Table 33 clearly reveals the trend. For example, the 
market capitalisation dropped from RMB 4,809bn in 2000 to RMB 3,706 in 2004, 
while the market capitalisation to GDP ratio declined from the peak level of 54% in 
2000 to 30% in 2004. In terms of the level of the stock market index, since 2001, both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock indices have fallen continuously, and there was no sign 
of a recovery even until now. China’s current shrinking stock market is against 
background of a recent boom in many other countries (ADB 2005; OECD 2005c). 
Table 35 shows that despite the global bear market around 2000, the stock markets in 
all our selected countries have started picking up quickly since 2003. For example, the 
growth rate for Japan in terms of stock market index was 31.4% in 2003, and 12.7% 
in 2004, while these two figures were 48.9% and 39.6% for South Africa. In fact, 
against the sustained rapid economic growth in China, and strong recovery of 
overseas equity markets, China’s sluggish stock market since 2000 has raised a great 
deal of concerns among policy markers and economists in China (OECD 2005a).  
 
5.1.2.4 Comparison between China and Chile 
 
Similar to the previous section, we move to a short comparison between China and 
Chile, seeking to find out whether China is ready to reform its pension systems in 
terms of the stock market conditions. To meet this end, we use three ratios, i.e. stock 
market capitalisation to GDP, stock traded to GDP and stock turnover to GDP, which 
measure size, liquidity and efficiency respectively. In terms of size, i.e. stock market 
capitalisation to GDP, as of 2003, China’s stock market was smaller than Chilean 
market, as shown in Table 31. Concerning liquidity, however, the Chinese stock 
market performed much more better. For example, in 2000, the ratio of stock market 
traded to GDP was 8% for Chile, and 43% for China. Due to illiquidity of the Chilean 
stock market, Chile’s efficiency indicator, i.e. stock market turnover ratio, showed 
worse results in all years. Despite superior performance of China’s stock market in 
comparison to Chile, it is worth to note that the Chinese stock market is not even as 
efficient as the average world level, as shown in Table 28. However, is current 
Chinese stock market sufficient to initiate pension reform? By comparing the data 
between Chile in 1980 and China 2003, it is revealed that the answer is “Yes”. For 
example, the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP for China 2003 was 41%, while it 
was 30% for Chile 1980. In addition, both market turnover and traded indicators also 
strongly support our conclusion.  
 
5.1.2.5 Conclusions on preconditions 
 
Above we reviewed and analysed the current situation of China’s stock market. It is 
shown that the market still faces many problems, and some of these problems are 
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structural and important. During the reform process, one issue is very important, and 
the sooner the issue is solved, the quicker and larger the beneficial impacts of pension 
reform are realised. This relates to the non-traded 2/3 percent State shares in the stock 
market, as discussed in Section 5.1.2. As far as the preconditions are concerned, 
however, the current stock market meets the basic requirements for a funding oriented 
pension reform. For example, there were more than one thousand listed companies 
and 70 million investors as of 2004. In addition, when compared to the Chilean 
situation in 1980, China outperformed Chile in all three indicators, strengthening our 
conclusion about the feasibility of the Chinese pension reform (Vittas 2000). As noted 
at the outset of Section 5.1.2, only a rudimentary level of the stock market is required 
to start pension reform, and with pension reform, the stock market would benefit 
significantly, which is the subject of the next section.  
 
5.1.2.6 Conclusions on benefits 
 
In view of the underdevelopment of China’s stock market in terms of size, liquidity 
and efficiency, pension reform can play an important role in improving it (Kim et al 
2003). Such a beneficial impact arises from the fact that pension funds, as long-term 
investors, invest a significant amount of assets in equities (OECD 2005b), e.g., for the 
UK top 100 pension funds, as of 2004, around 60% of the total assets were allocated 
to equities (domestic and foreign) (Clark and Hu 2005a). In consequence, pension 
funds growth leads to a larger market, which has been empirically proved by Walker 
and Lefort (2002) and Hu (2005b). In addition, pension funds might increase market 
liquidity and efficiency, given their superior information about fundamentals 
compared to individual investors (Davis 1998; Walker and Lefort 2002). In addition, 
stock market volatility might be reduced following growth of pension assets, given 
pension funds’ relatively long investment horizon and their professional investment 
management (Davis and Steil 2001). This is much needed in China, as indicated by 
high market volatility in Section 5.1.2. Indeed, financial regulators in China expect 
that growth of institutional investors will stabilise the current volatile equity market.  
 
It is noted, however, that the scale of the positive influence on China’s stock market 
hinges on some structural issues, particularly the non-traded state shares (see Section 
5.1.2.3 for details). Therefore, to maximise the beneficial impacts of pension reform, 
the authorities need to reform other aspects of the market correspondingly.  
 
5.1.3 Institutional investors 
 
Compared to institutional investors in advanced countries (Davis and Steil 2001), 
China has a very small sector of institutional investors, which is just at a nascent stage 
of development (Kim et al 2003; also see Section 5.1.3.3). Broadly speaking, 
institutional investors comprise mutual funds, insurance companies and pension 
funds. In China, there is another kind of institutions, i.e. securities companies, which 
are an important player in the market, as noted in the previous section.  
 
5.1.3.1 Preconditions 
 
Concerning the preconditions required for institutional investors, we would like to 
discuss the importance of insurance companies and mutual funds. For funded pension 
systems, it is a prerequisite to have a working insurance sector (Davis 1998; Mitchell 
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2000). This is because of the crucial role played by the annuities markets during the 
de-cumulation process of accrued pension assets (James and Vittas 1999). In this 
context, insurance companies should be able to provide annuity products to scheme 
members, and protect them from longevity risk. If such insurance companies do not 
exist, any funding oriented reforms would not succeed, since it is very likely that 
scheme members use up their accumulated pension funds in personal accounts before 
they die. This is a particularly important issue for those reforming countries which 
adopt the pension systems dominated by the personal component or defined 
contribution accounts, e.g. Chile.  
 
As far as mutual funds are concerned, the corresponding minimum requirement is 
much less strict, but we believe that a strong mutual fund industry will help pension 
reform and the growth of pension fund assets to a large extent. This is because mutual 
fund managers are investment experts, and have expertise and strong knowledge on 
portfolio investments. Therefore, if a large amount of pension assets are given to 
mutual fund managers to invest, it is more likely to achieve higher and more stable 
returns.  
 
5.1.3.2 Benefits of pension reform 
 
A pension reform toward funding components will stimulate the development of 
institutional investors (Davis and Steil 2001). The direct link to pension funds is 
straightforward, in that individuals accumulate savings over their working lives; these 
assets are deposited in their personal accounts, rather than used to pay off current 
pensions, like the PAYG system. It is observed that pension assets have grown 
dramatically over the past decades (Acuna and Iglesias 2001; OECD 2005b; Hu 
2005b). Regarding insurance companies, the positive effects are also obvious given 
the close link between DC schemes and annuities markets as noted in the previous 
section. This point is strengthened given the fact that the majority of reforming 
countries stipulates sponsors to offer annuities to DC scheme members, and in some 
cases, buying annuities is compulsory, e.g. in Brazil and Sweden (Blake 2000l; 
Yermo 2001; Davis 2002).  
 
The mutual fund industry will benefit from pension reform as well, although the scale 
of such positive effects differs, depending on whether there are regulatory restrictions 
on investment of pension assets in mutual funds (Yermo 2003). In general, the 
prudent person regime has the potential to maximise the benefits (Davis 2002a; Hu 
2005c). In addition, it is argued that rapid growth of the US mutual fund industry in 
the past decades has owed a great deal to development of 401(K) plans. A survey by 
ICI (2005a) shows that as of June 2005, 35.6 million households in the US owned 
mutual funds through employer-sponsored retirement plans, which accounted for 
31.5% of the total households.     
 
5.1.3.3 Current situation  
 
5.1.3.3.1 Insurance industry 
The insurance industry plays a very important role during the process of the pension 
reform. For example, insurance companies are important asset managers for pension 
funds, and life insurance can provide a means of saving for retirement (Vittas 2000; 
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Liu 2005). Meanwhile, their provision of annuities industry is closely linked to the 
pension assets’ de-cumulation within any funded pension system. In China, the 
insurance industry, particularly the life insurance industry, is quite small, when 
compared to other countries (Ji and Thomas 2001). Table 36 gives comparative 
statistics between the top 50 countries by the life insurance density (life premium per 
capital in US$). As of 2000, Japan had the largest life insurance industry; the life 
insurance density was US$ 2,877 in Japan, while it was US$ 2,633 in the UK, and 
US$ 855 in Korea. In comparison, it was only US$ 8 per capita in China. Another 
statistic, i.e. life insurance penetration (total life premia/GDP), again, indicates the 
underdevelopment of the Chinese life insurance industry. It was 8.7% in Japan, 12.6% 
in the UK, and 1.1% in China. The latest statistics (Wu 2005a) show that as of 2004, 
the life density ratio in China was US$ 40, and the penetration ratio was 3.4%.  
 
Despite the underdevelopment, China’s life insurance companies have witnessed 
significant growth over the past years. For example, as given in Table 49, the ratio of 
total assets within insurance companies to GDP was 3.8% in 2000, and while it was 
increased to 9.4% in 2004. In addition, Table 37 shows that total life premia grew 
rapidly during the period of 1992 – 2004 (Wu 2004; CIRC 2005). In 1992, total life 
premia were RMB 2.1bn, which then increased to RMB 100bn in 2000, and further to 
RMB 323bn in 2004. The average growth rate, as shown in Table 37 was 83% over 
the past 13 years. Against the rapid growth of the life insurance industry in China, the 
property insurance industry declined relatively over time, as shown in Table 38. For 
example, in 1999, the premium on property insurance was RMB 52bn, while it was 
RMB 87bn on life insurance. In 2004, however, the premium on the former became 
RMB 109bn, while the latter registered at the level of RMB 323bn, three times larger 
than the former. Among the life-related insurance premia, life insurance was the 
biggest contributor. The potential growth of China’s insurance industry over the 
coming decades, particularly the life insurance industry, was exemplified by the 
investors’ keen enthusiasm, when China Life went to IPO (Initial public offering) at 
the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) and the HKSE (Hong King Stock Exchange) 
in 2003. In addition, the continuing pension reform will stimulate development of the 
insurance industry in China over the coming decades (Wu 2005b; Hu 2005e).  
 
As regards the issue of fund investment and regulation, China’s insurance industry 
experienced three stages (Wu 2004). The first stage is from 1980 to 1987, when all 
funds were deposited with the banks, therefore earning low deposit returns. The 
second stage is related to China’s over-heating economic boom in 1987-1995. During 
this period, the previous tough investment restrictions were excessively relaxed, 
therefore leading to a large volume of funds invested in the real estate industry, stock 
market, and other high-return-high-risk sectors. In 1993, when the economy started 
cooling down, a large proportion of the insurance companies’ investments fell in 
value. Largely for the lessons learned from the second stage, China has conducted a 
very conservative investment approach in the insurance industry, since 1995 until 
recently.  
 
Table 39 lists the changes of investment regulations over the past decades. In June 
1995, the “Insurance Law” was passed, and it stipulates that the insurance assets can 
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be invested in bank deposits, government bonds, and financial bonds29 only. In May 
1997, the investment restrictions were relaxed, and the investment in those bonds 
issued by the central government controlled SOEs and rated as AA+ is allowed. In 
1999, the “Provisional regulations on the investment of insurance assets in mutual 
funds” was released. According to this regulation, insurance funds are allowed to 
enter the stock market, but indirectly via the investment fund companies. In 2000, the 
CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Commission) allowed China Life and other four 
insurers to invest assets in any mutual funds up to 10% of the total assets. Recent 
years have witnessed significant investment changes. For example, as shown in Table 
39, in September 2005, a regulation was released, specially focusing on the 
investment issue of those foreign assets within the Chinese major insurers30. In 
comparison to those insurance assets, generated and kept within the Chinese territory, 
the foreign insurance assets are allowed to invest in a slightly more diversified 
manner. For example, they are allowed to invest directly on the equities, but those 
equities must be issued by the Chinese firms in the overseas stock exchanges.   
 
Against the background of the evolution of the investment regulations in China, the 
investment largely tilts toward the low risk assets, particularly the bank deposits and 
government bonds (Lai 2002). For example, Table 38 reveals that over the period 
1999-2004, in all years except 2004, more than half assets were invested in bank 
deposits. Among these non-deposit investments, government bonds frequently 
accounted for more than half, with the mutual funds at an insignificant level. In 2004, 
there were RMB 265bn invested in government bonds, while RMB 67bn were in 
mutual funds. By following this investment approach, the returns are expected to be 
very low. Immediate historical return data are not available, but Wu (2005a), 
chairman of the CIRC, noted that as of 2002, the nominal return was 0.05%. Given 
the inflation rate of –0.77 (see Table 17), the real return was only 0.82%. In this 
context, the positive return is totally from the negative inflation rate, and the 
investment performance only accounts for 6% of the total return.  
 
To summarise China’s insurance industry, the size is still small relative to other 
countries, particularly compared to developed countries. Against this, however, 
insurance industry in China has grown rapidly since 1990s. For example, statistics in 
Table 37 show that during 1992-2004, the average growth rate of life premium was 
82%. When investment issues are concerned, real returns were quite low, which might 
be due to strict regulations.  
 
Comparison between China and Chile 
 
Last, a short comparison between Chile and China. Comparative statistics of life 
insurance market are given in Table 31. Both countries had an insurance industry at 
the similar size if using same-year comparison. The ratio of life insurance penetration 
                                                
29
 Financial bonds are issued by the state-owned banks, and can be viewed as a kind of government 
bonds.  
30
 For some Chinese insurers, they have a certain amount of foreign assets outside the Chinese territory. 
These assets manly come from the IPO revenues, injection capital from the foreign partners for those 
joint-ventures, and those business involving foreign markets. It is estimated that foreign assets within 
the Chinese insurers were equivalent to US$ 10bn as of 2004 (www.cei.gov.cn). In addition, for each 
major insurer, the SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange) issues a limit within which the 
foreign assets could be free invested abroad. For example, the PINGAN Company has a US$1.75bn 
quota, allowed for a free investment abroad. 
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(life premia to GDP) was 2.3% for China, and 2.6% for Chile, as of 2003. When using 
comparison of Chile 1980 versus China 2003, however, China showed an encouraging 
sign. Specifically, in 1980 the ratio of life insurance penetration was 0.2% for Chile, 
while it was 2.3% for China in 2003.  
 
5.1.3.3.2 Mutual fund industry 
 
Before 1997, there existed a range of different small mutual funds in China. During 
this period, there was not any national regulation regarding this industry, therefore 
their development was largely self-initiating, and separated between regions. Also 
irregularities often occurred in the industry (Chen 2001). In response to this problem, 
the Provisional regulations on the securities investment funds was released in 1997. It 
is the first of this kind of regulation, providing a framework for the development of 
the mutual fund industry in China. Moreover, by establishing and developing a strong 
mutual fund industry, the reformers want to solve another structural problem 
associated with China’s stock market, the speculative investment culture and the 
consequent high volatility. Financial regulators expect that mutual funds, as long-term 
investors, are able to conduct professional investment, i.e. buying or selling shares 
based on the fundamentals (Xu 2001). This kind of long-term investment culture or 
practice is very needed, in that China’s stock market tends to be dominated by 
individual investors and speculators (Green 2003a).  
 
At the beginning, all funds were closed end, and in 2001, open-end funds were 
introduced. As of August 2005, there are 195 funds, among which, 54 were closed-
end funds, and 141 were open-end funds. For these 141 open-end funds, 65 were 
equity funds, 13 were bond funds, 35 were balanced funds, 23 were money funds, and 
5 were income funds (Hu 2005). Table 40 reveals the rapid growth of China’s mutual 
fund industry, particularly the open-end fund industry. In 2001, there were only 50 
funds, including 2 open-end funds and 48 closed-end funds. The total amount of 
assets approximated RMB 66bn. Within one year, i.e. in 2002, the number of the 
open-end funds became 14, increased from 2, and that of the closed-end funds rose to 
53. As of June 2005, China mutual fund industry had 127 open-end funds and 53 
closed-end funds, with total assets of RMB 430bn, an 8 time-fold increase within 4 
years, despite sluggish stock market as reviewed in the previous section. Meanwhile, 
as shown in Table 49, the ratio of mutual funds assets/GDP was 0.9% in 2000, which 
then increased to 2.7% in 2004. In terms of the asset allocation of China’s mutual 
funds, the summary statistics are given in Table 4131. It is revealed that China’s 
mutual fund managers favour the equity much more than the bond and other assets. 
For example, as of 2004, 53% of the assets were invested in equities, and 36% in 
bonds, 6% in bank deposits, and 5% in others, e.g. money market.   
 
Stock is expected to have a higher return than other assets, e.g. bonds, at least from 
the long run perspective (see Table 17). Did mutual fund managers in China achieve a 
satisfactory performance? Table 42 shows the return on the net assets over the past 5 
years. All years witnessed positive nominal returns. After considering the inflation 
rate, however, the returns became negative in both 2004 and the first half year of 
2005. The growth rate of the net assets over the previous period was negative in 3 
                                                
31
 It is worth noting that the total assets in Table 41, in some cases, are not same as those in Table 40. 
Such difference might be due to the different calculation methods as well as the rounding errors.  
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years, and positive in 2 years. For example, in 2002, the growth rate was –5.03%. On 
one hand, the unsatisfactory returns and growth rates over the previous period were in 
line with the sluggish stock market in China during the same period (see Section 5.1.2 
for details), since more than half of the mutual funds’ assets were invested in equities, 
as noted above. On the other hand, given the downward trend of China’s stock market 
over the period 2000-04, as indicated by the declining stock indices in Tables 33 and 
33, China’s mutual fund managers outperformed the stock market during the period. 
For example, in 2004, the real return of mutual funds was –1% (Table 42), while in 
the same year, the return by following the market was even more negative, i.e. –5% 
(Table 33). In addition, it is shown in Table 42 that all years experienced positive 
over-performance ratios, e.g. 10% in 2001, and 8% in 2004.  
 
In comparison, US mutual fund managers performed much better in terms of real 
return, as indicated in Table 43. During the period 1971-1975, the real return was 
1.67%, partly owning to the bear market in the early 1970s. In 1990s until 2005, all 
average returns were above 10%, e.g. around 20% in 1996-2000. Regarding the over-
performance ratio, i.e. mutual fund return minus market return, it was negative in 4 
periods, while positive in 3 periods, notably 15% over 2001-2005. When it comes to 
the growth rate of net assets, it is shown that the US mutual fund industry grew more 
quickly than the Chinese fund industry. For example, except the two bear market 
periods, i.e. 1971-1975 and 2001-2004 (Davis 2003b), in most other periods, 
particularly in the early years, the US mutual fund industry registered high growth 
rates, i.e. 32% in 1981-1985, and 164% in 1951-1960. In addition, as given in Table 
43, the asset to GDP ratio was much larger for the US than that for China, i.e. 1-3% 
for China’s mutual fund industry, while it is 67% for the US mutual fund industry in 
2001-2005. All these comparison ratios indicate the large scope of development of 
China’s mutual funds in the future (Kim et al 2003). In this case, pension reform can 
play an important role, since mutual funds are an important investment vehicle for 
pension fund managers, as noted earlier.   
 
Table 44 shows the distribution statistics relating to the 100 shares which are most 
invested in by mutual funds in China. In 2001, the average/mean number of funds 
invested in the 100 shares was 1.1. The average percentage of the stock market 
capitalisation related to the tradable shares was very small, and close to zero. The 
insignificance is consistent with our discussion above; in 2001, the mutual fund 
industry was very small, therefore it was without voice in the stock market. By June 
2005, however, the picture had changed a lot. In terms of the number of funds, the 
minimum number of funds invested in each of those 100 shares was 3, and maximum 
81. On average, there were 28 mutual funds invested in each share. On the value part, 
the average market capitalisation of the tradable shares for the 100 shares invested in 
by mutual funds was 32%. In other words, for those 100 shares most favoured by 
mutual funds, on average, 32% of the tradable shares are controlled by mutual funds 
in China. If we consider the remaining non-traded shares, i.e. 2/3 of the total, mutual 
funds control around 11% of the total shares of those 100 stocks.   
 
Given the relatively large number of the share controlling, particularly in terms of the 
tradable shares, one interesting question is whether those mutual fund managers in 
China are engaged in herding, thus generating volatility. As reviewed in Hu (2005b), 
herding refers to mimetic investment behaviour, where asset managers try to buy and 
sell shares at the same time, underpinned by the regular performance assessment from 
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the fund sponsors (Davis 2000; Dennis and Strickland 2002). Table 45 presents the 
statistical summary of the 10 most invested shares by each mutual fund. In 2001, on 
average, the 10 most invested shares accounted for 50% of the total assets of each 
mutual fund. Moreover, in maximum, 70% of the assets were allocated in the 10 
largest shares. In 2003, the share holding became more concentrated among the 10 
largest shares. For example, for some mutual funds, they allocated 100% of their 
assets to the 10 shares, while the average allocation ratio was 59%. Another 
interesting observation is that the assets were most concentrated to the most favoured 
shares. In 2003, the largest share, on average, received 11% of the total assets, the 2nd 
largest share, 7.6%, and the 10th largest share received only 3.4%.  
 
Table 45 reveals that a large volume of mutual funds’ assets are invested in the 10 
largest shares. Although it provides some evidence of herding, it is not necessarily the 
case, if the 10 largest shares for each mutual fund are not the same. In extreme cases, 
if Fund A holds Share 1, Share 2 until Share 10, and Fund B holds Share 11, Share 12 
until Share 20, they both in fact are engaged in different investment strategies, 
therefore there is no herding behaviour. In order to get around this issue, a deeper 
analysis is needed. We selected 2 shares, which are believed to be among the most 
favoured by the fund managers in 2002 and 2003. As shown in Table 46, in 2002, 9 
out of 10 mutual funds were invested in the same stock, i.e. China Telecom (China 
Telecommunications), and China Telecom was among the 5 largest shares for all 
funds. In 2003, the concentration declined, but was still significant. 19 out of 43 funds 
put Sinopec in their portfolios as the 10 largest shares. Therefore, statistics in Table 46 
suggest that in China, the mutual fund managers have herding behaviour, at least to 
some extent. The finding is consistent with other research results in China (Yang and 
Chen, 2004; Xu 2003), and in other EMEs such as Poland (Voronkova and Bohl 
2003). 
 
Comparison between China and Chile 
 
The precise start date of Chilean mutual fund industry is unknown. However, it was 
estimated that in 1990, the assets under management by mutual funds in Chile were 
equivalent to US$ 670million (2.2% of GDP) (Harris 2005), while this figure rose to 
US$ 12.6billion (13.3% of GDP) as of 2004 (ICI 2005b). In comparison, China’s 
mutual fund industry was smaller. As shown in Table 49, as of 2004, the total assets 
managed by China’s mutual funds were RMB 336bn (US$ 41bn), which was only 
2.7% of GDP. If we use Chile-1980-China-2003 comparison as in the previous 
sections, however, the result is likely to be favourable to China’s pension reform. 
Although we do not have data concerning Chilean mutual fund industry as of 1980, it 
is expected to be quite small, and very likely to be smaller than China’s 2003 figure, 
i.e. 1.2%, as in Table 49.  
 
5.1.3.3.3 Pension funds 
 
In Sections 2 and 3, we reviewed the general development of China’s pension fund 
sector, e.g. the fund regulation and investment. In this section, we discuss another two 
different issues which are closely linked to the stock market in China. The first one 
relates to those pension assets handed over to the mutual fund managers for 
professional management from the NSSF (National Social Security Fund). It is noted 
that as of 2004, the ration of NSSF assets/GDP was 1.3%. Until recently, the NSSF 
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was managed by the in-house investment team. Due to the lack of expertise and 
knowledge of fund investment, the returns were very low (Ma and Wang 2001), also 
as noted in Section 3.3.3. Aware of this issue, the authorities decided to allow a 
portion of the NSSF to be invested in stocks, but through the mutual fund companies 
in 2003. After a rigorous and careful selection by National Council for the Social 
Security Fund NCSSF (NCSSF), six domestic fund mangers were chosen to manage 
around RMB 12bn assets, equivalent to 10% of the total assets in 2003 (ADB 2003). 
The initial investment mandate lasts 2 years, and the internal requirements for these 
six fund managers are to achieve at least a 3% real return per year, and/or a return 
higher than the one-year fixed interest by 20%. Based on the forecast inflation and 
interest rates in 2003, the target return was 4% per year during the first two-year 
mandate period. The actual returns earned by the fund managers are not available. The 
mandate-end assessment in June 2005 by the NCSSF, however, indicates that most 
managers achieved a satisfactory result. The NCSSF renewed the contacts for all six 
managers for another two years, and the asset allocations to each manage slightly 
changed, i.e. the out-performers were allocated more funds, and the under-performers 
allocated less funds (NCSSF 2005).  
 
Table 47 shows the statistical summary of the NSSF assets managed by mutual funds 
in China. The statistics are only related to those stocks for which the NSSF, through 
mutual funds, was among the top 10 largest shareholders of tradable shares. Overall, 
162 stocks meet this criterion, and those stocks are under the management of 11 stock 
portfolios. As shown in Panel A, on average, the NSSF served as the fifth largest 
shareholders in 2004. Moreover, in 24 of 162 cases, the NSSF, via mutual funds, held 
the largest number of tradable shares. The average market capitalisation per portfolio 
was RMB 327mn, and the average number of held shares was 35 millions. Panel B 
compares the total NSSF assets held by mutual funds with the market capitalisation. It 
is shown that relative to the market, the NSSF, through the fund managers, only 
controlled 3.1% of the total tradable shares, which approximated 1% of the total 
shares. Therefore, for the time being, the NSSF has not played an important role as in 
advanced countries (Davis and Steil 2001; Clark 2000). 
 
As we discussed in Section 3, the Chinese pension system is highly fragmented. 
Regarding pension funds accumulated in different regions, fund management is 
separated, and shows a large variation in terms of returns and investment procedures. 
In Table 48, we present the data concerning occupational pension assets accumulated 
and managed in two cities in China, i.e. Shanghai and Shenzhen. In these two cities, 
the Occupational Pension Management Centres were established, when the authorities 
encouraged the development of the supplementary or occupational pension funds in 
1997 (see Section 2). As of 2004, the total amount of assets allocated to the stock 
market was around RMB 463 millions, and the total number of shares held by these 
two centres was 69 millions.  
 
In terms of the shareholding structure, on average, the occupational pension funds 
within these two centres were the sixth largest shareholders concerning the tradable 
shares. Although it is only related to the investment practices in two cities, it to some 
extent reflects the start of the corporate engagement by pension funds in China (Clark 
2000; Clark and Hebb 2004). On the academic side in China, there is little debate on 
the role played by pension funds in corporate governance. On the one hand, it is due 
to the small size of pension fund sector in China, i.e. 1.4% of GDP in Table 49. On 
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the other hand, it is associated with the 2/3 non-tradable State shares. In other words, 
if only 1/3 of total shares are traded in China’s stock market, with the remaining 
controlled by the state, there is little room for institutional investors, and pension 
funds in particular, to actively engage in corporate governance (Tenev et al 2002).   
 
5.1.3.3.4 Securities companies  
Securities companies in China are defined as those financial intermediaries which 
mainly provide securities services such as dealing, brokerage and underwriting (Green 
and Wall 2000). As of October 2002, there were 124 securities companies in China 
(Kim et al 2003), and those companies are grouped into two types; one is termed as 
Brokerage firm, and the other is termed as Comprehensive firm (CSRC 1999). 
Generally, the requirements for establishing the former are stricter than for the latter. 
For example, the initial capital required for establishing a brokerage firm is RMB 50 
million, while it is RMB 500 million for the comprehensive firm (CSRC 1999). 
Largely for the high entry barriers and the difficulty in obtaining the licenses from the 
CSRC, securities companies used to enjoy profitable returns until 2001. As noted 
earlier, starting in 2001, China’s stock market has experienced a downward trend, 
with the transactions dwindling in 4 consecutive years. Because the majority of the 
revenues in securities companies generated from the dealing and brokerage (Green 
and Wall 2000), the recent sluggish stock market has significantly affected the 
profitability of many securities companies.  
 
In order to avoid the excessive dependence on brokerage activities, and develop new 
lines of business, many securities companies, in the 1990s, started to engage in direct 
asset investment business, mainly for large corporations. With the original purpose of 
diversifying income-generating sources, thus reducing profit volatility. Securities 
companies, in practice, directed most funds to the stock market and the property 
market, given their high returns. Everything went well, when the stock market was 
strong in the 1990s. The picture has, however, become less favourable since 2001. As 
of 2004, China’s securities companies registered losses at the level of RMB 6bn, 
including RMB 3.4bn in misused client funds (www.hexun.com, 2005). In addition, 
China Southern Securities, once the 5th largest securities firm, went into bankruptcy in 
2002. Many factors underpin the bankruptcy, and one of them is the risky investment 
of the client’s funds, which was exacerbated by the recent continuous market 
downturn.  
In order to regulate China’s securities companies, the CSRC, in December 2003, 
issued the “Provisional regulations on the management of clients’ assets by securities 
companies”, which aims to regulate securities companies’ investment banking 
business (CSRC 2003). For example, it is stipulated that government bonds and other 
liquid fixed-income bonds should be the main investment instruments. Equity 
investment is allowed, but the priority should be given to those blue-chip stocks and 
stock mutual funds. In addition, the upper limit on the investment in stocks is 20% of 
the total assets. In addition, it is regulated that any securities company should not buy 
more than 10% of the total shares issued by one company, and should not promise 
minimum guarantee returns to clients. Given the strict quantitative investment 
restrictions, and the potential growth of pension fund assets with China’s ageing 
population, many securities companies have started eyeing the accumulated asserts 
within pension systems, particularly the occupational pension funds (Chen 2001). The 
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beneficial impacts on securities companies could be direct, owning to the increase in 
the fee-based income, and indirect, related to the rise in business by their subsidiary 
asset management companies.  
In comparison to other institutional investors in China, the aggregate assets data of 
securities companies are difficult to be accessed. Kim e t al (2003), however, report 
that, as of October 2002, the total assets under the management of securities 
companies in China were around RMB 51 billion (0.53% of GDP).  
 
5.1.3.3.5 Summary  
 
In this section we provide an overview of the size of China’s institutional investors, so 
as to compare China’s institutions with those in other countries. By summarising the 
results presented in previous sections, it is expected to give some indication of the 
potential growth of the industry in the coming decades, if China continues its rapid 
economic growth, and reforms its pension system smoothly.  
 
Table 49 presents the aggregate statistics of China’s major institutions investors, as 
we discussed above. The only institutional investor, we did not mention earlier, is 
underground funds; they are defined as those large investors which engage in the 
investment business in the financial markets, but are not legally recognised in China. 
They grew dramatically from the early 1990s, to the current huge industry managing 
assets around RMB 500-800bn (www.hexun.com; Xia 2001). Their rapid growth is 
mainly linked to the promised high returns and flexibility in terms of fund investment 
and regulations. For these characteristics, they could be viewed as hedge funds, 
similar to that in advanced countries (Brooks and Kat 2001); the only major difference 
is that their operation and business in China is illegal. Due to the lack of the exact 
data, we estimate the assets under management of underground funds were same over 
the 4 years, i.e. at the level of RMB 650bn. In addition, the occupational pension 
assets in 2004 were RMB 0.45bn, and the assets under securities companies in 2002 
were RMB 0.5bn. In order to facilitate our analysis and for the simplicity, we assume 
that the assets under management did not change over the past 4 four years.   
 
Table 49 shows that the aggregate assets of institutional investors in China grew from 
RMB 1,316bn in 2001, to RMB 2,394bn in 2004, 80% growth over the four years. 
Relative to the level of GDP, it is found that the size of institutions increased steadily. 
For example, the ratio of All institutions/GDP (including underground funds) was 
13.5% in 2001, and increased to 18.9% in 2004. If excluding underground funds, the 
formal/legal institution investors in China accounted for 6.8% of GDP in 2001, and 
13.8% in 2004. If we consider pension funds only, the ratio of Pension funds/GDP 
was 0.8% in 2001, and 1.4% in 2004. It is worth noting that pension data herein only 
include the assets of the NSSF and the occupational pension assets in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, which obviously is smaller than the actual size of the total pension assets in 
China. As we discussed in Section 3, however, pension management in China is 
highly fragmented, and it is always conducted at the city or country level. In 
consequence, the accumulated assets in that way are very small, and not genuine 
institutional investors. It is also a relevant point that most assets in that context are 
invested in government bonds and bank deposits. Therefore, they are not expected to 
have any impact on the financial markets, which then justifies the exclusion of them 
from our analysis in this section.  
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By presenting the data for China’s institutional investors above, one interesting 
question naturally emerges, i.e. how large are China’s institutions relative to other 
countries? In order to make the comparison meaningful, we choose 2001 as the 
comparison year, since 2001 is the year for which we have consistent data regarding 
institutional investors in both China and other countries. As indicated in Table 50, we 
group OECD countries into three headings, i.e. OECD-all, including all OECD 
countries, OECD-advanced, including those advanced OECD countries only, and 
OECD-developing, including those less advanced OECD countries. In addition, we 
use another heading, i.e. All EMEs, when discussing pension data. All EMEs refers to 
33 emerging market economies, including Asian, Latin American, African and 
Eastern European countries, and the data are as of 2002.  When the ratio of All 
institutions/GDP is concerned, China was at the level of 14%, while the OECD-all 
was 163%, more than 10-fold higher. When the advanced OECD countries are 
dropped, however, the ratio (OECD-developing) decreases to 11.1%, comparable to 
the Chinese case. As regards the importance of pension funds as institutional 
investors, China had an insignificant pension industry as of 2001. The average ratio of 
Pension funds/GDP was 18.9% for all OECD countries, 34.4 for all advanced OECD 
countries, and 3.3% for those less advanced OECD countries. In addition, Hu (2005b) 
and Davis (2005) report that the ratio was 12% for the selected 33 EMEs. In 
comparison, China’s pension fund industry was only 0.8% of GDP in 2001, which 
was also significantly smaller than 12.7% for the Chilean case, as given in the last row 
in Table 50.  
 
5.1.3.4 Conclusions on preconditions 
 
By reviewing the current situation of China’s institutional investors above, it is 
indicated that they are sufficient to initiate pension reform with funding components. 
For example, the life insurance industry has developed from non-existence to a 
relatively large market, and it is also able to offer some annuities products, although 
admittedly there are still many problems, e.g. small market penetration and strict 
investment regulations. Concerning mutual funds, their current development is 
capable of supporting pension reform towards funded systems as well, given the size 
and range of products in the market. For example, as noted, mutual funds in China are 
classified into different funds, e.g. bond funds, equity funds etc, which can meet basic 
heterogeneous needs from pension funds.  Blake (1997a) argues that pension schemes 
with different maturities should shift between bond and equity investment 
accordingly.  
 
5.1.3.5 Conclusions on benefits 
 
Pension reform can improve the development of institutional investors in China. As 
noted in Hu (2005b), Chile had virtually no pension assets before 1980 when it started 
its pension reform. In 2002, however, the pension fund industry grew to around 60% 
of GDP. If China continues its rapid economic growth and current pension reform 
towards a funded system, China is expected to witness a significant expansion of the 
pension fund industry, like Chile, over the coming decades. This trend is underpinned 
by China’s rapid ageing population. This point, however, is closely linked to the case 
of “empty” personal accounts in China, as noted in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. If these 
savings in personal accounts are used to pay off current pensioners, rather than 
accumulated, the acclaimed positive impacts are expected to be small at best.   
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Another benefit relates to the mutual fund and insurance industries (Davis 2005a). In 
many countries a large volume of pension fund assets are outsourced to mutual fund 
managers for investment. For example, as noted in Section 5.1.3, 6 domestic mutual 
fund managers have been selected to manage the NSSF in China. Even in the case 
where pension funds are to invest by themselves, mutual funds are still a good 
investment vehicle in terms of risk diversification and professional management 
(Davis and Steil 2001; Ma and Wang 2001). Insurance companies also can benefit 
from pension reform (Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Melia 2002), since the annuities 
market plays a very important role in any funded system. The annuities market in 
China is in its infant stage, but expected to increase in size significantly in the coming 
decades (Hu 2005e).  
 
Securities companies of course would be able to obtain a share of the positive impacts 
as well, arising from pension reform and pension fund growth. For example, more 
activities and transactions required from other market participants, e.g. mutual funds 
and insurance companies, would bring more business to brokers, i.e. securities 
companies, thus implying more revenues and higher growth.  
 
5.1.4 Bond market 
 
5.1.4.1 Preconditions 
 
A sound bond market is the precondition for any pension reform, given the important 
role played by bonds in pension funds’ portfolios, especially for EMEs (OECD 
2005b; Clark and Hu 2005a). In this context, one point which is particularly 
important, relates to annuities markets. Specifically, for insurance companies offering 
annuities, their investment strategy mainly focuses on bond investment; therefore the 
availability of bonds in the market is a minimum precondition. The importance of the 
bond market becomes increasingly noticeable, given the current trend of liability 
driven investment (LDI). The Bank of England noted that UK pension funds were 
buying index-linked gilts at virtually any price (IPE 2005), which is partly explained 
by the LDI strategy. In addition, reforming countries frequently use debt financing, 
i.e. bond issuance, to meet up the implicit pension debts after implementing pension 
reform, e.g. Chile (Acuna and Iglesias 2001). Therefore, for those countries which 
have to consider issuing bonds to finance pension debts, a bond market must be ready 
before adopting pension reform with funded components.  
 
5.1.4.2 Benefits of pension reform 
 
Hu (2005b) investigates the impacts of pension fund asset growth on both private and 
public bonds. As shown in Table 26, the results are mixed, but there is some evidence 
indicating the positive influence of pension assets on private bonds in the long run. In 
addition, Impavido et al (2003) find a positive impact of contractual savings on 
aggregate bond markets, although they do not separate the data by public bonds and 
private bonds. The reason why the bond market can benefit from pension reform is the 
heavy investment of pension funds in both government and corporate bonds, as noted 
in the preceding section. In this case, the development of annuities markets and the 
popularity of liability driven investment (LDI) are particularly important and play as 
two powerful growth engines. In addition, pension reform can also contribute to the 
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growth of the bond market by facilitating bond-related financial innovation, e.g. 
inflation-linked bonds (Bodies 1989).  
 
5.1.4.3 Current situation  
 
China used to avoid the issue of bonds and any other debt securities, since under the 
past centrally planned regime, one objective of fiscal policy was to maintain equality 
between government spending and revenue. Moreover, the policy of “No domestic 
debt and international debt” was widely regarded as one advantage of the socialist 
society (MOF, Japan 2003). The picture changed, however, in 1981 when China first 
issued government bonds (Su 2005). Although the amount was very small, only 
around RMB 5bn (see Table 51), it opened another new era of China’s financial 
liberalisation. With China’s rapid growth, the authorities have gradually realised the 
importance of the bond market. In consequence, bond market has grown significantly 
over the past two decades. Table 51 shows that in most years, the size of government 
bond issuance grew at a two-digit rate, except in a few years when bond issuance 
dropped, e.g. 1990. Commensurate with the growth of bond issuance, bond 
repayments, including both principal and interests increased steadily. For example, in 
1990, the repayment was just around RMB 11bn (0.61% of GDP), while in 2003, it 
soared to RMB 288bn (2.45% of GDP).  
 
Figure 2 reveals the expanding trend of China’s bond market relative to the level of 
GDP. In the early 1990s, the combined size of both public and private bond markets 
was around 10% of GDP. Over the following years, China’s bond market continued 
its expansion, and in 2003, bond market capitalisation accounted for around 30% of 
GDP. Over the period until 1999, the public bond market was of the same size as the 
private bond market. Since 2000, however, the former has expanded more quickly, 
being size the double of the latter in 2003. In comparison to other countries, China’s 
bond market (both private and public) is small (Green and Wall 2000), as indicated in 
Figure 3. The ratio of bond market capitalisation to GDP for China was less than that 
for OECD and EMEs over the period 1990-2003. For example, in 2003, the ratio was 
above 90% for OECD countries, and 40% for EME, while it was only 30% for China.  
 
In China, bonds are classified into different types by issuers. They are long-term 
government bonds, issued by the government (Finance Ministry), treasury bills, issued 
by the central bank, policy financial bonds issued by the development banks, 
commercial bank bonds by the commercial banks, securities companies bonds by 
securities companies, and corporate bonds, mainly issued by the large SOEs. Among 
these bonds, the first three bonds account for most of the market share. Table 52 gives 
the issuance data of different bonds by issuers in China. The overall size of China’s 
bond markets was RMB 2,730bn in 2004, while the government issued RMB 481bn 
bonds (3.8% of GDP), the central bank issued 1,704bn (11% of GDP), and the 
development banks issued 435bn (3.4% of GDP). In terms of issuance frequency, the 
central bank issued 11 times in 2004, and corporate bond issuance only occurred 
twice. The data for 2005, as revealed in Table 52, have a similar picture, with the 
central bank being the largest issuer. It is admitted that large volume of treasury bills 
were issued to finance government deficits.  
 
In terms of the term structure, most bonds are issued with the maturity periods longer 
than 5 years, and the most common maturity periods are 5, 7 and 10 years. There are 
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bonds longer than 20 years, but they are very rare. The first 30-year bonds were issued 
for the purpose of financing China’s Three Gorges Dam project along Yangtze River, 
which is expected to cost billions of dollars. Statistics (www.hexun.com, 2005) show 
that as of August 2005, there were 74 government and corporate bonds traded in the 
markets32. Among them, 67 were bonds with maturity period longer than 5 years, and 
7 bonds less than 5 years. For those government/corporate bonds (36/38), 30/37 were 
issued with the maturity periods longer than 5 years, and 6/1 shorter than 5 years.  
 
In addition, Figure 4 depicts debt maturities and short-term debt ratios for China and 
EMEs in general over 1981 and 2003. Debts herein refer to publicly guaranteed loans 
borrowed by domestic governments from international organisations, e.g. the World 
Bank, as well as domestic agents, e.g. central banks. In terms of short-term debt ratio 
(debts under 1 year/total debts), China witnessed higher values consistently over the 
period. For example in 2003, the ratio was 37% for China, and just 16% for EMEs. 
Concerning maturity, both China and EMEs registered values around 15 years, 
although China’s values were larger over the whole period. Given the statistics above 
it to some extent reflects borrowing pattern in China, i.e. in favour of short financing, 
although loans are different from bonds. Therefore, it is suggested that if the Chinese 
authorities plan to use debt financing to cover the pension deficits in the future, more 
weight might be given to long-term debts, typically longer than 10 years, e.g. 20 and 
30 years. On the one hand, it adjusts the debt structure in China. On the other hand, it 
meets pension fund manages’ need for long-term investment instruments (Campbell 
and Viceria 2001; G10 2005). In addition, issuance of inflation-linked bonds might be 
considered, given its importance in pension fund management (Bodie 2001, 2004; Hu 
2005c).   
 
As to the returns, Table 53 shows that the average return, i.e. YTM (yield to 
maturity), was 2.52% for government bonds in 2005, and 1.04% in 2003. For 
corporate bonds, the returns were higher. The mean YTM was 3.21% in 2003, and 
2.87 in 2005. In addition, the maximum returns for corporate bonds were larger than 
those for government bonds. For example, in 2003, it was 4.16% for the former, and 
3.73% for the latter; the higher premium is consistent with the financial theory, i.e. as 
the compensation for the higher risk. In comparison to other countries, China’s 10-
year government bonds yield low returns than other countries, as shown in Table 54. 
For example, in 2004, China’s long-term bonds had a real return of -0.91%, much 
lower than 5.56% for selected OECD countries, and 4.42% for EMEs. The negative 
bond yield is consistent with the low level of interest rates in 2004, i.e. 2.25% in 
nominal, and -0.71% in real term (IMF statistics 2005), which in turn indicates the 
loose monetary policy since the late 1990s, in order to sustain high economic growth 
(Lin 2004).  
 
5.1.4.4 Comparison between China and Chile 
 
Last, we have a brief comparison between Chinese and Chilean bond markets. Data 
are given in Table 31. In terms of the same-year comparison, Chile was in a better 
position over the whole period. For example, the ratio of private bond market assets to 
GDP was 10.3% for China, while it was 19.4% Chile as of 2003. Concerning the 
                                                
32
 In China, the bonds used to be sold to targeted institutions and individuals, and they were not traded 
in the market. In order to facilitate the liquidity, in 1999, selected bonds could be traded in the market.  
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public bonds/GDP ratio, it was 18.9% for China, and 27.4% for Chile in the same 
year. If we compare Chile 1980 with China 2003 as in the previous sections, the 
results might differ. We do not have specific 1980 data for Chilean bond markets, 
however, presumably the figures should be less than 9.3% for private bonds/GDP, and 
19.8% for public bonds/GDP (both figures are 1995 observations). If this is the case, 
the current bond market in China is larger than that in the years when Chile started its 
pension privatisation.  
 
5.1.4.5 Conclusions on preconditions 
 
In terms of the basic requirements for a pension reform toward funded systems, we 
believe that the current bond market in China can sustain such a transition. However, 
a number of issues still need to be addressed, if it is intended to maximise the positive 
impacts of pension reform on the bond markets. The first one is concerned with the 
term structure. Currently, the majority of bonds in China are issued with the maturity 
periods less than 10 years. This is not sufficient to meet the demand from pension 
funds for a longer liability. Therefore, the Chinese authorities might consider issuing 
more bonds longer than 10 years, e.g. 20 years, and even 50 years, like the UK and 
France. Secondly, inflation linked bonds are very attractive to pension funds, in that 
this kind of bonds can protect scheme members from inflation risk to a large extent, if 
not completely33 (Hu 2005b). Therefore, inflation-protected bonds should be 
introduced to the market as soon as possible.  
 
5.1.4.6 Conclusions on benefits 
 
Pension reform can play a positive role in stimulating the growth of China’s bond 
markets. The public bond market will expand, since many reforming countries, e.g. 
Chile, use bond issuance to finance the pension liabilities. In China, the government 
has not yet issued bonds for the purpose of pension reform so far. It is, however, a 
reasonable policy alternative to consider in the future (Wang et al 1999). Particularly, 
at the moment, when the government’s favoured method of transferring IPO assets to 
the NSSF (see Section 5.1.2.3) was withdrawn, issuing bonds is an appropriate choice. 
In terms of the private bond market, pension reform also plays a beneficial role, in 
that fund managers always buy corporate bonds to diversify their portfolios, seeking a 
return, lower and less risky than equities, but higher than government bonds. In 
addition, pension fund growth can contribute to financial innovation, e.g. longer 
bonds and inflation-linked bonds, as noted above. It is notable that the balance of 
bonds rose from US$ 44million in 1981 to US$ 1,873million in 1997 in Chile’s bond 
markets; it is argued that pension reform played an important role  (Acuna and 
Iglesias 2001). 
 
5.1.5 Money market 
 
5.1.5.1 Preconditions 
 
                                                
33
 Specifically, the life insurers in many countries typically offer inflation indexation up to a pre-
specified level, e.g. 5 per cent in practice, and the risk above that level is still borne by the annuitants. 
In this context, the inflation risk is not removed completely.  
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Money market can be defined as the market for short-term securities issued by 
corporations, banks and the government (Luenberger 1998). The main activities 
involve inter-bank lending, repo (repurchase agreement), and circulation of 
commercial paper and discount notes. It is believed that the money market is not a 
minimum condition for pension reform. One the one hand, pension funds normally do 
not invest a large amount of assets in the money market directly, on the other hand, 
even in the case where pension funds buy money market products via mutual funds, 
the high liquidity and security provided by the money market could be met by 
investment in cash and bank deposits to some extent, although it is admitted that these 
two investment types are not the same. The money market, however, may still be a 
positive factor during the pension reform process in that it can help fund managers to 
find a better return-risk portfolio, not least due to that reason that an efficient money 
market plays a beneficial role in facilitating derivatives trading.  
 
5.1.5.2 Benefits of pension reform 
 
Pension reform again can benefit the development of the money market. The reason is 
quite straightforward. First, many mutual fund managers purchase money market 
products to diversify risk and achieve high liquidity. Then given the fact that mutual 
funds manage a large amount of pension assets in their portfolios, it is obvious to see 
a rapid growth of the money market, following pension reform. Second, Allen and 
Santomero (2001) mention that in the US, individuals are allowed to deposit their 
salaries automatically in money market accounts, and routinely withdraw money from 
cash machines. This convenience would increase the popularity of this account, and 
thus leading to the growth of money market assets.  
 
5.1.5.3 Current situation in China 
 
The money market first emerged in the 1980s in China, and has undergone rapid 
growth since 1990s (CCER 2004). As of May 2005, the total market volume reached 
the level of RMB 5,566bn, up from RMB 72bn in 1997 (Shen 2005). A variety of 
institutions have participated in the money market, including commercial banks, 
policy banks, securities companies, insurance companies and mutual funds, as well as 
the central bank (Su 2005). The largest market participant is the central 
bank/government. As shown in Table 52, the central bank had issued RMB 1,704bn 
(13.5% of GDP) treasury bills in 2003, accounting for more than 60% of the total 
bond market capitalisation. The amount of short-term debts issued by corporations in 
the money market is insignificant, although there is a consensus that the dominant 
position of the government and the state-owned banks should be changed by allowing 
more participants/institutions to finance short-term debts in the money market.  
 
Given the high liquidity and security, the money market has received a great attention 
from mutual fund managers. In order to encourage mutual funds to participate and 
also regulate their investment behaviour, PoBC (People’s Bank of China) and CSRC 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission) issued a joint circulate, i.e. “Provisional 
regulations on the management of the money mutual funds” in 2004. It stipulates 
money funds can only invest in one year saving certificates, one year treasury bills, 
and other high monetary assets recognised by the PoBC etc. In addition, investment in 
short-term corporate bonds issued by any single firm should not exceed 10% of the 
net assets of mutual funds.  
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Last, it is worth noting that the money market is the only place in China where the 
market decides the interest rates (Zhou 2003). The authorities hope that, by allowing 
the marketisation of interest rates in the money market, it can help develop the 
financial regulators’ experience in the issue, therefore facilitating the achievement of 
full interest rate liberalisation eventually some time in the future (CCER 2004). It is 
consistent with China’s style of economic reform, i.e. gradualism (Woo 1999; Yueh 
2003), whereby any major economic reform is always initiated in a small region or 
context; when the reformers obtained sufficient experiences, and became confident 
about its consequences, the reform then is extended to the other part of the country 
and the economy.  
 
5.1.5.4 Conclusions on preconditions 
 
As we noted at the outset of Section 5.1.5, it is not a prerequisite requirement to 
establish a money market first, before pension reform is initiated. However, if we 
want to reform pension system as smoothly as possible, and maximise the positive 
benefits of pension reform, it is necessary to have a healthy money market in China. 
The underlying reason is that the money market provides investment vehicles which 
are complementary to other traditional ones, e.g. bonds and shares, in terms of 
liquidity. In other words, it is beneficial from the perspective of fund management in 
terms of risk diversification (Davis 2002b; Hu 2005c).  
 
5.1.5.5 Conclusions on benefits 
 
The benefits of pension reform on the money market observed in other countries 
should also be available in China. Specifically, with deepening of pension reform, 
more pension assets would be invested in money market products, directly or 
indirectly via mutual funds. In consequence, the market grows in terms of both size 
and efficiency, and it might also lead to more efficient pricing of financial products as 
well as asset allocation within the economy. However, as noted in Section 5.1.5.3, 
currently there are some quantitative restrictions regarding investment by mutual 
funds on money market products. Therefore, in due course when the market becomes 
more developed, such restrictions should be lifted and ideally follow the prudent 
person rules. Another benefit, which is specific to China, relates to interest rate 
liberalisation, as noted in the preceding section. This is important in that such 
liberalisation can have wider impacts on the whole financial system, which in turn 
would benefit pension reform and pension fund growth.  
 
5.1.6 Other issues 
 
Although the financial markets, e.g. the banking sector, institutional investors, are 
crucially important in the process of the Chinese pension reform, there are a number 
of other preconditions for successful pension reform, which are equally important. 
They are monetary stability, financial stability, the legal and regulatory environment, 
good accounting standards, relatively experienced regulators, financial education and 
administrative capability. In what follows, we discuss them briefly.  
 
5.1.6.1 Monetary stability 
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Firstly, maintaining monetary stability is a precondition for successful pension reform 
shifting from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funding (Davis 1998, 2005a; Vittas 2000; 
Mitchell 2000; Holzmann and Hinz 2005). Monetary instability, particularly high 
inflation, is very destructive of the funded pension accounts, since the real value of 
accumulated assets could be eroded away significantly within a high inflation regime. 
In fact, the PAYG’s ability to protect pensioners from inflation (Barr 1998) is a major 
strength, while lack of inflation protection is one main disadvantage of the funding 
systems (Hu 2005b).  In China, inflation was out of control in two periods, i.e. in the 
late 1980s and in the early 1990s. For example, Table 17 shows that in 1994, the 
inflation rate was 24%. The first period was associated with the government’s 
intention to let the market decide the prices of almost all commodities in China, while 
the second high inflation period arose from lax fiscal policies. The high inflation in 
the early 1990s partly contributed to the passage of “Central bank law” in 1995, which 
legally stipulates the independence of the central bank (Hu 2005a). Since the second 
half of the 1990s, inflation has gone down, and remained at a quite low level, even 
negative in 2002 (Table 17). One point, relevant here, is that of inflation-linked 
government bonds. This type of bonds is very useful in a funded pension system, in 
that it can provide some degree of inflation protection. As noted in Section 5.1.4, 
inflation protected bonds are not available in China.  
 
Since China has changed into a market-oriented economy, it should be less common 
to have prices controlled and manipulated purposely by the authorities than before. 
The risk of high inflation, however, still exists. As argued in Davis (2005b), 
inflationary pressures might arise in an aging society, which partly links to the excess 
demand of goods and services over supply (Fitoussi 2003). It is noted, however, this 
effect would not materialise in China until 2030 and afterwards, when the 
demographic pattern changes and China converts to a truly ageing society. On the 
contrary, at the moment, there is counter-inflation effect, which is consistent with 
currently observed low inflation in China; one underlying reason might be “surplus 
labour” which results in downward pressure on wages and high productivity growth at 
a national level. Inflationary pressures could also occur if bond issuance is used to 
finance the transition costs from PAYG to funding (Wang et al 2001), and the 
government does not reduce other public expenditures and spending correspondingly. 
For the time being, China has not decided to use bond issuance to finance its pension 
deficits (Liu and Gao 2005). If the method is adopted some point in the future, 
however, it is recommended that prudent monetary policy is undertaken. When 
inflationary pressures do arise, the monetary authorities should monitor the economy 
carefully, and take restrictive monetary policy if appropriate, e.g. by increasing 
interest rates. “Giving in” to pressure to accommodate high demand with lax 
monetary policy and without reducing spending accordingly needs to be avoided.  
 
5.1.6.2 Financial stability 
 
Secondly, it is crucial to maintain financial stability. Despite the vast heterogeneity of 
financial instability in appearance, it could be summarised into bank, market-price, 
and market-liquidity linked cries by nature (Davis 2003a). A successful pension 
reform relies on the health of financial stability, in that financial markets serve as a 
pivotal intermediary in terms of financing and investment, which in turns has impacts 
on pension reform (Davis 2000; G10 2005). As noted in earlier sections, a large 
volume of pension assets in China has been invested in bank deposits. Therefore, a 
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widespread bank default will seriously harm pension fund assets, although the effect 
is expected to be smaller in the future, when bank deposits might comprise only a 
small portion of China’s pension assets, as in advanced countries (Clare 2005; OECD 
2005b).  
 
It is admitted that a degree of stock market volatility is inevitable, and might be 
necessary and beneficial in terms of helping adjust prices to fundamentals, and 
increase output potentially (Smets and Wouters 2004); in this case, it is argued that 
central banks should not respond to asset changes per se unless those changes signal 
expected future inflation pressures (Bernanke and Gertler 2000). Protracted collapse 
of market liquidity, however, is damaging during the process of pension reform, since 
it can temporarily erode the market value of pension assets, create difficulty in 
pension debt financing, as well as reduce people’s confidence in funded systems. On 
the other hand, pension reform per se might lead to market volatility, in that 
institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, intend to engage in herding behaviour, i.e. 
copy others’ investment strategies regardless of fundamentals (Davis and Steil 2001; 
Dennis and Strickland 2002; Lipson and Puckett 2005). In this context, a robust 
market surveillance mechanism is needed; whenever the market experiences 
turbulence, regulators should be able to quickly identify them to be transitory or long 
term. If it is the latter with a non-fundamental character, i.e. bubbles, actions should 
be taken to mitigate its negative impacts at least.    
 
5.1.6.3 Legal environment 
 
The third issue relates to the legal and regulatory environment (Li and Gao 2005). 
There are two relevant points. As noted in Section 4.4, a national social security law is 
needed in China, since it would provide the legal framework upon which pension 
provisions are based. In this context, whether to participate in the public pension 
system in China becomes an issue of compulsion, thus any ignorance and deliberate 
evasion is against the law. In addition, such a law can enhance people’s confidence 
about the government’s reform commitment (Mitchell 2000), and therefore increase 
the participation rate. Passage of laws, including both the social security law and other 
relevant financial laws, however, is just the first step. Another issue is law 
enforcement. The problem of weak law enforcement, currently quite common in 
China, mainly arises from the bureaucratically political structure, as well as the 
principal-agent problem between central and local governments (James 2002), i.e. 
maximising own interests at the expenses of the other. Therefore, in addition to 
passing the laws, it is necessary to strengthen law enforcement, which could be 
achieved by streamlining the regulatory framework (Davis 1998), and establishing 
coordination between agencies (OECD 2005a), to the extent the unnecessary 
bureaucractism and conflicts of interest are minimised. Recent progress in terms of 
facilitating and strengthening investors’ rights to sue listed companies, e.g. due to 
false financial disclosures, is an encouraging sign in China (Li 2004).   
 
5.1.6.4 Accounting environment 
 
Fourthly, good accounting standards and practices are necessary in order to conduct 
pension reforms smoothly. The indirect link between accounting standards and 
pension reform is through the stock market, i.e. by improving the quality of listed 
companies, whose shares are an important component of pension fund portfolios. 
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Many listed firms in China are engaged in document falsification and accounting 
information manipulation, just in an attempt to make their stocks attractive and meet 
regulatory requirements (CSRC 2003; Li 2004). This mis-behaviour is destructive in 
that it induces company’s management to “create numbers”, rather than enhance 
productivity and profitability (Cheng 2005). It partly explains why investors in China 
care little about fundamentals (Green 2003a), as well as the public’s lack of 
confidence in China’s stock market (Chen et al 2003). The direct need of good 
accounting practices for pension reform is to help establish internationally recognized 
pension accounting standards34. In this case, it is argued that pension funds per se, as 
large institutional investors, will push for reform of accounting, e.g. the Calpers 
(Global Aging 2003). Pension accounting has undergone major changes, and there is a 
trend to move to the fair value or mark to market approach (Skerratt 2002; Fore 
2004), for example the IAS (International Accounting Standards) 19. The new 
approach constrains management’s opportunities to “creative accounting”, and their 
ability to mislead investors (Shirai 2002). The relevance to the Chinese pension 
reform is not immediate, since the occupational pension industry in China is very 
small at the moment (Hu 2005e). However, the positive benefits of good accounting 
standards will become large when more and more Chinese enterprises establish pillar 
2, i.e. occupational pensions in the near future.  
 
5.1.6.5 Regulator’s competence 
 
Fifth, regulators’ competence is an essential precondition for pension reform. It is 
closely linked to the points mentioned above. For example, when a new pension 
reform is designed and agreed, the relevant parties should have a basic capability to 
implement it. The more capable the governmental agencies, the more likely the 
positive benefits will be achieved, other things equal. As noted, law enforcement is 
also important in developing markets, including China. Weak law enforcement arises 
from the conflicts of interest between regions (see Section 3.4), and from wide 
political corruption (Wei 2003). This issue is important in that new policies 
themselves have little impact, and what really matters is successful implementation of 
relevant policies at a regional level. On the pension fund investment side, the 
capability of financial regulators is also of critical importance, in that pension funds 
are becoming a major player in the financial markets in China (Kim et al 2003; Green 
2005b), and at the same time, the capital markets are expected to be more complex, as 
in advanced countries (Greenspan 2003; Large 2004). Given these new developments, 
in order to preserve pension assets’ real value by maintaining monetary and financial 
stability as noted above, financial regulators should have skills and expertise to 
monitor market movements, e.g. financial disorder and fluctuation carefully (G10 
2005). In this case, ideally financial regulators are independent, desirability of which 
is highlighted by the worsened financial situation following political interference and 
intervention during major financial crisis over the past decades (Quintyn and Taylor 
2004).  
 
                                                
34
 During the period until 1980s, accounting in China was essentially a bookkeeping system, and there 
were no any formal accounting standards (Xiao and Pan 1997). With economic development, 
international accounting practices have been gradually introduced to China, partly arising from 
pressures from foreign investors for a more transparent system (Zhang 1992). The magnitude of 
accounting reform, however, is limited, highlighted by the co-existence of old accounting systems and 
the international standards in most SOEs and many private enterprises (Xiao et al 2004). 
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5.1.6.6 Financial education/awareness 
 
Sixth, in order to foster and facilitate the development of occupational pensions, it is 
critical to pay attention to financial education in general and pension education in 
particular (Lusardi and Mitchell 2005; Johnston 2005). The issue is especially 
important in a pension regime where individual accounts are a large component, and 
individual consumers are allowed to make their own decisions at least to some extent. 
Experiences in other countries suggest that if uninformed consumers are left with 
choosing pension provisions, they are very likely to end up with an inappropriate 
scheme, e.g. the mis-selling scandal in the UK (Whitehouse 2000a; Blake 1997b). In 
addition, empirical work in Nyce (2005) gives evidence that improved communication 
between employers and employees leads to higher 401(k) participation and 
contribution rates. Meanwhile, the latest report on the reassessment of Chile’s 
retirement programme shows that 80% of those surveyed did not know how the 
benefits are computed (Mitchell 2005). In the Chinese case, in the short term it is still 
reasonable to aggregate individual accounts and manage them in a centralised manner 
and/or provide individuals with relatively limited choices, which is consistent with 
argument of reducing administration costs (James et al 2001). In the long term, when 
Chinese consumers become more sophisticated and familiar with a range of financial 
products following financial education, more individual responsibilities could be 
granted so as to better meet individual needs.     
 
5.1.6.7 Administrative competence 
 
The last issue is related to administrative capability of all relevant parties (Holzmann 
and Hinz 2005). One the one hand, it involves some specific “hard” constraints, e.g. 
computerization and record-keeping (Mitchell 2000). Given the size of China’s 
population and potential massive number of pension participants, any pension reform 
will not succeed, if various administrative tasks are undertaken manually. Among 
others, such tasks include individual account management, contribution collection, 
benefit distribution and data collection. In this context, advanced technology, e.g. 
purpose-designed computer programmes and softwares, is recommended and indeed a 
prerequisite. Without computing help, it is very likely that pension reforms will run 
into chaos at the very start. Beside such “hard” constraints as above, on the other 
hand, there are “soft” human-related constraints. In other words, it is not difficult to 
purchase large amount of computers and other relevant equipments, one immediate 
issue, however, is how operate them properly and efficiently. In this case, staff 
training is necessary, so that all relevant parties, including administrative staff and 
professionals, e.g. accountant and auditors, have sufficient expertise and knowledge 
on their respective fields. For example, account administrators need to be able to 
manage a large dataset by using appropriate software programmes, while accountants 
are familiar with international accounting standards and able to apply them to their 
daily work.  
 
5.2 Wider benefits of pension reform 
 
Since 1990s, China has been determined to move towards a multi-pillar pension 
model, as recommended by the World Bank (1997). It is a necessary step in the right 
direction. Indeed, it is widely believed that by shifting from PAYG to funding, many 
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beneficial impacts arise (James 2002; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Hu 2005b). In this 
section, mainly linked to the pension and growth literature, we shall briefly discuss 
those positive implications, from both the short run and long run perspectives.  
 
5.2.1 SOEs restructuring 
 
The first benefit, which is a short-term one issue, is related to the restructuring of 
China’s SOEs (State-owned enterprise) (Zhao and Xu 2002; James 2002). Since the 
late 1990s, China’s ailing SOEs have laid off millions of workers (see Section 2.4.1). 
Many of them, although far away from the official retirement age, are allowed to be 
treated as pensioners. For example, it is not uncommon to hear that workers retire in 
the 40s. When those workers are laid off, their links with the previous enterprises 
normally are terminated, although they often receive a certain amount of one-off 
compensation. As regards old-age provision and medical care, the municipal 
government starts taking the charge. Behind such a massive SOE restructuring is the 
government’s intention to free SOEs from this heavy non-commercial responsibility, 
therefore increasing their competitiveness in the market economy (World Bank 1997). 
The expected positive results for the SOEs’ performance remains to be seen, since 
empirical research needs to be conducted. In addition, pension reform can also have 
positive impacts on the financial side of restructured SOEs. It links to the growth of 
the bond market as noted in Section 5.1.4. By issuing bonds in the market and 
optimising their debt-equity ratio, the SOEs can benefit from less financial risk, given 
the diversity of financing sources away from bank lending (Davis and Stone 2004).  
 
One caveat, however, is that during this restructuring process, some undesirable 
consequences arise, which we believe will affect the effectiveness of the pension 
reform on SOE’s performance. Specifically, when the restructuring starts, it is always 
announced that any worker who is willing to quit the job is allowed to do so, and will 
receive some level of compensation. The younger the worker is, the more 
compensation she receives. In this context, many young skilled workers choose to 
leave, since they believe they can find better jobs without much difficulty. Moreover, 
they are compensated with a large amount of cash which is really attractive to them. 
In addition, corruption is reported to occur to the extent that those who have close 
connections with the managers are not sacked, while those who are not lucky enough 
to have such connections are laid off, although the latter might be more competent 
than the former. For example, by using urban household survey data, Knight and 
Yueh (2004) find that people with Communist Party membership was less likely to be 
laid off during the period 1995-1999, when there was a massive wave of lay offs 
among the SOEs, as shown by the large increase of pensioners between 1995 and 
2000 in Table 9. Potential consequences, following the above restructuring, include 
increases in future pension payment, and loss of would-be higher productivity. Future 
pension payment is increased, in that many laid-off workers are still young, and could 
have made contributions to the system longer than remaining older workers. 
Similarly, given many of them are skilled workers, their leaving can have negative 
implications for those firms’ productivity and further profitability.  
 
5.2.2 Labour market 
 
Another benefit arising from pension reform, is concerned with the labour market 
(Disney 2004). As reviewed in Hu (2005b), the close link between contributions and 
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pension benefits is one main advantage of the World Bank pension model over the 
PAYG system (World Bank 1994), mainly for the former’s actuarial fairness 
(Lindbeck and Persson 2003). Pillar 1B (see Table 6) in China’s pension system is a 
DC pillar, therefore it is expected to see the improvement of the labour market 
conditions to the extent that the workers are willing to work longer. It might not be an 
immediate beneficial impact, since labour in China is currently abundant. It will 
become more relevant, however, in 2030 and afterwards, when China’s abundant 
labour resources reach the peak, and starts declining (Wang et al 2001). In addition, as 
discussed in Sections 3 and 4, the Chinese pension system is characterised by the high 
degree of fragmentation and large variation across regions. If a national unified 
pension system is implemented across the country some time in the future, it will 
make job change and migration easier, thus leading to increased job mobility, since 
the DC element of the new multi-pillar system, by definition, entails pension assets’ 
portability. The portability to a large extent links to the establishment of individual 
accounts (Clark and Hu 2005b).  
 
5.2.3 Saving rate 
 
Following the shift from PAYG to funding, there may be an increase in the saving 
rate. As reviewed in Davis and Hu (2006), private saving might increase, if pension 
participation is compulsory, and pension assets accumulated can not be fully offset by 
reducing discretionary saving correspondingly. In addition, tax incentives of pension 
assets (McCarthy and Neuberger 2004; Clark and Hu 2005a), and the recognition 
effect arising from pension reform (Hu 2005b), are also drivers for a potential higher 
personal saving. As regards China’s case, however, we believe that in the short run, 
the private saving rate will not increase in a significant manner. There are two 
underlying reasons. The first one is that current private saving rate in China is already 
very high, i.e. 40%, in comparison to around 20-30% and even lower in many OECD 
countries (Loayza et al 1998; Serres and Pelgrin 2003). Therefore, there is little room 
for a large further increase in private saving rate. Secondly, the disposable income 
earned by many workers and the majority of rural people in China is very small, 
which in many cases is just sufficient to meet their basic needs. In consequence, it is 
very likely that those workers, if forced to participate, reduce their discretionary 
saving, thus leaving the level of private saving rate unchanged. Another scenario is 
that for those people who do not save at all now, their total saving will increase 
following a compulsory pension reform. They, however, would suffer from “social 
burden”, in that they sacrifice current assumption too much for future retirement 
provision, compared to wealthier people. In the long run, the beneficial effects on the 
saving rate might emerge and become larger, since at that time, people become richer, 
i.e. have more disposable income, and they are more willing to, and are capable of 
saving more money.   
 
Besides private saving, national saving is another relevant issue. Given that national 
saving equals private saving plus government saving, the level of national saving after 
pension reform, is largely influenced by government behaviour. It is widely 
recognised that governments can finance the existing pension liabilities by issuing 
public bonds and increasing taxes. Their effects, however, differ, with implications for 
national saving. If the government finances the debts by borrowing via bond issuance, 
and there is not corresponding decrease in other public spending, the overall national 
saving rate might remain unchanged or even reduced (Cesaratto 2003). Empirical 
 67
results are mixed generally, despite the fact that a number of authors find the positive 
impact of funding on national saving rate (Hu 2005b; Schmidt-Hebbel 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is important to watch government’s behaviour during reform, since an 
unjustifiably lax fiscal policy is neither supportive of increasing national saving rate, 
as discussed in this section, nor constructive in maintaining a stable macro-economy 
(see Section 5.1.6).  
 
5.2.4 Economic growth 
 
Pension reform towards a funded system has been argued to positively impact on 
economic growth (World Bank 1994; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Davis and Hu 2005). 
Figure 5 illuminates the linkage between pension reform and growth, which could be 
direct, or indirect. For example, higher growth might be due to less labour market 
distortion, given the closer linkage between contributions and benefits (see Section 
5.2.2), and a higher saving rate (see Section 5.2.3). Besides those two channels, the 
improved financial markets, following pension reform, are also one underlying factor, 
which will be discussed in the next section. Another potential channel is through the 
increased corporate engagement, or pension fund activism. This occurs because of the 
wide use of indexation techniques in the pension funds industry, which hinders exit 
via sale of shares in underperforming companies which are in the index (Clark and 
Hebb 2004a). Empirical evidence at both micro and macro levels (Davis 2004b; Clark 
and Hebb 2004b), to some extent, suggests the beneficial impacts of pension funds’ 
corporate engagement, although the effect is not uniformly agreed (Blair 2002; 
Orszag 2002). In addition, Davis and Hu (2005) find the direct linkage between 
pension assets growth and economic growth for both OECD countries and emerging 
market economies, which is consistent with the findings in Harichandra and 
Thangavelu (2004) and Hu (2005b,d).  
 
If pension reform towards a funded system can contribute to higher growth, it will 
have profound implications for China’s economy. For example, as noted in the 
beginning of the paper, the ratio of the population aged above 65 to the total 
population was 5% in 1960, but is forecast to increase to 24% in 2050 (UN 2004). In 
consequence, based on the funded model, if every person is established with an 
individual account, and these accounts are accumulated with their lifetime saving, the 
aggregate amount will be massive. As a result, these assets can serve as a useful 
engine (Davis and Hu 2005), stimulating economic growth over a long period. The 
beneficial impacts are most likely to materialise and strengthen around 2020, since 
any major reforms need a relatively long period to be established effectively in such a 
large country as China. In 10 or 20 years, all externalities, quantitative and qualitative, 
will be able to show positive effects, thus boosting growth. These positive 
externalities include more developed financial markets (see the next section), less 
distorted labour markets (see Section 5.2.2), a higher saving rate (see Section 5.2.3), 
and more experienced and competent regulators (see Section 5.1.6). Therefore, 
pension reform is not only important in itself, but also of crucial importance in 
helping China maintain sustainably high economic growth in this century (Lin 2004). 
From the policy perspective, a successful pension reform will have far reaching 
impacts on Chinese society.  
 
5.2.5 Qualitative impacts 
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Besides the impacts mentioned above, pension asset growth can have some positive 
qualitative implications for the financial sector and economic growth (Davis 2005; 
Walker and Lefort 2002). The first positive externality is financial innovation (Bodie 
1989). Although observable in both OECD countries and EMEs (emerging market 
economies), the impacts are larger for the latter than the former, given the 
underdevelopment of financial markets in EMEs. In China, financial innovation 
means that more financial instruments might be developed and introduced. For 
example, in the funded system, for inflation protection, zero coupon bonds or 
inflation-linked bonds are desirable. Also, it is necessary to develop derivative 
markets, e.g. options and futures, to hedge the risk (Cheng 2005). Some of these 
securities come to the market, influenced directly or indirectly by pension funds in 
many countries, e.g. Chile (Acuna and Iglesias 2001). If China’s pension reform leads 
to rapid growth of the pension fund industry in the near future, new financial 
instruments will come into being as well in China’s financial markets. Meanwhile, in 
order to avoid the risks specific to China’s conditions, the NSSF has been actively 
lobbying the authorities to allow pension funds to invest abroad (see Section 3). If 
their request is, and very likely to be, authorized some time in the future, it is very 
likely to be a starting point of lifting such restrictions from other institutions; in 
consequence, it might help and facilitate further financial liberation in China.  
 
Another qualitative improvement is concerned with corporate governance (Tenev et al 
2002). As we discussed in Section 5.2.4, pension asset growth can facilitate pension 
funds’ corporate engagement, which might arise from the increasing demand by 
owners for more transparency and accountability, particularly after the Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmalat scandals. In the Chinese case, we believe that whether 
pension funds will be actively and positively engaged in corporate governance 
depends on a number of issues. First, the critical issue is when the non-tradable State 
shares in most listed firms35 will become fully tradable. It is a central question, since 
if those shares, accounting for 2/3 of the total shares in most cases, are controlled by 
the government and not tradable, corporate governance by any institutions is not 
possible, given that all the remaining shares are only equivalent to 1/3 of the total 
(Cheng 2005). The second question is when the prudent person rules (PPR), or a more 
liberalised investment system will be adopted in China. As noted in Sections 3.3 and 
5.1.3, there are quantitative restrictions on institutions’ investment in China. However, 
in order to facilitate pension funds’ corporate engagement, it is more appropriate to 
implement the PPR, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Davis and Steil 2001). In this 
case, however, more developed mechanisms for monitoring and supervising the 
financial markets need to be established, so as to prevent deliberate share price 
manipulations, as happened and condemned in early 2000s in China (Wu 2001). 
Despite these questions waiting to be solved, some encouraging signs have emerged 
in China. For example, the NSSF and occupational pension funds have frequently 
appeared to be among the top shareholders in listed firms’ annual reports, as shown in 
Section 5.1.3. In addition, the NSSF is expected to be largest institutional investor in 
China in the future (Li and Gao 2005), since the government has requested 10% of the 
newly listed firms’ shares during the IPOs to be transferred to the NSSF36.  
                                                
35
 It is worth to note that the majority of listed firms in China is state-owned. For the very small number 
of fully private firms, all shares are tradable in the market.  
36
 But as we discussed in Section 5.1.2, the state share selling was terminated in 2001, following the 
large share price drop. The government, however, does not give up this plan. It is expected that a fully 
compromised scheme will be drawn up in the near future.  
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The third issue is that pension asset growth can have impacts on China’s exchange 
rate regime. Until July 2005, China’s exchange rate policy was fixed to the US dollar 
at the nominal rate of RMB/US$ 8.27, which was steadily depreciated from 1.5 RMB 
to the dollar in 1978 (Lardy 2005). For years, politicians in western countries, 
principally from the US, have argued that China’s controlled exchange rate makes 
Chinese goods artificially cheap, and distorts the world trade patterns, although many 
economists challenge it and argue that the revaluation of the Chinese currency would 
help little in reducing US’s trade balances, and might destabilise the world market and 
the global financial system (Mundell 2005; Greenspan 2005). Besides the political 
aspect, the rapid accumulation of foreign, largely US dollar, reserve holdings by the 
People’s Bank of China, the central bank, has a consequence of increasing the money 
supply, and the accompanying risk of a high inflation and the overheating of the 
Chinese economy (Greenspan 2005). Therefore, the Chinese government has been 
under pressures to revalue its currency, and allow it to stop pegging on the US dollar. 
A revaluation of 2% in July 2005 was a good step towards a more flexible exchange 
rate system (PoBC 2005), and was sought by the government to mitigate the 
international pressures.  
 
Institutional investors, e.g. pension fund growth can play a role in this case, if 
international investment is allowed some time in the future. It has been argued that for 
some emerging markets, foreign assets might be better to be held and managed 
through pension funds, rather than central banks (Davis 2005; SFRC 2005). One 
benefit is that the pension funds’ international investment can reduce inflationary 
pressures by leaking some funds abroad. In addition, currently, the majority of 
China’s foreign reserves is used to buy government bonds, particularly US 
government bonds. Therefore, if pension funds are allowed to manage a portion of 
these assets, a stable and safe return can be achieved and pension fund investment is 
more diversified in terms of risk, for the reason of professional asset management of 
pension fund managers. Another important positive effect is that if in many countries, 
particularly Asian countries, a “global saving glut” does exist, as argued by Bernanke 
(2005), it might be wise to facilitate capital flows through market forces, e.g. global 
pension fund investment, rather than the central banks, which is more vulnerable to 
“dangerous political grandstanding” (SFRC 2005).  
5.3 Summary 
 
In this section, we reviewed and analysed China’s financial structure, preconditions, 
and benefits of pension reform. It is revealed that China has the basic conditions 
needed for a pension reform towards funded pillars, e.g. relatively sound banking 
sector, rudimentary stock market and basic accounting standards etc, not least by a 
comparison to Chile in Section 5.1. Despite these, China’s financial system is still 
underdeveloped when compared to other countries, particularly to advanced OECD 
countries. In this context, pension reform is needed in itself for the purpose of tackling 
the issue of insufficient retirement provision; in addition, it serves as a powerful 
engine to improve broader issues, e.g. financial development and economic growth 
(Davis 2004; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Hu 2005b).  
 
With more and more pension assets invested in domestic and global stock markets, 
better accounting standards, e.g. International Accounting Standards (IAS), and more 
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transparent information disclosure will become a norm in the markets. It helps 
enhance the quality of Chinese listed firms, and thus investors’ confidence about the 
stock markets (Shirai 2002; Chen et al 2003). In addition, the requirements for better 
information disclosure can facilitate the development of credit rating and performance 
evaluation agencies, which is helpful in selecting best performers. This development 
is useful in that sponsors of pension plans need to compare the performance of fund 
managers and entrust their pension assets. Besides the impacts on the performance 
evaluation industry and also the research industry potentially, pension funds, as long-
term investors, might help maintain financial stability, in that they have superior 
information about firms, thus driving share prices back to fundamentals, and reducing 
market volatility (Davis and Steil 2001; Walker and Leford 2002).  
 
Meanwhile, as we noted earlier, pension funds have beneficial impacts on other 
aspects of financial structure as well, which is also very important during China’s 
economic reform process. For example, it stimulates growth of bond markets and 
efficiency of the banking sector, which is mainly due to the close link and interaction 
between pension reform towards funded systems and financial markets (Davis 1995, 
1998). Last, it is worth noting all the benefits above are two sided. In other words, 
when the financial markets become more developed, following pension reform and 
growth of pension funds, such positive effects will also make further pension reform 
towards a funded system easier, e.g. in terms of debt financing, and investment 
returns.   
 
6 Empirical work 
 
In previous sections we reviewed/analysed the Chinese pension system and also 
provided some practical solutions to the Chinese pension crisis, as well as assessing 
preconditions. In this section, we report on an empirical simulation investigation of 
the impacts of several policy options on the pension system. Policy options we look at 
include changes in contribution rates, alternative pension fund investments, changes 
in retirement ages and transaction costs. By employing a stochastic simulation 
technique, it is hoped to demonstrate the quantitative extent to which the changes in 
those variables impact on the pension benefits. Our analysis is based on the purely 
funded model.  
6.1 Model specification 
 
The model, which is same as that in McCarthy and Zheng (1996) and Cairns (2003), 
is as follows: 
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where in Equation 1, B is the balance of pension fund accumulation, c the 
contribution rate, W income or wage, TC the transaction cost and r the annual rate of 
investment returns. A is the pension payment and pi  the inflation rate in Equation 2. 
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In addition, we assume a person starts working at the age of N1, retires at N2 and dies 
at N3. t  and η  denote the time dimension. A similar methodology was used by 
OECD (2005d), where they looked at how retirement benefits from mandatory public 
pensions change with different assumptions, e.g. level of individual earning and return 
on DC pensions. In addition, their simulation analysis included work relating to both 
DC and DB components (Hu 2006).  
 
Equation 1 above mathematically describes the asset accumulation process of a person 
from the time he/she starts working at N1 to the time he/she finishes working at N2, 
while Equation 2 is concerned with pension fund decumulation during the post-
retirement period from N2+1 to N3. We assume that pension payment is linked to 
inflation; therefore an inflation variable pi  is included into the equation. In addition, 
consistent with the fully funded nature of the pension scheme in our model, the end-
year balance of pension assets should not be greater than zero and ideally equal to 
zero. In other words the interest of pensioners is maximised if the account balance is 
zero, i.e. 3 0NB =  when the person dies. In order to derive the function of 3NB in terms 
of variables we are interested in, we expand Equations 1 and 2, by undertaking the 
mathematical manipulations as follows: 
 
Substituting t = 2 1N + and t = 2 2N +  into Equation 2 respectively, we have  
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Then we substitute Equation 3 into Equation 4, getting 
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Based on Equations 3 and 6 we can identify that both equations are a sum of the 
geometric series with the number of terms determined by time t. Therefore we write 
down equations of tB  when t = 2 3N +  and t = 3N accordingly 
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If we set Equation 8 equal to zero and undertake some manipulation, the value of A 
could be calculated as follows: 
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Given the value of A we can easily compute replacement rates by dividing A by 
wages of the year before retirement.  
6.2 Data description 
 
All data of asset returns as well as wages and inflation rates are given in Table 55. In 
this simulation work, we used 4 different assets, i.e. bank deposits, government bonds, 
domestic equities and global investment. A quick look at the data in Table 55 shows 
that real returns on the first two assets were very low, i.e. below 1% and even lower. 
In comparison, returns on domestic equities and global investment were much higher. 
The high returns achieved by global investment are much due to the persistent 
devaluation of the Chinese RMB in the past 10 years. We discuss these data in more 
detail below.  
 
Wages (W) are defined as the annual real income after inflation rates are considered. 
The inflation rate is proxied by the consumer price index (CPI). The transaction cost 
(TC) is defined as a proportion of wages. In the paper, in order to assess the impacts 
of different rates of transaction costs on the contributions, we used 2%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The medium rate, i.e. 5% is based on and in line with investment and 
administration regulations on occupational pensions in China (NCSSF 2001). The rate 
is slightly lower than the management cost of 8% observed in Hungary (Matits 2004). 
The upper limit, i.e. 10% is estimated based on one paper (Whitehouse 2000b) where 
administrative charges are compared across both OECD and developing countries. 
The contribution rates are assumed to be at the level of 10%, 20% and 30%. These 
levels of contribution rates are consistent with the current pension system in China as 
discussed in Section 2.3.3.  
 
In addition, we have return data for eight different portfolios, which are constructed 
from our historical and simulated data series. Portfolio 1 refers to a portfolio 
consisting of bank deposits only, portfolio 2 government bonds only, portfolio 3 
domestic stock only and portfolio 4 global investment only. Portfolio 5 is a “naïve” 
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portfolio with four types of assets allocated equally (25-25-25-25), i.e. bank deposits 
25%, government bonds 25%, domestic stocks 25% and global investment 25%. 
Portfolio 6 is based on the latest portfolio construction of Chinese National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) as shown in Section 3.3.1; the structure is 40-50-10-0, i.e. bank 
deposits 40%, government bonds 50%, domestic stocks 10% and zero global 
investment. Portfolio 7 has a 5-23-45-27 structure, reflecting the 2004 asset allocation 
of the UK top 100 pension funds (Clark and Hu 2005a). The last portfolio, i.e. 
portfolio 8 consists of 50% bank deposits and 50% government bonds, which is 
consistent with pension fund investment practice in China except the very recent 
investment structure of the NSSF (see Section 3.3.3 for details).  
 
In the simulation work, we assume that a representative person starts working at the 
age of 22 in 199337. The year 1993 is selected since it is the earliest year for which we 
have return data for all assets as well as wages and inflation rates. We also assume 
that the person could live longest until 2051 when he/she is 80. Given that we only 
have data observations up to 2004, observations from 2005 to 2051 have to be 
simulated first. As for wages, the annual growth rate is estimated to be 4.6% during 
2000-2025 and 3% up to 2075 (McCarthy and Zheng 1996). Their estimates, similar 
with those in Sin (2005), are based on the purpose-built econometric model specified 
in the paper, and the underlying economics is that when the economy gets richer, 
growth slows. The simulation of inflation rates is based on the assumption that these 
rates are normally distributed; therefore we simulate the data from 2005 to 2051 by 
using the historical mean and standard deviation. The simulation of rate of returns on 
all eight portfolios are conducted in the same way as that in the inflation rates, i.e. 
using historical mean and standard deviation to simulate observations from 2005 to 
2051. For the simulations, we used the full sample of these variables as shown in 
Table 55. All simulations were programmed and conducted with Matlab 6.5. 
 
Regarding data source and observation period, wages (1978 – 2000) were obtained 
from the MOLSS (2005) and inflation rates (1978 – 2004) from the NBS (2005). 
Rates of returns on bank deposits (1980 – 2004) were from the IMF database (2005) 
and government bond yields (1993 – 2004) from Datastream. Returns on domestic 
stocks (1992 – 2004) were collected and derived from statistical yearbooks on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. As shown in 
Tables 32 and 55, China’s stock market is very volatile based on historical data. As a 
variant, we assume that the stock market will be more developed in the future. 
Therefore, we use another standard deviation, i.e. 14.7%, equal to around half of the 
original one. In both cases, however, the mean returns on equities are set to be the 
same. Returns on global investment (1973 – 2004) were derived from returns on 
global equity yields and global bond yields with a 50-50 split, as in Davis (2002a, 
2002b). Global returns were corrected by allowing for currency risk since the 
exchange movement frequently has a significant impact on returns denominated by 
local currency (Hu 2005c). Details on the above statistics can be found in Table 55.  
 
6.3 Empirical results 
 
                                                
37
 In China children typically start going to school at the age of 7, and stay in the school until around 
18. Then those school graduates might go to four-year university and graduate at 22. 
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In this section we report the extent to which replacement rates respond to changes in a 
number of variables, i.e. contribution rates, retirement ages, transaction costs and 
investment portfolios. A similar simulation was conducted by Alier and Vittas (2000). 
They, however, only researched the impacts of different investment strategies on 
replacement rates in the US. In addition, a World Bank paper (Friedman 1996) looks 
at potential implications of raising the retirement age and moving to price indexation 
for replacement rates in China. In this paper, we extend their studies by investigating 
more variables. For example transaction costs are found to have a non-negligible 
impact on replacement rates (Whitehouse 2000b), therefore it is interesting to see the 
quantitative effect. Meanwhile we select eight investment portfolios, which is larger 
than the number of investment portfolios used in Friedman et al (1996) and thus more 
realistic. Moreover we include global investment in our analysis, which is very 
imperative for the Chinese case, since the authorities are about to allow pension funds 
to be invested abroad, particularly the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).   
 
6.3.1 Simulation results in basic model, a scenario with the highest replacement 
rate, and a scenario with the lowest replacement rate 
 
Before proceeding to details of how replacement rates move with changes in the 
variables, we first present the simulation results relating to the basic model which 
serves as a benchmark in the study. Based on the discussion of the Chinese pension 
system in previous sections, the specification of the basic model is as follows: a 
typical person retires at 60 and dies at 75. The contribution rate is 20% of payroll with 
a transaction cost of 5% of wages. The investment strategy is a 50-50-0-0 approach, 
i.e. 50% of assets are allocated to bank deposits and government bonds respectively. 
Table 56 gives the simulation results of replacement rates with the basic model. The 
mean of our simulated replacement rates is 15.7%, with a standard deviation at 1%. 
The 15.7% replacement rate looks very low, but it is due to our assumption that all 
assets are allocated to bank deposits and government bonds, with real returns being 
0% and 1% respectively38.  
 
For each stochastic simulation, 1,000 replications are conducted. The mean is the 
simple average of 1,000 replications and the STDEV standard deviation of 
replications. The distribution of 1,000 simulated replacement rates is given in Figure 
6. The upper panel shows the values of replacement rates in each replication, while 
the lower panel reveals the histogram of simulated results. 1,000 replications are 
computed, since simulations generated random results by the computer, and thus we 
seek to obtain results as representative and/or accurate as possible. Figure 6 clearly 
shows the distribution and gives us a visual image of how dispersed the results are. 
Both graphs in Figure 6 are useful in our analysis. For the sake of saving space, 
however, we will only present the lower panel for the remainder of our simulation 
work. 
 
The 15.7% replacement rate found above is very low, and apparently not sufficient to 
support a typical retiree’s post-retirement life. This ratio is also lower than the 38% 
replacement rate promised by the current Chinese authorise in pillar 1B (Table 6). In 
the remaining part of this section and the next two sections, we simulate different 
                                                
38
 If we used higher estimates of returns on bank deposits and bonds, replacement rates would be more 
satisfactory. In the following part of the paper, we identify the extent to which higher returns on 
simulated replacement rates by including high-yield assets, i.e. equities and international investment.  
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scenarios, seeking to improve our results. Table 56 gives the results under two 
scenarios; Scenario A refers to the case where the average replacement rate is highest, 
and Scenario B the case where the average replacement rate is lowest. It is worth 
nothing, however, that Scenarios A/B is not necessarily the most optimal/sub-optimal. 
A very high replacement rate is not necessarily the most optimal choice, since in 
many cases it requires a contribution rate which is prohibitively high, therefore 
politically impossible. In order to achieve the highest and also relatively realistic 
replacement rate, we specify that the person retires five years later, i.e. at the age of 
65 in comparison to 60 in the basic model. Meanwhile we assume that he/she dies at 
80. The contribution rate is 30%. The investment strategy is the 5-23-45-27 type, i.e. 
5% of fund assets allocated to bank deposits, 23% to government bonds, 45% to 
domestic stocks and 27% to global investment. It is in line with the asset allocation 
strategy of the UK’s top 100 pension funds as of 2004 (Clark and Hu 2005a). 
Transaction cost is assumed to be 2%. Conditioning on all these assumptions, the 
mean of replacement rates is 93%, the standard deviation 8.3% and coefficient of 
variation 11.2. The last column in Table 56 gives the simulation results under 
Scenario B. The mean replacement rate is just 4.5% given a 20% contribution rate39. 
Other assumptions include the retirement age at 55, the mortality age at 80, investing 
100% in bank deposits and transaction costs of 10%. The corresponding coefficient of 
variation is 8.4, less than that in both basic model and Scenario A.  
 
In addition, it can be observed that in Table 56, the mean replacement rates under 
scenario A had two results, one is 93% as discussed above, while the other one is 
120%. These two replacement rates corresponds to two different assumption 
regarding China’s stock market volatilities from 2005 onwards (see Table 55). The 
higher replacement rate is achieved by higher compounded equity returns, and 
resulting portfolio returns, under the assumption that China’s stock market in the 
future, i.e. 2005 onwards, will be half as volatile as that in the past. When high 
volatility and low volatility assets are concerned, and assuming that they both have 
same expected average returns over periods, the overall compounded return for the 
latter is always higher than that for the former, in that the latter grows money at a 
greater rate, when we compound interest or returns over years (Merrill Lynch 2005; 
also see Equation 2). The magnitude of the difference varies depending on investment 
horizon, and might be marked if a long horizon is involved, e.g. life-time investment 
over 20 or 30 years. Last, the distributions of simulated replacement rates are reported 
in Figures 7 and 8.  
 
6.3.2 Simulation results with changes in contribution rate, retirement age and  
         transaction cost 
 
In this section we quantitatively measure the extent to which replacement rates 
respond to changes in three variables, i.e. the contribution rate, retirement age and 
transaction costs. In the first simulation, we change the contribution rates to a lower 
level at 10%, and a higher level at 30% respectively. The portfolio is still assumed to 
adopt a 50-50-0-0 investment approach, i.e. 50% in bank deposits and 50% in bonds. 
All other specifications are the same as those in the basic model. When the 
contribution rate is 10%, Table 57 shows that the replacement rate is just 5.2% with 
the coefficient of variation at the level of 11.1. Figure 9 also shows that 1,000 
                                                
39
 We tried to use a 10% contribution rate. Based on our programme, however, no results came. 
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simulated results are distributed in the range of 5% and 6%. When we specify a larger 
contribution, i.e. a 30% contribution rate, the person would have a wealthier 
retirement life since the replacement rate becomes 26.2%, which is 10% higher than 
that in the basic model. The corresponding distribution graph is Figure 10. As we 
mentioned earlier, a high replacement rate achieved by increasing the contribution 
rate is not necessarily a good strategy, since it might not be reasonable in reality, 
particularly from the political point of view. The simulation results here are mainly 
used to demonstrate the quantitative effects of changing a particular variable on 
replacement rates, thus serving as empirical evidence supporting any potential policy 
modifications.  
 
The second simulation relates to changes in the retirement age or the pensionable age 
as in OECD (2005d). For this work we consider two cases; one is retirement at the age 
of 55, the other is at 65. Raising the retirement age further to 65 and even more is 
highly debated in many countries, mainly in OECD countries. The justification is that 
since people live longer due to medical improvement, it is natural to require people to 
retire later, and it is indeed one of most effective ways to tackle the issue of an ageing 
population (PPI 2003; Turner 2005). By raising the retirement age to 65 in China, the 
person could have a 28% replacement rate with a 20% contribution rate. The standard 
deviation is 2.1% and the corresponding coefficient of variation is 13.0. When the 
person retires at 55, the replacement rate would be lower, i.e. 10%. The subsequent 
coefficient of variation is 9.4. By comparing these two results as well as results in the 
basic model, it is revealed that changing the retirement age is very effective in terms 
of pension provisions since it acts as a double-edge sword, i.e. increasing contribution 
years and reducing benefit years simultaneously. As regards a retirement pattern, i.e. 
55-60-65, the corresponding replacement rates are 10%-16%-28%. The results are 
consistent with findings in Friedman et al (1996). Figures which reveal distributions 
of replacement rates are Figures 11 and 12 respectively.  
 
Transaction costs have been argued, and also empirically investigated to be able to 
have sizable implications for asset accumulation (James et al 2001; Whitehouse 
2000a). It is mainly due to the long term horizon of pension fund management and 
planning. In Table 57, significant differences with alternative transaction costs are 
revealed. In the first case, transaction costs are set to be 2% of wages. While keeping 
other specifications the same as those in the basic model, the resultant replacement 
rate is 19%. When transaction costs are assumed to be 10% of wages, the replacement 
rate is 11%. In both cases, the coefficients of variation are not much different, i.e. 10.9 
and 11.2 respectively. In addition, Figures 13 and 14 reveal that in both cases, there 
are similar distributions except that the 2% case enjoys a higher mean replacement 
rate. The findings serve as quantitative evidence in favour of providing a less costly 
pension system. Therefore, in order to reduce transaction costs in China, small 
individual accounts could be aggregated into large blocks and managed on a 
centralised basis (James et al 2001; Turner 2005), e.g. the central clearing house 
established in Swedish pension reform (Weaver 2005). In addition, as noted in 
Section 4.1, the Chinese authorities need to unify the pension system along both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions, which is expected to be able to reduce transaction 
costs by improving institutional efficiency and mitigating bureaucratism.   
 
6.3.3 Simulation results with changes in investment strategies 
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The last part of our simulation work is related to pension fund investment. The issue 
of pension fund investment is highly debated in current literature (Davis 2002b; Hu 
2005c; Reisen 1997), since it is one of the most important factors determining the 
balance of asset accumulation over a long management period. In this work we 
consider seven portfolios as mentioned in Section 6.2; they are an all-bank deposit 
portfolio, all-government bond portfolio, all-stock portfolio, all-global investment 
portfolio and three other portfolios with a mixture of these four assets. The simulation 
results of replacement rates are given in Table 58. In comparison to 16% replacement 
rate in the basic model, all but one replacement rates in Table 58 are larger, and in 
many cases it is much larger. The largest replacement rate is achieved by investing 
100% assets in foreign assets. The corresponding risk, however, is also highest at 
level of 8%.  
 
Another two investment strategies which lead to relatively high returns are the 25-25-
25-25 type and the 5-23-45-27 type, in which cases, the mean replacement rates are 
34%/38% and 43%/55% respectively. The two numbers in each pair are related to two 
cases; the first number is calculated based on the high risk assumption of China’s 
stock market, while the second number is based on the low risk assumption of China’s 
stock market (see Section 6.2). The former corresponds to higher overall compounded 
returns on both equities and the whole portfolio, while the latter corresponds to lower 
overall compounded returns, although it is assumed that they both have same expected 
returns if averaging annual returns over periods. There is a 9/17% replacement rate 
difference between these two strategies. However, if accounting for the cost 
advantage associated with naïve (equal weigh) diversification, the beneficial effect of 
the latter strategy is likely to be smaller. The finding is to some extent consistent with 
results in Bateman and Thorp (2005), where it is found that an investor who adopts a 
naïve diversification strategy performs as well as actively managed superannuation 
funds in Australia.  
 
In addition, besides the all-domestic strategy, the 5-23-45-27 strategy leads to the 
largest replacement rate. As a result, we used this strategy as one component for 
Scenario A in Section 6.3.1. The all-stock case was disregarded since it is not 
realistic. Meanwhile, the all-deposit investment strategy gives the worst return, i.e. 
12% replacement rate, which is lower than that in the naive strategy by a ratio of 3, 
and that in the 5-23-45-27 strategy by a ratio of 4. Last, distributions of replacement 
rates under all 7 strategies are presented in Figure 15 through Figure 21, which gives 
us the visual results complementary to findings represented in Table 58. For example, 
Figure 20 gives the distributions of replacement rates with the investment strategy of 
40-50-10-0, and Figure 21 shows the case relating to the investment strategy of 5-23-
25-27. By comparing these two Figures, it is clearly shown that these two graphs in 
Figure 21 are more dispersed than those in Figure 20. For example, the values of 
replacement rates range from 15% to 25% in the top panel of Figure 20, while they 
vary from 30% to 58% in the top panel of Figure 19. These features are reflected by 
the higher standard deviations of the 5-23-25-27 strategy in Table 58.  
 
6.3.4 Summary of the simulation results 
 
In this section, we employed simulation technique to assess alternative policy options. 
The analysis was conducted according to a range of different dimensions, i.e. the 
contribution rate, retirement age, transaction costs and investment strategy. Inter alia, 
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increase in contribution rate would raise the replacement rate; this option, however, is 
politically unpleasant, given its current high level of contributions in China (Section 
3). Raising the retirement age is one option to mitigate the Chinese pension crisis, and 
the impact is quite effective, i.e. enhancing the replacement rate nearly 3 times, if the 
worker serves 10 more years. This policy, however, is likely to provoke resistance 
from the public, like in the UK (Turner 2005); therefore, if this option is considered, 
the increase is better to match demographic changes. The impacts of different 
transaction costs on the benefits are quite large as well. This is consistent with our 
previous results and recommendations in Section 4. The last empirical work relates to 
pension fund investment. By computing benefits with different mixes of investment 
approaches, it was shown that an appropriately designed investment strategy can lead 
to a quite satisfactory replacement rate. In this context, pension fund global 
diversification and investment in equities can improve our results significantly.   
7. Policy recommendations 
 
In previous sections, we have sought to identify structural shortcomings of the 
Chinese pension system, assess the current preconditions, and then empirically 
investigate the quantitative impacts of changing a number of variables on replacement 
rates. Based on historical review, critical analysis and empirical findings above, we in 
this section seek to provide some policy recommendations regarding how to improve 
the Chinese pension system so as to make it more sustainable in the future.  
7.1 Unifying the system 
 
As noted in previous sections, the Chinese pension system is separated between rural 
and urban areas, different provinces, and central and local governments; different 
pension rules and polices apply in different regions. Such horizontal isolation is 
devastating, since it creates labour immobility and economic inefficiency. For 
example, in China there are around 150 million rural migrants working in urban areas. 
They, however, are entitled to different pension regulations from other urban workers. 
Moreover only a small portion of those rural migrants participate in the urban pension 
system, since the design is less favourable for them and they receive only very little 
benefit from the system. Therefore a national unified pension system needs to be 
established in China. The new unified system should not discriminate between people 
based on origin, gender and type of employment etc.  
 
In addition, the system should be unified vertically, i.e. unifying pensions 
administration. One advantage of integrating vertically is that it reduces 
administration costs or transaction costs. Our simulation work in Section 6 shows that 
if transaction costs decrease it has sizable impacts on the pension income received by 
retirees. In order to integrate or unify the system vertically, local branches of the 
MOLSS should be granted more power and be able to minimise the influence of local 
governments. Therefore local branches of labour and social security authorities would 
follow policies set by their highest officials in Beijing. In this context, whenever top 
officials of the MOLSS in Beijing order pension reform, labour authorities at 
provincial or municipal levels would be able to implement the reform without such 
local modifications which meet local government’s regional need but undermine the 
system’s national interest.  
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The pension system’s unification could be achieved by effectively implementing a 
national social security law. A national social security law can serve as a catalyst for 
quickening the Chinese pension reform. Such a law will provide a legal framework 
under which a national pension system is provided. In this context, any evasion from 
the system is against law, thus it is expected to increase participation and coverage 
rates. In addition, passage of such law indicates government’s determination to 
conduct a serious pension reform at a national level, thus increasing public confidence 
in the system. 
 
7.2 Improving incentives 
 
As noted before, based on our latest statistics China had a pension coverage rate of 
only 21%. This rate is low and must be addressed and solved as soon as possible. If 
the current system continues into the middle of this century without any material 
changes, most Chinese will face a very hard post-retirement life at that time. One way 
to encourage more people to participate in the pension system is to redesign the 
system so that people feel they are treated in a fair manner. In other words, the 
Chinese authorities need to improve people’s incentives of joining the system. For 
example, the contribution rate to the multi-pillar model’s social pooling component 
needs to be reduced to a level which is just sufficient to cover basic living cost, i.e. 
with the replacement rate at 20-30%. All complementary retirement income is 
obtained from the fully funded individual accounts.  
 
Based on the World Bank estimation (1997), a 5-9% contribution rate is enough to 
fulfil the purpose. In China, however, an 18%-20% contribution rate applies instead. 
The extra part of the excessive contribution collections is used by the Chinese 
government to meet the cash shortfall inherited from the past system. As a result, it is 
unfair for current working generations, thus affecting their participation incentives. In 
our view, it is more desirable to contribute at a fair and low rate just to meet basic 
needs. The rest of retirement income should be mainly from individual accounts under 
a DC regime, subject to an appropriate investment strategy. As we will discuss in the 
next section and also in the empirical results demonstrated in Section 6, as long as 
pension funds are invested properly and professionally, it is not difficult to achieve a 
decent level of replacement rates. Transition costs or implicit pension debts (IPD), 
inherited from the old system, however, still need to be addressed (see next section).  
 
7.3 Implicit pension debts (IPD) 
 
Estimates regarding China’s IPD range from 46% to 69% of GDP in 1994 (World 
Bank 1997). The latest median estimate from the World Bank put the number at 141% 
of GDP for 2001, which approximates US$ 1.6 trillion (Sin 2005). We believe that 
charging employers and employees at a high contribution rate is not sensible and 
workable, which in turn tends to reduce incentives to participate in the pension 
system, as discussed in Section 7.2. Generally, there are a number of methods to 
finance old pension liabilities, e.g. issuance of recognition bonds, increase in taxation 
revenues etc. For the Chinese case, the government currently prefers to finance the 
debt by using proceeds from state asset sales. Such interest shown by the authorities is 
mainly inspired by the large volume of state assets accumulated during the past 
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decades. For example, a conservative estimate places the value of China’s SOEs 
assets at over US$1 trillion for 2001 (James 2003). Moreover, it is argued that the 
pension debt in China can be easily financed by selling SOEs assets (Friedman et al 
1996).  
 
As a result, some widely used options to pay off IPD in other countries, i.e. bonds and 
taxation, although suggested in Wang et al (2001) and Li and Gao (2005), are 
currently dismissed in China. In Section 5.1.2, we mentioned that the plan for state 
share sales terminated in October 2001, largely because of the negative stock market 
response. For example, the market indices dropped by 30% with a few days of the 
plan’s announcement (Asher and Newman 2002). Therefore, it is urged that the 
government should solve the issue of state share sales as soon as it can. To this end, 
the crucial point is to find a comprise plan accepted by the individual investors, 
institutions, and the state, as disused in Section 5. At the same time, the authorities 
might consider other options, e.g. bond issuance, so as to reduce the financing 
volatility. In addition, as analysed by Sin (2005) and James (2002), a number of 
parametric reforms could be employed, e.g. increase in the retirement age, and 
decrease in benefit levels for the existing system.  
 
7.4 Diversifying pension fund investment 
 
Based on modern finance theory, an internationally diversified portfolio is most likely 
to maximise return for given risk (Solnik 1998; Davis 2002b; Hu 2005c). In China, 
however, pension fund assets are heavily invested in bank deposits and government 
bonds, thus leading to a low return over the past decades. In Section 6, we provided 
quantitative evidence that a diversified investment approach could achieve a much 
high return and thus a higher replacement rate. Hence, Chinese pension funds should 
adopt a more diversified asset allocation approach. The process, however, needs to be 
phased in gradually, rather than a one-off change.   
 
In the short and medium terms, portion of Chinese pension funds should be allowed to 
be invested abroad, which is expected to earn a stable and relatively high return, since 
international markets in comparison to the Chinese stock market are much more 
developed and mature. As noted in Section 3.3, all pension fund assets in China, 
except those in pillar 2, and the NSSF are not allowed to invest in domestic equities. 
This restriction is not justified and should be lifted as soon as possible. Despite this, 
however, an investment limit based on domestic stocks at certain levels, e.g. up to 
40% in our view is still justified. The underling reason is that it is too risky to invest 
an in-proportional portion of pension assets in a market where there is no major 
hedging financial product and serious structural shortcomings persist (Green 2003a; 
Liu 2005). In the long term when the Chinese stock market becomes deep and liquid 
(Green 2003b), however, prudent person rules are more justifiable. In this case, fund 
managers are not subject to any investment restriction and could conduct asset 
allocation task from a purely financial perspective. Benefits of employing prudent 
person rules were empirically studies and consolidated in a number of pension studies 
(Solnik 1998; Davis 2002a; Hu 2005c).  
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7.5 Preconditions of pension reform 
 
We believe that reforming any pension system is a very difficult and complicated 
task. Therefore, in order to achieve a successful reform, in terms of pension reform 
itself and the positive externalities, it is better to look at other aspects of the economy 
carefully as well (Davis 1998, 2005a; Blake 2003; Mitchell 2000, 2004; Vittas 2000). 
For example, a sound and healthy banking industry is necessary since banks are 
crucial in the settlement and clearing etc. In China, it is analysed that the current 
banking system, although suffering from many problems, is sufficient to support 
pension reform. In addition, a working insurance industry is needed in order to 
develop the annuities markets. The current industry in China grows rapidly, and is 
also able to offer some annuities products in the market, which implies that the basic 
conditions are met. The current Chinese stock market is large, and has more than 1000 
listed companies. In this sense, it meets the preconditions for pension reform to 
diversify risk and achieve high returns. A more developed market, however, is 
desirable, in that it would maximise the benefits of pension reform. For example, a 
less volatile stock market is helpful, since it produces stable and high investment 
returns, particularly for long-term investors. 
 
Macro-economic stability and financial stability are essential since pension fund 
investment could not function properly in a high inflation regime. In this context, one 
relevant point relates to inflation-protected bonds. Currently, there is no such bond in 
China. Therefore, to preserve pension values and facilitate pension reform, the 
authorities should consider issuing inflation-linked bonds with long maturities. 
Meanwhile financial regulators should be relatively experienced and capable of 
supervising markets, which also contributes to financial stability. Another 
precondition is basic financial knowledge for individual investors. It is not an 
immediate issue now, but becomes increasingly important, given the rapid growth of 
China’s occupational pension industry (Hu 2005e). Good accounting standards and 
practices are also important in that it enhances the quality of listed firms in the stock 
markets, and help Chinese investors to focus on fundamentals (Cheng 2005). The 
current accounting standards are not sufficient to prevent frauds and accounting 
manipulation. Credit rating agencies and financial analysts are needed in pension 
reform, because they facilitate pension sponsors to select best performers. Good 
corporate governance is also relevant there, in that it increases investors’ confidence 
in investing in listed firms. This issue, however, is complex due to the 2/3% of non-
traded shares in most listed SOEs (Tenev et al 2002).  
 
7.6 Family support 
 
Another issue is concerned with family support. In our view, traditional family 
support is still of crucial importance in China, which is against the background that 
the extended family network is breaking down during China’s recent industrialisation. 
As noted in Section 3, millions of younger workers migrant to work in urban areas in 
China, thus leaving old parents behind at home villages. However, supporting older 
parents is so deeply rooted in Chinese culture that it is likely to remain over a 
relatively long term (McCarthy and Zheng 1996). It is reflected by the fact that most 
migrant workers still regularly remit money back to their parents or close relatives in 
their home villages. Besides such strong culture, we also noted in Section 4.5 that, in 
 82
term of pension provisions, the family mechanism is less costly and more secure 
given the small size of pooling unit. In the long term, when the Chinese economy 
becomes more developed, the importance of traditional family support might be 
weakened gradually, while in the short term it is desirable to preserve such traditional 
value. Indeed experiences in Hong Kong and Taiwan suggest that even when the 
economy becomes developed family support still plays an important role (Li 1999). 
This traditional family support mechanism is strengthened by the passage of Family 
Support Law in 1981, which gives adult children the legal obligation to support their 
parents if their parents are not able to live by themselves alone.  
8. Conclusions 
 
China, as the largest developing country in the world, is working hard to realise its 
ambition of becoming a middle income country around 2050. Over the past decades, it 
has witnessed high economic growth and successfully transformed from a central 
planning economy to a market economy. Despite impressive economic expansion, a 
number of issues have to be addressed and solved as quickly as possible, e.g. banking 
reform and income equality (Feldstein 2003; OECD 2005a). Failure to tackle any of 
these problems will have a devastating impact on Chinese economy. In this paper we 
sought to address one of these problems, i.e. pension reform.  
 
China, currently a young country, is about to undergo a dramatic demographic 
transformation in this century. Forecasting statistics (UN 2004) estimate that the 
65+/total population ratio will be 16% of the total population in 2030 and 24% in 
2050. Similar to other countries (Hu 2005b), the rise in old age dependency ratios in 
China is mainly due to two factors, i.e. increasing life expectancy and a decreasing 
fertility rate (Munnell 2004). The one-child family planning policy, together with a 
system of birth permits and penalties to enforce it (Jackson and Howe 2004), to a 
large extent contributes to the decreasing fertility rate. Against the background of a 
rapidly ageing population, however, China is very badly prepared to cope with the 
increasing number of the elderly. Inter alia, the current pension system features a low 
coverage rate, poor participation rate, a high contribution rate etc. In this paper we 
sought to find solutions to China’s coming pension crisis.  
 
In Section 2 we reviewed the pension system over the period from 1949-2004. Over 
that period, the Chinese pension system has undergone a great transformation, from a 
solely government sponsored PAYG system to a multi-pillar model recommended by 
the World Bank (Friedman et al 1996; World Bank 1997). Sections 3 and 4 identified 
current questions related to the Chinese pensions system, and then sought to provide 
some practical advice about how to improve the system. Section 5 discussed pension 
reform’s external environment in China, with particular focus on the current 
development of the financial structure in China, and then presented the reform 
benefits. Section 6 conducted an empirical study; we simulated the impact of different 
policy alternatives on pension provisions from a range of aspects, i.e. retirement age, 
contribution rate and investment strategy. Section 7 concluded the paper by 
summarising results and main findings.   
 
Based on our critical analysis and empirical results from the simulation work, a 
number of policy recommendations were proposed in the paper.  
 
 83
First, Chinese authorities need to unify the system, which implies a unification along 
both horizontal and vertical dimensions, i.e. a system fair to everyone without 
discrimination against region, background and type of employment etc. A unified 
national law is help in this case. Under such a legal framework, uncertainties and 
confusions, felt by many people resulting from frequent changes in pension policies 
during the past decade, will also be eased. In consequence, public confidence and 
participation will increase.  
 
Second, participation incentives need to be improved. Besides unification efforts 
above, the current policy by using the cash surplus from employers and employees 
contributions to pay off costs inherited from the past system should be altered. In 
other works, historical pension costs should be borne by the government through 
general taxes and bond issuance, rather than the current working population.  
 
Third, again in order to encourage participation, a smaller contribution rate is applied 
to meet pensioners’ basic retirement needs. All the complementary income is met with 
the relatively large funded DC component. The relatively high replacement rate could 
be achieved by appropriate fund management.   
 
Fourth, as regards pension fund investment, it is more appropriate to diversify asset 
allocation so as to achieve a stable and high return. In this context, assuming that the 
exchange rates are not too volatile, international investment should be gradually 
phased in, in that the risk is largely diversified away by investing in different 
countries, which are expected to be not perfectly correlated to each other.  
 
Fifth, besides portfolio diversification, our empirical results also suggest the positive 
effects of implementing a range of policy alternations, i.e. raising the retirement age, 
reducing transaction costs. In this case, the most effective way to improve the 
replacement rate is to raise the retirement age, which serves as a double-edge sword in 
that it implies simultaneously a shorter pension benefit period and a longer pension 
contribution period.   
 
Sixth, traditional family support is still crucial in China and expected to continue its 
important role in the foreseeable future. It is not only because culture of supporting 
older is deeply rooted in China, but also family insurance in some cases is more 
efficient and less costly than the social insurance system.  
 
Last but not least, given the complexity of reforming a pension system, in order to 
maximise the benefits of a pension reform, a range of pre-conditions need to be 
addressed. Among others are stable macro-economy, sound banking system, healthy 
insurance industry, relatively experienced financial regulator, and good accounting 
and audit practices etc.  
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Table 
Table 1 Selected socio-economic development indicators comparison, as of 2003 
  
China 
 
Low income 
economies 
 
Lower middle 
income 
economies 
 
High income 
OECD 
economies  
 
World 
 
 
Economy 
    GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
    GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
    GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 
 
Population and demographics 
     Population growth rate (annual %) 
      Population aged 65 and above  (% of total) 
      Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 
      Life expectancy at birth (years) 
 
Education* 
     Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 
     Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) 
 
Health**  
    Health expenditure per capita (current US$) 
    Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
9.29 
1,067.35 
4.726.41 
 
 
0.62 
7.30 
30.00 
70.80 
 
 
90.92 
98.86 
 
 
 
68.00 
5.80 
 
 
 
6.92 
432.39 
1,925.62 
 
 
1.81 
4.15 
79.81 
58.08 
 
 
57.99 
72.36 
 
 
 
29.44 
5.49 
 
 
 
5.69 
1,493.61 
4.845.21 
 
 
0.86 
6.94 
31.39 
69.21 
 
 
89.77 
96.75 
 
 
 
84.01 
5.98 
 
 
 
1.72 
28,108.71 
26,120.58 
 
 
0.49 
14.90 
5.43** 
       78.53 
 
 
N.A. 
N.A. 
 
 
 
3,088.23 
11.13 
 
 
2.83 
5,345.16 
7,161.78 
 
 
1.17 
7.12 
56.80 
66.76 
 
 
79.07 
86.62 
 
 
 
523.75 
10.05 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI 2005). *, as of 2000; **, as of 2002. 
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Table 2 GDP per capita growth, 5-year average (%), 1961-2004 
 China 
Low income 
economies 
Lower 
middle 
income 
economies 
High 
income 
OECD 
economies World 
1961-1965 0.2 1.5 1.9 4.1 3.4 
1966-1970 4.6 1.9 3.9 4.2 3.1 
1971-1975 3.6 0.5 5.1 2.3 1.6 
1976-1980 5.2 0.9 3.9 2.8 2.0 
1981-1985 9.3 1.4 2.2 2.0 0.9 
1986-1990 6.3 2.5 2.2 3.0 1.9 
1991-1995 10.7 1.6 3.8 1.3 0.8 
1996-2000 7.2 2.9 3.2 2.4 1.9 
2001-2004a 7.9 3.6 4.8 1.5 1.3 
Averageb 6.1 1.9 3.4 2.6 1.9 
Averagec 8.3 2.4 3.2 2.0 1.4 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI 2005); a, 4-year average between 2001 and 2004; b, average between 1961-2004; c, average between 1981-
2004.  
Table 3 Demographic statistics of China, 1960-2003 
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 3.39 5.78 2.54 2.1 1.9 1.88 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 36a 60 65 69 70 71 
Population ages 65 and above (% of total) 4.84 4.31 4.75 5.56 6.98 7.30 
Population growth (annual %) -0.12b 2.76 1.25 1.47 0.71 0.62 
Population, total (in million) 667 818 981 1,140 1,260 1,290 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI 2005); a, 36 years was estimated for 1960, due to the widespread national famine during 1958-1961; b, the 
negative growth rate in 1960 was again due to the famine. 
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Table 4 A comparison of retirement age, eligibility and replacement rate, 1951-1978 
 1951 1953 1958 1978 
Retirement agea     
     Men 60 60 60 60 
     Women 50 50 50 50 
Qualifying years of total employment     
     Men 25 25 25 10 
     Women 20 20 15 10 
Qualifying years of employment at current place of work     
      Men 10 5 5 n.a 
      Women 10 5 5 n.a 
Replacement rate % 35-60 50-70 50-70 60-90 
Memo: life expectancy at birth (years)b 41 41 45 65 
Source: Song, S and G, Chu, 1997; Yearbook of Labour Statistics of China, various years; UN population statistics fro Memo data; a, those women in the 
managerial position are allowed to retire at 55. In addition, those workers employed in hazardous industries, e.g. mining, are allowed to retire five years earlier 
than normal, e.g. at the age of 55 for men and 45 for women; b, 41 was the 5-year average estimate for 1950-1955, 45 the estimate for 1956-1960, and 65 for 
1976-1980.  
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Table 5 Selected pension statistics in China, 1978-1988 
Year 
No. of pensioners 
(millions) 
Expenditure (RMB 
billion)* Dependency ratio** % 
1978 3.1 1.7 3.3 
1979 6.0 3.3 6.0 
1980 8.2 5.0 7.8 
1983 12.9 8.7 11.2 
1984 14.8 10.6 12.5 
1985 16.4 15.0 13.3 
1986 18.1 19.5 14.1 
1987 19.7 23.8 14.9 
1988 21.2 32.1 15.6 
Source: Yearbook of labour statistics of China (1998). *, in nominal terms; **, dependency 
ratio, ratio of the number of retirees to that of the working population 
 
Table 6 The structure of the 1997 pension reform in China 
Pillar 
Contribution rate 
% 
Replacement 
rate % PAYG/funded 
Mandatory/ 
voluntary Status 
1A 
Enterprise:17 
Individual:0 20 PAYG Mandatory In operation 
1B 
Enterprise:8 
Individual:3 38 Funded Mandatory In operation* 
2 
Enterprise: N.A. 
Individual: N.A. N.A. Funded Voluntary Not finalized 
3 Individual: N.A. N.A. Funded Voluntary Not finalized 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and Hussain (2001). *, in operation in 
principle since the individual accounts are empty (see text for details).  
 
Table 7 Statistical summary of Chinese National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
2000-04, RMB bn and % 
Source/year
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Transfer from central  
government budget   
20.0 
(100.0) 
67.4  
(84.7) 
97.7  
(80.7) 
97.7  
(77.6) 
114.8  
(74.6) 
Transfer from the state  
shares in  SOEs  
12.2  
(15.3) 
21.0  
(17.3) 
21.4  
(17.0) 
26.1  
(17.0) 
Lottery income   
2.38  
(2.0) 
6.9  
(5.5) 
12.9  
(8.4) 
Investment income  
0.98  
(1.2) 
3.09  
(2.5) 
6.5  
(5.2) 
16.9  
(11.0) 
Total assets 20.00 80.51 124.19 132.50 170.80 
Source: National Council of Social Security Fund (NCSSF) Annual Statistics, various years; 
all statistics are in stocks; the numbers within the brackets are the weights in percentage 
relative to the total assets; see Section 3.3.3 for details on asset allocation.  
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Table 8 Rural pension coverage in China, 1999-2003 
Year       Participants   Rural working population  Coverage rate 
 Million Million % 
1999 64.6 615.5 10.5 
2000 61.7 651.3 9.5 
2001 60.0 616.0 9.7 
2002 54.6 616.5 8.9 
2003 54.3 612.6 8.9 
Source: MOLSS Statistics, various years. United Nations Population Database (2004). WDI 
(2005). The pension coverage ratio was calculated by dividing the number of year-end 
participants by the number of rural working population, i.e. aged above 15. 
 
Table 9 Urban pensiona statistics in China, 1989-2003 
 
Pension 
Participants Pensioners 
Dependency 
ratiob 
Urban working 
population 
Coverage 
ratioc 
 Million Person % Million Person % 
1989 48.2 8.9 18.5 216.9 26.3 
1990 52.0 10.9 20.9 228.9 27.5 
1991 56.5 16.8 29.7 239.1 30.7 
1992 77.7 18.4 23.7 249.4 38.6 
1993 80.1 20.8 26.0 259.7 38.8 
1994 84.9 22.4 26.4 270.3 39.7 
1995 87.4 23.6 27.0 281.2 39.5 
2000 104.5 33.8 32.4 343.0 40.3 
2001 108.0 33.8 31.3 357.0 39.7 
2002 111.3 36.1 32.4 371.9 39.6 
2003 116.5 38.6 33.1 391.7 39.6 
Source: NBS Statistics (2004). United Nations Population Database (2004). WDI (2005); a, all 
pension statistics are referred to the pillar one of the multi-pillar system in China; b, the 
dependency ratio is the number of pensioners divided by the number of pension participants; 
c, the pension coverage ratio was calculated by dividing the number of year-end participants 
by the number of urban working population, i.e. aged above 15. 
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Table 10 A comparison of coverage rates and GDP per capita as of 2002a, % 
 Coverage rate GDP per capita 
 % US$ (constant 2000) 
Argentina 55.4 6,452.7 
Bolivia 23.1 1,011.8 
Costa Rica 69.3 4,208.4 
EI Salvador 36.7 2,128.1 
Mexico 71.9 5,805.6 
Peru 27.2 2,084.7 
Uruguay 41.4 5,136.8 
Malaysia 60.5 3,882.6 
Singapore 65.3 22,152.5 
Philippines 28.3 1,008.1 
Thailand 25.1 2,143.6 
Averageb 45.8 3,838.8 
China 20.7 982.7 
Source: coverage rate Claramunt (2004) and Holzmann et al (2000), and GDP per capita WDI 
(2005) World Development Indicators; a, coverage data of 4 Asian countries (but China) are 
as of 1997; b, average between 7 Latin American countries and 4 Asian countries. 
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Table 11 A comparison of contribution rates for the social security pension 
between countries (11OECD+11EMEs) 2004 
 Country  
Insured 
person Employer Total 
 Code Name % % % 
OECD AUSa Australia 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 BELb Belgium 7.50 8.86 16.36 
 CAN Canada 4.95 4.95 9.90 
 DEU Germany 9.75 9.75 19.50 
 ESP Spain 4.70 23.60 28.30 
 FRA France 6.55 8.20 14.75 
 GRE Greece 6.67 13.33 20.00 
 ISL Iceland 4.00 6.00 10.00 
 JPN Japan 6.79 6.79 13.58 
 GBR Britain 11.00 12.80 23.80 
 USA USA 6.20 6.20 12.40 
 NOR Norway 7.80 14.10 21.90 
EMEs BRA Brazil 7.65 20.00 27.65 
 CHLc Chile 10.00 0.00 10.00 
 
CHNd China 8.00 22.00 30.00 
 CRTe Croatia 15.00 0.00 15.00 
 EGY Egypt 13.00 17.00 30.00 
 FJI Fiji 8.00 8.00 16.00 
 HUN Hungary 8.50 18.00 26.50 
 IDNf Indonesia 2.00 3.70 5.70 
 KOR Korea 4.50 4.50 9.00 
 MEXg Mexico 1.13 3.15 4.28 
 SGPh Singapore 20.00 13.00 33.00 
 THA Thailand 3.00 3.00 6.00 
 ZAFi South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average_OECD     15.87 
Average_EMEs     16.39 
Average_All     16.14 
Source: SSA (2004). Contributions herein are used to cover old age, disability and survivors.  
a. Refers to the social security.  
b. Disability pensions are financed under the Sickness and Maternity Programme. 
c. Enterprises contribute to 0% except 2% of salary for employees working under arduous 
conditions. 
d. It includes contributions to basic pension and work injury insurance; for more details see 
Table 12. 
e. Refers to basic pension. 
f. Refers to provident funds. 
g. The government pays 10.14% of the total employer contributions. 
h. Relevant to monthly wages greater than S$750. If wages are less than S$750, smaller 
contribution rates apply. In addition, depending on the member’s age, 0 to 22% of the 
contributions are used to finance home purpose and education. 
i. The government bears all cost.  
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Table 12 Summary of contribution rates for overall social welfare programme in 
China (%), 2004 
 Pensions 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Medical 
insurance 
Work injury 
insurancea 
Maternity 
insurance 
Provident 
fundsb Total 
Employers 20 2 6 2 1 8 39 
Employees 8 1 2 0 0 8 19 
Both 28 3 8 2 1 16 58 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2005) and author’s estimates.  
a. According to the “Work injury insurance regulations” (MOLSS 2004), the contribution 
rates for work injury insurance are not fixed. Local governments are given the rights to 
decide their own collections so as to balance the payouts and contribution collections in 
different industries and localities. In order to complete the table, I estimated the 2% 
contribution rate based on information in Table 18.   
b. Provident funds are accumulated funds for the purpose of housing purchase.  
 
Table 13 Number of retirees by enterprise ownership 1997-2004, '000 persons 
Year SOEsa COEsb 
Public 
inst.c Govt.d 
HK, MA 
&TW 
firmse 
Foreign 
firmsf Othersg Total_A Total_B Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1+2+3+4 5+6+7 1-7 
1997 19,081 6,217 4,887 2,132 92 105 719 32,317 916 33,233 
1998 20,665 6,042 4,735 2,163 94 139 1,811 33,605 2,044 35,649 
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 
2000 20,189 5,800 5,805 2,515 155 114 2,420 34,308 2,688 36,996 
2001 21,613 5,890 6,544 2,631 132 123 2,966 36,678 3,221 39,899 
2002 22,595 6,080 6,611 2,736 185 252 3,501 38,022 3,938 41,960 
2003 23,936 6,175 7,201 2,902 166 175 4,413 40,214 4,754 44,967 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2004).  
a. State owned enterprises. 
b. Collective owned enterprises. 
c. Public institutions, e.g. universities, hospitals. 
d. Government in all levels. 
e. Firms established by funds from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
f. Firms with any other ownerships. 
 
Table 14 Number of retirees by enterprise ownership 1997-2004, % 
Year SOEs COEs Public inst. Govt. 
HK,MA& 
TW firms 
Foreign 
firms Others Total_A Total_B Total_C 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1+2+3+4 5+6+7 1+2 
1997 57.4 18.7 14.7 6.4 0.3 0.3 2.2 97.2 2.8 76.1 
1998 58.0 16.9 13.3 6.1 0.3 0.4 5.1 94.3 5.7 74.9 
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2000 54.6 15.7 15.7 6.8 0.4 0.3 6.5 92.7 7.3 70.2 
2001 54.2 14.8 16.4 6.6 0.3 0.3 7.4 91.9 8.1 68.9 
2002 53.8 14.5 15.8 6.5 0.4 0.6 8.3 90.6 9.4 68.3 
2003 53.2 13.7 16.0 6.5 0.4 0.4 9.8 89.4 10.6 67.0 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2004). Key: see Table 13.  
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Table 15 Pension payment by enterprise ownership 1997-2003, RMB bn 
Year SOEs COEs Public inst. Govt. 
HK,MA& 
TW firms Foreign firms Others Total_A Total_B Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1+2+3+4 5+6+7 1-7 
1997 89.9 21.2 31.0 14.5 0.4 0.6 3.5 157 4 161.0 
1998 104.4 22.0 36.8 16.1 0.5 0.7 9.6 179 11 190.0 
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 
2000 118.8 24.2 46.8 20.1 0.9 0.8 13.2 210 15 224.8 
2001 135.9 29.1 68.2 29.6 1.9 2.2 19.9 263 24 287.0 
2002 167.5 35.1 77.5 34.9 1.3 2.5 25.1 315 29 344.0 
2003 184.2 37.8 92.0 40.4 1.4 1.5 32.8 354 36 389.9 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2004). Key: see Table 13. 
 
Table 16 Pension payment by enterprise ownership 1997-2004, % 
Year SOEs COEs 
Public 
institutions Government 
HK,MA&TW 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Other 
firms Total_A Total_B Total_C 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1+2+3+4 5+6+7 1+2 
1997 55.8 13.2 19.2 9.0 0.3 0.3 2.2 97.2 2.8 69.0 
1998 54.9 11.6 19.3 8.5 0.3 0.4 5.0 94.3 5.7 66.5 
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2000 52.8 10.8 20.8 9.0 0.4 0.3 5.9 93.4 6.6 63.6 
2001 47.3 10.2 23.8 10.3 0.7 0.8 6.9 91.6 8.4 57.5 
2002 48.7 10.2 22.5 10.2 0.4 0.7 7.3 91.6 8.4 58.9 
2003 47.2 9.7 23.6 10.4 0.4 0.4 8.4 90.9 9.1 56.9 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2004). Key: see Table 13. 
 
Table 17 Asset returns in China 1993-2004, % 
 Nominal returns Inflation Real returns 
Year Deposit Govt bond Equitya  Deposit Govt bond Equity 
1993 10.98 13.86 31.70 14.58 -3.60 -0.72 17.12 
1994 10.98 13.86 -19.54 24.24 -13.26 -10.38 -43.77 
1995 10.98 13.86 -1.45 16.90 -5.92 -3.04 -18.34 
1996 7.47 9.00 82.20 8.32 -0.85 0.68 73.88 
1997 5.67 9.00 16.23 2.81 2.86 6.19 13.42 
1998 3.78 5.22 0.70 -0.84 4.62 6.06 1.55 
1999 2.25 2.88 21.61 -1.41 3.66 4.29 23.02 
2000 2.25 2.88 33.29 0.26 1.99 2.62 33.04 
2001 2.25 2.88 -23.79 0.46 1.79 2.42 -24.26 
2002 1.98 2.79 2.22 -0.77 2.75 3.56 2.98 
2003 1.98 2.79 -11.68 1.16 0.82 1.63 -12.84 
2004 2.25 2.79 -7.44 3.90 -1.65 -1.11 -11.34 
MEAN (1993-2004) 5.2 6.8 10.3 5.8 -0.6 1.0 4.5 
STDEV (1993-2004) 3.9 4.8 29.3 8.4 5.1 4.6 30.8 
MEAN (1997-2004) 2.8 3.9 3.9 0.7 2.1 3.2 3.2 
STDEV (1994-2004) 1.3 2.2 18.8 1.9 1.9 2.4 19.3 
Source: Datastream, National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), and World Development 
Indicator (WDI) (2005); a, calculated as percentage changes in weighted stock market indices 
between Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
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Table 18 Asset accumulations by type of social insurance 1990-2003, RMB bn 
Year Total Pensionsa 
Unemployment 
insurance 
Medical 
insurance 
Work injury 
insurance 
Maternity 
insurance 
1990 11.7 9.8 1.9    
1991 17.0 14.4 2.6    
1992 25.3 22.1 3.2    
1993 30.4 25.9 4.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 
1994 36.6 30.5 5.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 
1995 51.7 43.0 6.8 0.3 1.3 0.3 
2000 132.8 94.7 19.6 11.0 5.8 1.7 
2001 162.3 105.4 22.6 25.3 6.9 2.1 
2002 242.3 160.8 25.4 45.1 8.1 3.0 
2003 331.4 220.7 30.4 67.1 9.1 4.2 
Source: MOLSS Statistics (2004); a, assets accumulated in pillars 1A and 1B.  
 
Table 19 Asset allocation of National Social Security Fund (NSSF) by type of 
assets 2001-2003 
  
In RMB bn 
Risk level Instruments 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Very low Deposit & others 52.2 94.9 77.7 66.7 
Low Government bonds and others 27.0 28.0 48.0 74.4 
Medium Other investment 1.3 1.3 0.0 11.3 
High Stocks/Mutual funds 0.0 0.0 6.7 18.4 
 Total 80.5 124.2 132.5 170.8 
   
In % 
Risk level Instruments 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Very low Deposit & others 64.9 76.4 58.7 39.1 
Low Government bonds and others 33.6 22.5 36.3 43.6 
Medium Other investment 1.6 1.0 0.0 6.6 
High Stocks/Mutual funds 0.0 0.0 5.1 10.8 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: National Council of Social Security Fund (NCSSF) Statistics.  
 
Table 20 Asset allocation of rural pension funds by type of assets 1999-2003 
 In RMB bn 
Instruments 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bank deposits 9.2 9.7 9.9 11.0 11.0 
Government bonds 3.3 3.5 3.9 3.3 3.5 
Management by governmenta 3.5 2.9 4.9 5.7 6.5 
Others 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.2 4.4 
Total 18.4 19.6 21.6 23.3 26.0 
 In % 
Instruments 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bank deposits 49.9 49.7 45.9 47.2 42.5 
Government bonds 17.8 17.8 18.2 14.3 13.6 
Management by governmenta 19.0 14.8 22.7 24.6 25.1 
Others 13.2 12.5 13.2 13.8 16.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 106 
 
 
Source: MOLSS (2004). Note: a, refers to such fund managed by the local authorities. The 
funds are always regarded as the fiscal revenues, and the related investment procedures are 
very opaque.  
 
Table 21 Returns of rural pension funds 1999-2003 
 
Nominal return Inflation rate Real return 
1999 4.82 -1.41 6.23 
2000 2.86 0.26 2.60 
2001 2.89 0.46 2.43 
2002 3.11 -0.77 3.88 
2003 2.89 1.16 1.73 
Mean 3.31 -0.06 3.37 
Source: MOLSS (2004). 
 
Table 22 Returns of the NSSF 2002-2004 
 
Nominal return Inflation rate Real return 
2002 2.59 -0.77 3.36 
2003 3.56 1.16 2.40 
2004 3.10 3.9 -0.80 
Mean 3.08 1.43 1.65 
Source: National Council of Social Security Fund (NCSSF) Statistics.  
 
Table 23 Pension fund assets and returns by type in China, 2003 
 
Pillar 
1A+1B Pillar 2 NSSF 
Rural 
Pensions 
Assets (RMB bn) 220.7 35.0 132.5 26.0 
Assets (%) 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Real returns (%) 1.2 1.2/2.4a 2.4 1.7 
Estimated total returns (%) 1.6/1.7b    
Source: Tables 18-22; a, returns for assets in Pillar 2 are not available, so we estimate it at 
the lower bound 1.2% as pillar 1, and the upper bound 2.4 as the NSSF; b, the returns on 
Chinese pension funds are estimated by weighting returns by four different components, i.e. 
Pillar 1A+1B, Pillar 2, the NSSF, and rural pension funds. 1.6% is estimated based on 1.2% 
return for Pillar 2, while 1.7% is based on 2.4% return for Pillar 2.  
 
Table 24 A comparison of pension funds’ real returns, 2003 
Country Australia Canada UK Philippine Mexico Malaysia China 
Return % 26.2a 10.7 16.1b 8.8 3.9 3.6c 1.6/1.7d 
Source: Hu (2005c); a, the high return was due to 59% return achieved by equity investment 
in 2003; b, Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2005); c, as of 2001 (Thillainathan 2003); d, Table 23.  
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Table 25 Pension fund investment regulations across countries as of 2001  
 Equity Real Estate Bonds 
Investment 
Funds Loans 
Bank 
Deposits Foreign assets 
OECD countries
 
       
Australia No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Canada No limit 25% No limit No limit No limit No limit 30% 
Denmark 70% No limit No limit 70% No limit No limit 
High-risk assets (domestic & foreign 
shares and unlisted securities) limited to 
70%, min 80% currency matching limit 
Italy No limit 
Direct investment 
not allowed No limit 
20% for 
close-end 
funds 0 20% 
67% currency matching limit, 5% for 
debt & equity securities issued by non-
OECD residents 
Japan No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Netherlands No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit No limit 
Spain 
no limit (quoted); 
10% (unquoted) No limit No limit No limit 
10% (if no 
mortgage 
guarantee)  15% 
No limit on investment in OECD 
securities 
UK No limit No limit No limit No limit 
No employer-
related loans No limit No limit 
USA No limit No limit No limit No limit 
No employer-
related loans No limit No limit 
EMEs        
Czech Republic 25% (non-listed) No limit No limit 25% 0 10% 
Permitted on securities traded in OECD 
markets 
Fijia 
Authorized investments include: stocks and government securities in Fiji, the UK, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, loans secured by first legal mortgage, debentures of any city or town in Fiji, and bank deposits n.a. 
Hong Kong n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  70% currency matching limit 
Hungaryb 
50% (MPF) 
60% (VPF) 
5% directly, 10 
together with real 
estate investment 
(MPF) 
10 % directly or 
through real estate 
investment funds  
(VPF) 
30% (corporate, 
municipalities), 
no limit on 
financial 
institutions 25 
(mortgage) 50% 
0 (MPF) 
30% of the 
projected fund 
income to the 
liquidity and 
operational 
reserves 
during the 
majority of the 
loan (VPF) No limit 30% 
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5% to fund 
members 
(VPF) 
Korea 40% 15% n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10% 
Malaysiac n.a.  n.a.  
70% government 
bonds n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Mexico 0 0 
No limit (federal 
government), No 
limit (AAA 
corporate), 35 
(AA corporate), 5 
(A corporate) 0 0 
250,000 in 
Mexican pesos 
and US$ 
25,000 in 
foreign 
currency plus 
the required 
amount for 
currency 
matching Not allowed generally 
OPF 
40% (listed on 
primary market), 
10% (listed on 
secondary 
market or 
unlisted) 
 
0 
30% (mortgage), 
15% (municipal), 
10% (corporate) 
10% 
(National 
Investment 
Funds), 10% 
(close-
ended), 15% 
(open-
ended) 
Equal to 
investment in 
the shares of 
the borrower 20% 5% 
Polandd EPF No limit 0 5% No limit 
Equal to 
investment in 
the shares of 
the borrower No limit 5% 
Thailande 60% on low-risk instruments; 40% on other assets n.a. 
Turkey No limit 0 No limit 10 10 10 15% 
Source: all data are from Yermo (2003) until specified otherwise.  
a. Data from Fiji National Provident Fund (www.fnpf.com.fj). 
b. MFF, mandatory pension fund; VPF, voluntary pension fund. 
c. Data from Davis (2002b). 
d. OPF, open pension funds; EPF, employee pension funds, NIP, national investment funds. 
e. Data from the Government Pension Fund (www.gfp.or.th) 
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Table 26 Empirical results of the implications of pension funds for financial 
development 
Variablea  All  OECD  EMEs  
  Ab Bb A B A B 
PCDMBOFIGDP Short term 0.03708* 0.04012 0.01454 -0.13214** 0.02993 0.12856** 
 Long term -0.00151 0.00847 -0.00127 -0.03987** -0.01238 0.03830*** 
CREDIT Short term -0.04291** -0.13198* 0.00210 -0.17661* -0.15416* 0.04061 
 Long term -0.02833* -0.04192* 0.00210 -0.05252* -0.09363* -0.06626** 
DMBTFA Short term 0.02473*** 0.00101 -0.09833*** -0.04429 0.05691** 0.11320 
 Long term 0.02377* -0.01349*** 0.04004 0.02718 0.03284*** 0.14327* 
STKCAP Short term 0.30419* 0.34786*** 0.63711* 0.89834* 0.19722* -0.38154 
 Long term 0.13411* 0.09992** 0.13324** 0.10420 0.10004* -0.01734 
STKTRD Short term 0.33685** 0.81232*** 1.39857* 3.12497* 0.04871 -0.63489 
 Long term 0.10399 -0.00047 0.47207* 0.64437* 0.23459*** -0.24607 
STKTNV Short term 0.01546 0.95407*** 0.76833* 2.64679* -0.11897 0.15174 
 Long term -0.02118 -0.03833 0.19866 0.51356* 0.04247 -0.15179 
PUBBND Short term 0.21266* 0.23950* 0.01877 0.04614 0.29412* 0.23943 
 Long term 0.08060** -0.03846 -0.27031* -0.24126* 0.11001** -0.24614* 
PRIBND Short term 0.27914* 0.20547 0.11086 0.12460 0.41275* 0.04577 
 Long term 0.07651* 0.01312 0.10422 0.08581 0.15088** 0.03620 
Source: Hu (2005b); a, PCDMBOFIGDP, private credit provided by monetary bank and other 
financial institutions to GDP, CREDIT, domestic credit provided by banking industry, 
DMBTFA, domestic monetary bank assets to total financial assets, STKCAP, stock market 
capitalisation to GDP, STKTRD, stock market traded to GDP, STKTNV, stock market turnover 
to GDP, PUBBND, public bond capitalisation to GDP, PRIBND, private bond capitalisation to 
GDP; b, A represents the OLS estimator, and B represents the TSLS estimator.  
Table 27 A comparison of financial systems with different legal origins (%), as of 
1999 
 
English 
origina 
French 
origin 
German 
origin 
Scandinavian 
origin 
Sample 
average China 
Bank credit/GDP 62 55 99 49 73 111 
Total value traded/GDPb 58 18 55 25 47 32 
Market capitalisation/GDPc 31 7 37 8 27 11 
Overhead cost/bank total 
asset 4 5 2 3 3 12 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2000); China Statistical Yearbook (2000). 
Cited in Allen et al (2005); a, origin refers to the legal origin of the company law or commercial 
law; b, total value traded/GDP, the ratio of the total value traded of shares to GDP; c, market 
capitalisation/GDP, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP. 
 
Table 28 A comparison of financial systems between regions (%), as of 2004 
 
Low 
income 
Middle 
income OECDa World China
 
Bank credit/GDP 47.2 76.4 209.1 171.1 167.0 
Stock market capitalisation/GDP 44.5 45.7 106.9 97.4 38.8 
Total value traded/GDP 45.2 25.1 112.9 98.5 45.4 
Stock market turnover 112.7 60.3 113.6 105.2 113.3 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005); a, high-income OECD countries. 
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Table 29 Balance sheet of the central bank in China, 2005 
 
RMB bn US$ bn in % 
Foreign assets 5760.5 711.2 60.6 
      Of which: Foreign exchange 5634.7 695.6 59.3 
                      Monetary gold 33.7 4.2 0.4 
                      Other foreign assets 92.1 11.4 1.0 
Claims on government 293.0 36.2 3.1 
      Of which: Central government 293.0 36.2 3.1 
Claims on deposit money banks 852.3 105.2 9.0 
Claims on specific depository institutions 95.2 11.8 1.0 
Claims on other financial institutions 1418.5 175.1 14.9 
Claims on non-financial institutions 9.5 1.2 0.1 
Other assets 1076.6 132.9 11.3 
TOTAL ASSETS 9505.5 1173.5 100.0 
 
   
Reserve money 5827.1 719.4 61.3 
       Of which: Currency issue 2294.3 283.3 24.1 
                         Deposit of financial institutions 3516.4 434.1 37.0 
                         Deposits of non-financial institutions 16.4 2.0 0.2 
Bond issue 1618.7 199.8 17.0 
Foreign liabilities 62.4 7.7 0.7 
Deposits of government  1051.0 129.8 11.1 
       Of which: Central government 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Own capital 22.0 2.7 0.2 
Other liabilities 924.3 114.1 9.7 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 9505.5 1173.5 100.0 
Source: The People’s Bank of China (2005). Data are as of July 2005.  
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Table 30 Statistical summary of assets held by Chinese financial institutions, 1995-2003 
Year SOBsa RCCsb UCCsc 
Insurance 
companies TICsd 
Non-deposit 
intermediaries 
Other commercial 
banks 
Foreign 
banks Total 
In RMB bn          
1995 5,373.3 679.1 303.9  458.6 49.0 536.9 4.3 7,405.1 
1996 6,582.7 870.7 374.8  563.7 82.0 770.0 5.5 9,249.4 
1997 7,914.4 1,012.2 498.9  636.4 100.4 948.6 7.6 11,118.6 
1998 8,860.9 1,143.1 560.6  802.5 121.0 1,128.2 11.8 12,628.2 
1999 9,970.6 1,289.2 630.2 260.4 907.5 137.1 1,376.9 19.1 14,591.0 
2000 10,793.7 1,393.1 678.5 337.4 975.9 160.8 1,828.3 37.9 16,205.6 
2001 11,188.2 1,610.8 780.0 459.1 1,088.3 223.7 2,255.7 34.2 17,640.0 
2002 13,549.6 2,205.2 119.2 649.4 1,544.1 408.1 2,997.7 31.8 21,505.2 
2003  2,674.6 148.7 912.3  495.6   4,231.2 
in %  
        
Year SOBs RCCs UCCs 
Insurance 
companies TICs 
Non-deposit 
intermediaries 
Other commercial 
banks 
Foreign 
banks Total 
1995 72.6 9.2 4.1  6.2 0.7 7.3 0.1 100.0 
1996 71.2 9.4 4.1  6.1 0.9 8.3 0.1 100.0 
1997 71.2 9.1 4.5  5.7 0.9 8.5 0.1 100.0 
1998 70.2 9.1 4.4  6.4 1.0 8.9 0.1 100.0 
1999 68.3 8.8 4.3 1.8 6.2 0.9 9.4 0.1 100.0 
2000 66.6 8.6 4.2 2.1 6.0 1.0 11.3 0.2 100.0 
2001 63.4 9.1 4.4 2.6 6.2 1.3 12.8 0.2 100.0 
2002 63.0 10.3 0.6 3.0 7.2 1.9 13.9 0.1 100.0 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000-2003.a, State-owned banks; b, Rural credit cooperatives; c, Urban credit cooperatives; d, Trust and 
investment companies. 
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Table 31 A comparison of financial structure between China and Chile (%), 1980-2004 
  Financial intermediary and banking industry Stock market 
Life 
insurance 
market Bond market 
Country 
Name Year 
Liquid 
liabilities to 
GDP 
Central 
Bank 
Assets to 
GDP 
Deposit 
Money 
Bank 
Assets to 
GDP 
Private 
credit by 
deposit 
money 
banks and 
other 
financial 
institutions 
to GDP 
Financial 
system 
deposits 
Stock market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Stock 
market 
total value 
traded to 
GDP 
Stock 
market 
turnover 
ratio 
Life 
insurance 
penetration 
Private bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Public bond 
market 
capitalization 
to GDP 
Chile 1980 22.7 15.9 31.9 30.8 18.9 29.0 2.0 6.8 0.2 n.a. n.a. 
 1985 33.9 40.7 60.2 53.2 23.4 12.2 0.3 2.8 1.0 n.a. n.a. 
 1990 36.9 28.1 45.1 47.7 28.2 39.6 2.5 6.4 1.6 9.3 19.8 
 1995 33.3 13.8 44.5 57.0 30.1 101.8 15.5 15.3 1.8 13.4 27.6 
 2000 41.6 12.8 58.8 66.6 38.8 87.6 8.2 9.3 2.7 17.4 27.7 
 2001 40.5 13.1 60.5 69.2 37.8 83.0 6.2 7.5 2.8 22.3 30.5 
 2002 38.2 12.8 61.2 70.1 35.5 77.1 4.6 6.0 2.5 23.7 28.1 
 2003 37.3 11.1 61.7 75.0 34.6 86.4 8.8 10.2 2.6 19.4 27.4 
China 1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 1985 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 1990 72.0 6.2 79.5 79.5 54.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2 4.7 3.9 
 1995 93.6 4.1 81.4 80.1 76.6 6.3 7.1 113.0 0.3 3.4 4.6 
 2000 145.0 1.9 126.8 119.2 123.0 42.6 66.8 157.0 1.0 8.7 13.7 
 2001 152.1 2.5 130.9 121.3 129.2 47.6 38.2 80.2 1.3 9.2 15.7 
 2002 164.6 2.9 138.7 126.9 145.2 39.2 26.2 67.0 2.0 9.9 17.6 
 2003 176.4 2.7 147.9 135.5 159.8 40.6 33.8 83.1 2.3 10.3 18.9 
Source: Financial Structure Database (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2005). 
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Table 32 The world top 15 stock markets by capitalisation, 2003 
Rank Exchange US$ bn P/E ratio
 
1 NYSE 11,329.0 n.a. 
2 Japan (Tokyo) 2,953.1 122.1 
3 Nasdaq 2,844.2 n.a. 
4 London 2,460.1 18.3 
5 Euronext 2,076.4 14-20a 
6 Deutsche Börse 1,079.0 n.a. 
7 TSX Group 888.7 19.7 
8 Swiss Exchange 727.1 19.3 
9 Spanish Exchanges (BME) 726.2 19.4 
10 Hong Kong 714.6 19.0 
11 Borsa Italiana 614.8 15.7 
12 Australian 585.4 23.9 
13 Shanghai+Shenzhen (Totalc) 513.0 36.5/36.2b 
14 Taiwan 379.1 24.8 
15 Korea 298.2 10.1 
20 Shanghai+Shenzhen (Tradabled) 171.0 36.5/36.2b 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges, www.fibv.com. a, the P/E ratios for the Euronext 
(Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext Brussels, Euronext Lisbon, Euronext Paris) varied between 
14 and 20; b, 36.5 for SHSE and 36.2 for SZSE; c, stock market capitalisation of all shares; d, 
stock market capitalisation of tradable shares only (around 1/3 of total shares) (see Section 
5.1.2 for details).  
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Table 33 Statistical summary of the Chinese stock market, 1990-2004 
Years Listed Firms 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(total) 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(tradable) Stock turnover Total Investors 
Market 
Capitalisation/GDP 
Shanghai 
Stock 
index 
Growth 
rate 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
index 
Growth 
rate 
 (A and B-share) RMB bn RMB bn RMB bn (Million) (%)  %  % 
1990 8 1.2 n.a. N.A. N.A. 0.1     
1991 14 10.9 n.a. 4.4 0.4 0.5 207  72  
1992 53 104.8 n.a. 68.7 2.5 3.9 540 161.4 242 234.3 
1993 183 355.2 n.a. 362.7 8.7 10.3 819 51.7 239 -1.2 
1994 291 369.1 n.a. 818.2 11.7 7.9 713 -13.0 155 -35.2 
1995 323 347.4 93.8 403.6 14.6 5.9 726 1.9 139 -10.4 
1996 530 984.7 n.a. 2133.2 32.3 14.5 976 34.4 337 142.1 
1997 745 1752.9 n.a. 3072.2 33.8 23.5 1178 20.6 375 11.4 
1998 851 1950.6 574.6 2354.4 39.1 24.9 1216 3.3 366 -2.4 
1999 949 2647.1 821.4 3132.0 44.8 32.3 1497 23.1 438 19.7 
2000 1088 4809.1 1608.8 6082.7 58.0 53.8 1947 30.1 602 37.4 
2001 1160 4352.2 1446.3 3830.5 66.5 44.7 1521 -21.9 439 -27.0 
2002 1224 3832.9 1248.5 2799.0 68.8 36.4 1548 1.8 453 3.0 
2003 1287 4245.8 1317.9 3211.5 70.8 36.2 1398 -9.7 384 -15.2 
2004 1377 3705.6 1168.9 2069.7 72.1 29.3 1329 -4.9 338 -11.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2004); China Securities Regulatory Commission (2005); Shanghai Stock Exchange & Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Factbook (2004); World Development Indicator (WDI) (2005).  
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Table 34 A comparison of volatilitya, 1994-2005b 
 China EMEc EAFEd WRLDe 
1994 0.133 0.073 0.042 0.035 
1995 0.050 0.047 0.036 0.025 
1996 0.125 0.036 0.022 0.022 
1997 0.130 0.071 0.047 0.042 
1998 0.177 0.118 0.056 0.056 
1999 0.164 0.063 0.030 0.031 
2000 0.129 0.065 0.047 0.049 
2001 0.095 0.087 0.039 0.047 
2002 0.045 0.068 0.068 0.068 
2003 0.058 0.047 0.046 0.044 
2004 0.078 0.057 0.037 0.033 
2005 0.057 0.041 0.030 0.020 
Mean 0.104 0.064 0.042 0.039 
Source: Datastream; a, standard deviation of monthly total stock returns (capital gains plus 
dividends); b, 2005 refers to January 2005 to October 2005; c, emerging market economies; 
d, Europe, Asia, and Far East; e, world developed countries.  
 
Table 35 A comparison of stock market growth ratea (%), 1991-2004 
Years Canada Japan UK Korea Singapore Turkey Argentina Mexico South Africa 
1991 9.7 -1.6 2.9 -13.4 24.2 -49.0 423.8 111.5 23.6 
1992 -12.3 -17.2 -1.2 -4.0 0.3 -45.8 -9.6 29.2 -15.5 
1993 24.4 26.3 20.1 29.2 55.5 216.3 49.5 36.1 20.6 
1994 -7.6 12.6 -3.6 28.1 -4.3 -25.6 -6.7 -4.1 17.3 
1995 21.8 1.0 16.5 2.8 6.2 -8.3 -14.7 -49.7 9.4 
1996 31.2 -9.0 22.5 -38.3 5.8 37.0 26.1 25.0 -9.6 
1997 16.9 -26.0 24.4 -62.7 -27.4 49.1 24.1 41.7 -2.5 
1998 -9.5 1.7 9.5 108.3 -15.5 -39.9 -22.1 -39.0 -31.3 
1999 37.1 72.9 18.7 115.1 67.8 164.6 24.5 72.6 53.7 
2000 16.3 -24.1 -14.6 -49.3 -25.5 -30.6 -29.5 -13.8 -20.5 
2001 -21.3 -34.5 -17.0 16.2 -19.9 -41.9 -37.1 4.6 -17.7 
2002 -10.8 -14.5 -17.6 11.3 -13.3 -2.5 -45.5 -11.3 28.2 
2003 42.7 31.4 25.9 16.6 31.7 32.8 98.6 19.4 48.9 
2004 22.6 12.7 19.9 16.8 18.9 38.8 10.9 41.4 39.6 
Mean 11.5 2.3 7.6 12.6 7.5 21.1 35.2 18.8 10.3 
SDb 20.4 28.1 15.9 50.7 29.3 80.2 118.2 42.7 27.1 
Source: a, calculated by the author using stock market price index data from Datastream; b, 
standard deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 
Table 36 A comparison of the life insurance industry across countries, 2000 
Rank Countrya Densityb Penetrationc 
 
 
US$ % 
1 JPN 2877 8.7 
2 GBR 2663 12.6 
3 CHE 2297 7.8 
4 USA 1390 4.5 
5 SWE 1348 5.9 
6 DNK 1084 4.1 
7 AUS 1059 6.1 
8 KOR 855 9.9 
9 HKG 790 3.7 
10 CAN 670 3.2 
15 CYP 411 4.0 
20 MYS 76 2.2 
25 CZE 51 1.2 
30 HRV 19 0.5 
35 CHNd 8 1.1 
 
CHNe 40 3.4 
40 CRI 6 n.a. 
45 EGY 2 0.2 
50 ROM 2 0.1 
Source: OECD (2003) and Wu (2005); a, The World Bank 3-digit country code is used; b, 
Density is the life premium per capita in US$; c, Penetration is the total life premia divided by 
the GDP in %; d, as of 2000; e, as of 2004 
 
Table 37 Life premium growth in China over 1992-1999 
 
Source: Wu (2004) and CIRC (2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Premium Growth rate 
 RMB bn % 
1992 2.1  
1993 14.9 609.5 
1994 15.2 2.0 
1995 20.8 36.8 
1996 32.5 56.3 
1997 61.1 88.0 
1998 76.8 25.7 
1999 87.2 13.5 
2000 100 14.7 
2001 142 42.0 
2002 227 59.9 
2003 301 32.6 
2004 323 7.3 
Average 108.0 82.4 
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Table 38 Historical data of China's insurance industry, 1999-2004 (RMB bn) 
 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Premium 432 388 305 211 160 139 
 1. Property insurance 109 87 78 69 60 52 
    2. Life-related insurance 323 301 227 142 100 87 
       a) Death insurance 12 10 8 7 8 7 
        b) Health insurance 26 24 12 6 7 4 
     c) Life insurance 285 267 207 129 85 77 
       
Payment 100 84 71 60 53 51 
1. Property insurance 57 48 40 33 31 28 
    2. Life-related insurance 44 36 30 27 22 23 
       a) Death insurance 4 3 3 3 3 3 
        b) Health insurance 9 7 5 3 1 1 
    c) Life insurance 31 26 23 20 18 19 
       
Expenses 44 36 31 26 22 18 
 
      
Investment        
   1. Bank deposit 497 455 303 193 124 93 
   2. Other investment 571 383 250 171 130 89 
        a) Government bonds 265 141 111 80 96 68 
         b) Investment funds 67 46 31 21 13 1 
       
Total asset 1,185 912 649 459 337 260 
Source: CIRC (2005). 
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Table 39 List of investment regulation changes on insurance assets, 1980-2005 
Year Investment regulations Regulation details 
1980-1987 n.a. Bank deposits only 
1987-1995 n.a. Bank deposits and many others, but 
mainly in the real state industry, stock 
market and other high risk sectors 
June 1995 Insurance Law Bank deposits, Government bonds and 
financial bonds 
August 1998 n.a. Repo in the money market 
May 1999 Directives on the Investment 
in corporate bonds 
Corporate bonds, limited to those rated 
above AA+, and issued by the central 
government controlled SOEs; the upper 
limit is 10% of the total assets at the 
end of last month 
October 1999 Provisional regulations on the 
investment of insurance 
assets on mutual funds 
The upper limit on mutual funds is 15% 
of the total assets at the end of last 
month 
March 2001 n.a.  The upper limit on mutual funds is 
100% on those commercial insurance 
accounts which are designed to 
achieve high returns 
March 2001 n.a. Investment in the corporate bonds 
issued by telecom sectors allowed 
June 2003 Provisional regulations on the 
investment of insurance 
assets in corporate bonds 
All corporate bonds rated above AA; 
the upper limit is 20% of the total 
assets 
October 2004 Provisional regulations on the 
investment of insurance 
assets in equities 
Common stock; convertible bonds; 
30% investment limit on one issuer; 
investment on those firms who had 
misbehaviours in the recent past is not 
allowed 
August 2005 Provisional regulations on the 
investment of insurance 
assets in bonds 
Government bonds, no limit; financial 
bonds, 30% upper limit, and no limit in 
some cases; corporate bond, 10-30% 
upper limit 
September 2005 Provisional regulations on the 
investment of insurance 
companies’ overseas assetsa 
Foreign government bonds; MBS 
(mortgage-backed securities); money 
funds; equity investment limited to 
those issued by Chinese firms listed in 
the NYSE, LSE, Frankfurt SE, Tokyo 
SE, Singapore SE and HK SE. Limit 
ranges 5% to 20% of the allowable 
assetsb.  
  
 
Source: CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Committee), and Wu (2004a); a, for some 
Chinese insurers, they have a certain amount of assets outside the Chinese territory. These 
assets manly come from the IPO capitals, injection funds from the foreign partners for those 
joint-ventures, and those business involving foreign markets. It is estimated that foreign 
assets within the Chinese insurers were equivalent to US$ 10bn as of 2004. 
(www.cei.gov.cn); b, for each major insurer, the SAFE (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange) issues a limit within which the foreign assets could be free invested abroad. For 
example, the PINGAN Company has a US$1.75bn quota, allowed for a free investment 
abroad. 
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Table 40 Statistical summary of China's mutual fund industry, 2001-2005 
Year Open-end funds  Closed-end funds  Total    
 No. of funds Assets  No. of funds Assets  No. of funds Assets  
 No. % RMB bn % No. % RMB bn % No. % RMB bn % 
2001 2 4 3.5 5 48 96 62.4 95 50 100 65.9 100 
2002 14 21 35.3 32 53 79 74.4 68 67 100 109.7 100 
2003 49 48 58.6 44 53 52 74.9 56 102 100 133.5 100 
2004 99 65 206.7 73 53 35 74.9 27 152 100 281.6 100 
2005a 127 71 348.3 81 53 29 80.9 19 180 100 429.2 100 
Source: www.hexun.com; a, as of June 2005.  
 
Table 41 Summary of asset allocation of China's mutual funds, 1998-2005 
 
Total assets Equity Bond Deposit Others 
  
RMB bn % RMB bn % RMB bn % RMB bn % 
1998 11 7 63 0 0 0 0 4 37 
1999 45 30 68 0 0 0 0 15 32 
2000 83 57 69 0 0 0 0 26 31 
2001 75 34 46 0 0 0 0 41 54 
2002 107 51 53 0 0 0 0 55 47 
2003 149 100 66 0 0 0 0 50 34 
2004 336 158 53 141 36 0 6 20 5 
2005a 448 161 51 201 33 9 9 52 7 
Source: www.hexun.com; a, as of June 2005; total assets, in some cases, are different from 
those in Table 34, which might be due to the different calculation methods used in different 
reports as well as rounding errors.  
 
Table 42 Return on Chinese open-end mutual funds (%), 2001-2005 
 
Nominal 
return Inflation rate Real returna Market returnb Over-performancec 
Growth rate  
of net assets 
2001 0.55 0.46 0.09 -9.80 10.35 0.79 
2002 0.09 -0.77 0.86 -11.85 11.94 -5.03 
2003 2.29 1.16 1.14 -13.99 16.28 9.40 
2004 2.95 3.90 -0.95 -5.00 7.96 -1.08 
2005d 0.08 1.30 -1.22 -12.03 12.11 -2.09 
Memo  The ratio of net assets to GDP was very small, i.e. 1-3% 
Source: www.hexun.com, and Datastream; a, return on net assets minus inflation rate; b, 
weighted stock market return by Shanghai and Shenzhen stock capitalisations; c, return on 
net assets minus market return; d, as of October 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
 
Table 43 Return on US mutual funds (%), 1971-2005 
 
Nominal 
return Inflation rate Real Returna 
Market 
returnb 
Over-
performancec 
Growth rate 
of net assets 
Asset/GDP 
ratio 
1971-1975 8.46 6.79 1.67 5.87 2.58 1.43 3.69 
1976-1980 10.76 8.93 1.83 14.89 -4.13 26.63 3.26 
1981-1985 13.69 5.51 8.18 15.44 -1.75 32.19 9.33 
1986-1990 13.54 3.97 9.58 13.82 -0.28 17.39 17.01 
1991-1995 13.40 3.13 10.28 17.41 -4.01 21.85 29.98 
1996-2000 22.37 2.48 19.90 19.37 3.00 20.29 61.75 
2001-2004 16.37 2.34 14.03 1.40 14.98 4.28 66.97 
Memo  Growth rate of net assets: 1941-50 (141.9), 1951-60 (163.5), and 1961-70 (106.9) 
Source: www.hexun.com, Datastream, and ICI (Investment Company Institute); a, return on 
net assets minus inflation rate; b, S&P 500 market return; c, return on net assets minus 
market return. 
 
Table 44 Distribution of 100 most invested equities by mutual funds 
  
No of 
funds 
% of stock market 
capitalisationa 
2001 Min 1.0 0.0 
 Mean 1.1 0.0 
 Median 1.0 0.0 
 Max 2.0 0.0 
2002 Min 1.0 0.0 
 Mean 2.0 0.0 
 Median 1.0 0.0 
 Max 9.0 0.0 
2003 Min 1.0 5.9 
 Mean 12.2 10.9 
 Median 10.5 10.1 
 Max 45.0 23.6 
2004 Min 5.0 17.9 
 Mean 25.8 29.3 
 Median 24.0 27.7 
 Max 65.0 62.7 
2005b Min 3.0 20.1 
 Mean 28.2 32.4 
 Median 25.5 30.9 
 Max 81.0 61.6 
Average Min 2.2 8.8 
 Mean 13.9 14.5 
 Median 12.4 13.7 
 Max 40.4 29.6 
Source: www.hexun.com; a, % of the stock market capitalisation related to the tradable 
shares only, which approximates 1/3 of the total shares; b, as of June 2005.  
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Table 45 Distribution of the 10 most invested equities for each mutual fund 
  
Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
2001 Min 29.1 4.4 3.5 3.4 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.0 
 Mean 49.7 8.8 6.2 6.0 5.9 4.9 4.9 3.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 
 Median 49.7 8.8 6.2 6.0 5.9 4.9 4.9 3.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 
 Max 70.3 13.2 9.0 8.7 8.6 7.1 7.1 4.8 4.7 3.8 3.5 
2002 Min 25.1 5.7 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 
 Mean 44.3 10.8 6.5 5.3 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.3 
 Median 40.8 9.2 5.7 4.5 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 
 Max 69.9 18.6 13.0 9.4 9.0 8.7 7.8 5.2 4.5 3.2 3.2 
2003 Min 10.3 4.9 3.0 0.0 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 
 Mean 58.8 11.1 8.7 7.2 6.2 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.4 
 Median 60.7 9.3 7.6 7.0 6.3 5.6 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.9 3.6 
 Max 100.0 38.1 23.6 17.2 13.0 11.1 8.4 8.2 7.1 6.4 5.9 
Average Min 28.4 6.4 4.0 2.9 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.3 1.6 1.5 
 Mean 50.9 10.2 7.1 6.2 5.5 4.8 4.5 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.8 
 Median 57.3 10.6 7.4 6.7 6.2 5.4 4.9 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.1 
 Max 65.0 20.8 13.1 9.8 8.1 7.3 6.0 5.1 4.5 3.7 3.5 
Source: www.hexun.com; 1st to 10th refers to the Nth largest share in each mutual fund’s portfolio, in terms of asset allocation to this particular share.  
 
Table 46 Distribution of numbers of open-end mutual funds invested in two selected equities 
  
Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
2002 China Telecom 9 (10) 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 Sinopec 19 (43) 4 2 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Note: Number in bracket is the total number of total funds; 1st to 10th refers to the Nth largest share in each mutual fund’s portfolio, in terms of market value. 
 
 
 122 
 
 
Table 47 Statistical summary of the NSSF assets managed by mutual funds and 
allocated to 162 stocks under 11 portfolios, 2004 
 
Rank of the 
NSSF portfolio 
as the largest 
shareholders 
Number of 
held shares 
Stock 
capitalisation 
Panel A 
 Million RMB mn 
Min 10 0.21 1.89 
Average per stock 5 2.93 22.34 
Median 5 1.88 16.89 
Max 1 (24)a 12.66 94.92 
Total n.a. 384.28 3597.13 
Average per portfolio/fund n.a. 34.93 327.01 
Panel B 
   
Stock market capitalisationb (RMB bn) n.a. n.a. 1169 
% n.a. n.a. 3.1 
Stock market capitalisationc(RMB bn) n.a. n.a. 3706 
% n.a. n.a. 1.0 
Source: www.cnfund.com; a, number in bracket is the frequency; b, refers to the tradable 
shares only; c, refers to all shares.   
 
Table 48 Statistical summary of occupational pension funds allocated to 26 
stocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 2004 
 
Rank of the 
NSSF portfolio 
as the largest 
shareholders 
Number of 
held shares 
Stock 
capitalisation 
 
 Million RMB mn 
Min 10 0.1 1.0 
Mean 6 2.9 19.3 
Median 7 0.9 8.8 
Maxa 1(2) 24.9 136.5 
Total n.a. 68.6 463.1 
Source: www.cnfund.com; a, number in bracket is the frequency.  
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Table 49 Summary of China's institutional investors, 2001-2004 (RMB bn, %) 
 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Mutual funds 336 (2.7)a 140 (1.2) 107 (1.0) 75 (0.8) 
Insurance companies 1,185 (9.4) 912 (7.8) 649 (6.2) 459 (4.7) 
Pension funds     
a) NSSFb 171 (1.3) 133 (1.1) 124 (1.2) 81 (0.8) 
    b) Occupational pensionc,d 0.5 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 
Securities companiesd 51 (0.4) 51 (0.4) 51 (0.5) 51 (0.5) 
Underground fundsd 650 (5.1) 650 (5.5) 650 (6.2) 650 (6.7) 
Total 2,394 1,886 1,582 1,316 
     
GDP 12,667 11,729 10,520 9,731 
All institutions/GDPe, % 18.9 16.1 15.0 13.5 
All institutions/GDPf, % 13.8 10.5 8.9 6.8 
Pension funds/GDP, % 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.8 
Source: see Section 5.1.3 for details; a, figures in brackets are % of GDP; b, National Social 
Security Fund; c, occupational pensions in Shanghai and Shenzhen; d, data are estimated to 
be same across all four years (see Section 5.1.3 for details); e, total institutions/GDP with 
underground funds; f, total institutions/GDP without underground funds.  
 
Table 50 Comparison of institutional investors and pension funds between China 
and other countries, 2001 
Ratio Country % 
All institutions/GDP China 13.5 
 OECD-alla 163.1 
 OECD-advanced 315 
 OECD-developing 11.1 
Pension Fund/GDP China 0.8 
 OECD-all 18.9 
 OECD-advanced 34.4 
 OECD-developing 3.3 
 All EMEsb 11.5 
Memo: Pension Fund/GDP Chileb 12.7 
Source: OECD Institutional Investors (2004), Hu (2005b; Davis 2005a), www.hexuen.com, 
NCSSF (2005), and CIRC (2005); a, OECD countries are classified into three groups, i.e. all 
OECD countries (OECD-all), those advanced OECD countries (OECD-advanced), and those 
less advanced OECD countries (OECD-developing), e.g. Turkey and Korea; b, refers to 33 
emerging market economies, including Asian, Latin American, African and Eastern European 
countries, the data are as of 2002.  
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Table 51 Government bond issuance and repayment in China, 1981-2003, (RMB 
bn) 
Year 
Issuance 
size Growth rate Repaymenta 
 
% of GDP Growth rate 
 RMB bn % RMB bn % % 
1981 4.87  n.a.   
1982 4.38 -9.93 n.a.   
1983 4.16 -5.13 n.a.   
1984 4.25 2.28 n.a.   
1985 6.06 42.51 n.a.   
1986 6.25 3.13 0.80 0.08  
1987 11.71 87.28 2.32 0.19 190.48 
1988 13.22 12.90 2.84 0.19 22.69 
1989 26.39 99.67 1.93 0.11 -32.14 
1990 19.72 -25.26 11.34 0.61 487.67 
1991 28.13 42.60 15.67 0.72 38.15 
1992 46.08 63.82 34.24 1.29 118.53 
1993 38.13 -17.24 22.43 0.65 -34.50 
1994 102.86 169.74 36.50 0.78 62.71 
1995 151.09 46.89 78.41 1.34 114.83 
1996 184.78 22.30 126.63 1.87 61.50 
1997 241.20 30.54 182.04 2.44 43.76 
1998 322.88 33.86 224.58 2.87 23.37 
1999 371.50 15.06 179.23 2.18 -20.19 
2000 415.70 11.90 155.22 1.73 -13.40 
2001 448.35 7.85 192.34 1.98 23.91 
2002 567.90 26.66 246.77 2.35 28.30 
2003 n.a.  287.66 2.45 16.57 
Source: www.ndac.gov.cn (National Debt Association of China); a, includes both principal and 
interests.   
 
Table 52 Bond issuance by issuer in 2004 and 2005 
 
2004 2004-October 2005 
 Issuance size 
Issuance 
frequency Issuance size 
Issuance 
frequency 
 RMB bn % of GDP  RMB bn % of GDP  
Government bonds
 480.9 3.8 2 295.9 2.1 1 
Treasury bills 1,703.7 13.5 11 1,628.0 11.8 9 
Policy financial bonds 434.8 3.4 3 351.4 2.5 4 
Commercial bank 
bonds 74.8 0.6 1 75.9 0.5 1 
Securities companies 
bonds 2.7 0.0 0 2.4 0.0 0 
Corporate bonds 32.6 0.3 2 75.3 0.5 4 
Total 2729.5 21.5 19 2428.9 17.6 19 
Source: Liu (2005); see Section 5.1.4 for definitions of different bonds; 2004 GDP is from WDI 
(2005), and 2005 GDP is estimated to grow at 9%.  
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Table 53 Distribution of Yield to Maturity of China's bond markets 
 
 
2005 2004 2003 
Government bondsa   Min 0.75 2.38 0.00 
(36) Mean 2.52 4.38 1.04 
 Median 2.66 4.65 0.56 
 Max 3.63 5.17 3.73 
Corporate bondsa Min 0.66 0.16 0.93 
(38) Mean 2.87 4.36 3.21 
 Median 3.09 4.65 3.36 
 Max 3.51 5.41 4.16 
Source: www.hexun.com; a, refers to those bonds where are allowed to be traded in the 
market only. 36 are government bonds, and 38 are corporate bonds.  
 
Table 54 Cross-country comparison of 10-year government bond returns (%), as 
of 2004 
 
Nominal 
return 
Inflation 
rate 
Real 
return 
Australia 9.61 2.34 7.27 
Canada 7.59 1.83 5.76 
Denmark 9.11 1.16 7.95 
Germany 9.22 1.67 7.55 
Italy 9.13 2.21 6.92 
Japan 0.91 -0.01 0.92 
Netherlands 8.82 1.24 7.59 
Norway 6.37 0.47 5.91 
UK 6.75 2.96 3.78 
USA 4.59 2.68 1.92 
Mean 7.21 1.65 5.56 
    
Argentina 16.83 4.42 12.41 
Hong Kong 6.34 -0.43 6.77 
India -5.55 3.77 -9.32 
Korea 7.94 3.59 4.35 
Malaysia 5.63 1.45 4.17 
Mexico 6.04 4.69 1.36 
Singapore 5.40 1.66 3.74 
South Africa 15.15 1.39 13.76 
Thailand 5.34 2.77 2.57 
Mean 6.90 2.59 3.54 
    
China 2.99 3.90 -0.91 
Source: nominal return (calculated by the author from Global Financial Data), inflation rate 
from World Development Indicators (2005).  
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Table 55 Data summary of asset returns (%) and wages (RMB) 
Variable Observation Meana STDEVb Source 
Wage (RMB) 1978-2000 2,490 2,113 MOLSS (2005) 
Inflation ratec 1978-2004 3.51 3.78 NBS (2005) 
Deposit 1980-2004 0.00 4.74 IMF (2005) 
Government bond 1993-2004 1.02 4.56 Datastream 
Equityd 1992-2004 4.54 27.2/14.7e SSE and SZE 
Global investmentf   1973-2004 10.68 19.48 Hu (2005c) 
a. Average of returns. All return data are in real terms. 
b. Standard deviation. 
c. The observations of 1998, 1999, 1994 and 19995 were dropped due to the outlier 
concern. 
d. Weighted average of the market returns of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. 
e. 27.1 is the standard deviation, derived from our observations. Given its high level and the 
assumption that China’s stock market will be more developed in the future, we use a 
lower standard deviation, i.e. 14.7 (around half of the original one) as a variant.  
f. The currency risk was allowed for. The mean return was high since the Chinese currency, 
i.e. RMB was continually deteriorating against the US dollar over the past decades except 
last month (July 2005) when China revalued the RMB against the US dollar by around 
2%.   
 
 
Table 56 Replacement rates with the basic model, Scenario A and Scenario B 
 
Basic model  Scenario Aa Scenario Ba 
Retirement age 60 65 55 
Mortality age 75 80 80 
Contribution rate, % 20 30 20 
Investment strategyb 50-50-0-0 5-23-45-27 100-0-0-0 
Transaction cost, % 5 2 10 
Replacement rate    
Meanc, %  15.7 93.0/119.6c 4.5 
STDEVc, % 1.4 8.3/10.4c 0.4 
Coefficient of variationd 11.4 11.2/11.5 8.4 
a. Scenario A refers to the case where replacement rate is highest, while scenario B the 
case where replacement rate is lowest.  
b. The four-digit code is the percentage allocation to bank deposits, government bonds, 
domestic stocks and foreign assets.  
c. The mean and the standard deviation reported in the table are computed via stochastic 
simulations with 1,000 replications. Whenever two figures are presented with a slash 
separator, the second figure is always the case where we assume that China’s stock 
market will be less volatile in the future, therefore the standard deviation of 14.7 used. 
d. The ratio of the mean to the STDEV (standard deviation). 
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Table 57 Replacement rates with changes in contribution rate, retirement age 
and transaction cost  
a. The four-digit code is the percentage allocation to the bank deposits, the government 
bonds, domestic stocks and the global investment.  
b. The mean and standard deviation reported in the table are computed via stochastic 
simulations with 1,000 replications.  
c. The ratio of the mean to the STDEV (standard deviation). 
d. Mean divided by STDEV. 
 
 
Table 58 Replacement rates with changes in investment type 
Retirement age 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Mortality age 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Contribution rate, % 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Investment strategya 100-0-0-0 0-100-0-0 0-0-100-0 0-0-0-100 25-25-25-25 40-50-10-0 5-23-45-27 
Transaction cost, % 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Replacement rate        
Meanb, % 11.7 20.7 25.1/61.7 95.8 34.3/37.5 18.0/18.5 42.9/55.0 
STDEVb, % 1.0 1.9 2.3/5.3 7.9 2.9/3.3 1.6/1.7 3.7/4.7 
Coefficient of variationc 11.2 10.5 10.8/11.7 11.9 11.7/11.3 11.4/10.9 11.5/11.8 
a. The four-digit code is the percentage allocation to the bank deposits, the government 
bonds, domestic stocks and the global investment.  
a. The mean and the standard deviation reported in the table are computed via stochastic 
simulations with 1,000 replications. Whenever two figures are presented with a slash 
separator, the second figure is always the case where we assume that China’s stock 
market will be less volatile in the future, therefore the standard deviation of 14.7 used. 
b. The ratio of the mean to the STDEV (standard deviation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change in contribution rate Change in retirement age Change in Transaction cost 
Retirement age 60 60 55 65 60 60 
Mortality age 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Contribution rate, % 10 30 20 20 20 20 
Investment strategya 50-50-0-0 50-50-0-0 50-50-0-0 50-50-0-0 50-50-0-0 50-50-0-0 
Transaction cost, % 5 5 5 5 2 10 
Replacement rate       
Meanb, % 5.2 26.2 9.6 27.9 18.9 10.5 
STDEVb, % 0.5 2.4 1.0 2.1 1.7 0.9 
Coefficient of 
variationd 11.1 10.8 9.4 13.0 10.9 11.2 
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Figures 
Figure 1The structure of China’s financial system 
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Source: Allen et al (2005); Hu (2005a); Herrero and Santabarbara (2005);  
a, China Banking Regulatory Commission; China Insurance Regulatory Commission; b, China Securities Regulatory Commission;  
c, Shanghai Stock Exchange, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange; d, Rural Credit Cooperative, and Urban Credit Cooperative Companies;  
e, Trust and Investment Company. 
 130 
 
 
Figure 2 China’s bond market capitalisation to GDP (%), 1990-2003 
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Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005); the top line is for bond market capitalisation 
(both private and public) to GDP, the middle line is for private bond market capitalisation to 
GDP, and the bottom line is for public bond market capitalisation to GDP.  
 
 
Figure 3 A comparison of bond market (both private and public) capitalisation 
to GDP (%), 1990-2003 
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Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005); the top line is for OECD, the middle line is 
for EMEs (emerging market economies), and the bottom line is for China. 
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Figure 4 Short-term debt ratio (%) and bond maturity (years), China and 
emerging markets 
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Source: Global Development Finance (2005); ST debt ratio is debts issued under 1 year 
divided by total debts; maturity is the average maturity for all new public debts during the 
year; CHN: China, and EMEs, emerging/developing markets; debts include those from 
international organisations (IMF), and those from governments (the central bank).  
 
Figure 5 Links between pension reform, pension funds, economic growth and 
financial development 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
                                                                                           
 
 
                                                               
 
 
 
Source: Hu (2005b) 
 
Financial development Economic growth 
Pension reform Pension funds growth 
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Figure 6 Distribution of replacement rates with the basic model 
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications 
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Figure 7 Distribution of replacement rates with Scenario A  
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 
replications; Scenario A refers to the case where replacement rare is highest; the top 
panel is related to the assumption of the high risk of China’s stock market, while the 
bottom panels is related to the assumption of the low risk of China’s stock market.  
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Figure 8 Distribution of replacement rates with Scenario B 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; 
Scenario B refers to the case where replacement rare is lowest. 
 
Figure 9 Distribution of replacement rates with a 10% contribution rate 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
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Figure 10 Distribution of replacement rates with a 30% contribution rate 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
 
Figure 11 Distribution of replacement rates with a retirement age at 55 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
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Figure 12 Distribution of replacement rates with a retirement at 65 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
 
Figure 13 Distribution of replacement rates with a transaction cost at 2% 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
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Figure 14 Distribution of replacement rates with a transaction cost at 10% 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications. 
 
Figure 15 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 100-0-0-0 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details).  
 
 138 
 
 
Figure 16 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 0-100-0-0-0 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details).  
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Figure 17 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 0-0-100-0 
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details); the Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations 
with 1,000 replications; the top panel is related to the assumption of the high risk of China’s 
stock market, while the bottom panels is related to the assumption of the low risk of China’s 
stock market. 
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Figure 18 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 0-0-0-100 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details). 
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Figure 19 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 25-25-25-25 
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details); the Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations 
with 1,000 replications; the top panel is related to the assumption of the high risk of China’s 
stock market, while the bottom panels is related to the assumption of the low risk of China’s 
stock market. 
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Figure 20 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 40-50-10-0 
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details); the Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations 
with 1,000 replications; the top panel is related to the assumption of the high risk of China’s 
stock market, while the bottom panels is related to the assumption of the low risk of China’s 
stock market. 
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Figure 21 Distribution of replacement rates with investment type 5-23-25-27 
 
 
Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations with 1,000 replications; for 
the four-digit number, 1st digit refers to the percentage of pension assets allocated to bank 
deposits, 2nd refers to bonds, 3rd refers to equities, and 4th refers to foreign assets (see 
Section 6.2 for details); the Notes: replacement rates are computed via stochastic simulations 
with 1,000 replications; the top panel is related to the assumption of the high risk of China’s 
stock market, while the bottom panels is related to the assumption of the low risk of China’s 
stock market. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Classification of equity shares in China 
 
The classification of the Chinese equity shares is complex in comparison to other 
advanced countries. Currently, there are six different types of shares in China, i.e., 
State share, Legal person share, Employee/staff share, A share, B share and H share 
(Liu 2005).  
 
Different shares 
 
The State shares are directly owned by the state via those government agencies as 
State Asset Management Bureau.  
 
Regarding the Legal person shares, some are held indirectly by the state via State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) or other government-affiliated organisations with the legal 
person status, while the remaining portion of Legal person shares are held by the non-
government related organisations, be they domestic or foreign, with legal person 
status.  
 
The Employee shares are shares offered to employees of the listed companies, be they 
workers or managers, usually under a substantial discount40.  
 
A shares, like the classic common stock in advanced equity markets, refer to those 
shares that are traded among the domestic residents and denominated in RMB 
(Chinese currency). B shares are traded in US dollars in Shanghai and HK dollars in 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and were limited to the foreign investors41 initially; but 
since 2001, the domestic Chinese residents with the authorised foreign currency 
accounts have been allowed to purchase B shares (CSRC 2001; Chinadaily 2001).  
 
H shares represent shares of the Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, London, 
New York and Singapore Stock Exchanges42. Since most of such Chinese companies 
are listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, then H designation is used customarily 
and in a general sense.  
 
As of August 2003, there are sixty-six Chinese firms listed in HK, three in London43, 
one in Singapore, and thirteen in New York (CSRC 2003) 
 
Note that the State shares, Legal person shares and employee shares are not tradable, 
although transferable, while A shares, B shares and H shares are tradable in the 
Exchanges.  
                                                
40
 This mainly happened in the early 1990 when stockification started. Now this practice has been 
phrased out (Green and Wall 2000).  
41
 Foreign investors are used here broadly, including foreign individuals and firms from other countries, 
those from Hong Kong, Marco, Taiwan and mainland Chinese citizens but living abroad (Shirai 2002).  
42
 But, some authors (Shirai 2002) give different names to those shares by breaking down H-share 
further into H-share for those listed in Hong Kong, L for those listed in London, N for New York and S 
for Singapore respectively.  
43
 They are Beijing Datang Power Generation, China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. and Jiangxi Copper 
Co. (London Stock Exchange) 
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Difference between H and B-share 
 
H shares and B shares are similar in that they are both traded in foreign currencies, but 
H shares differ from B shares in at least three ways (Fernald and Rogers 2002).  
 
Firstly, H shares trade in more liquid and developed markets, e.g. in HK and London.  
 
Secondly, H share companies must meet both the foreign securities rules and Chinese 
regulations, thus providing better information to investors.  
 
Thirdly, H share companies tend to be much bigger and more profitable than 
companies issuing B shares.    
 
Red chip share 
 
Last, a concept, which is always mentioned when talking about the Chinese stock 
market and often appears in the media, is the Red Chip. Red chip is shares listed in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange by companies with a significant connection with the 
mainland China (Fan et.al. 2003).  
 
To qualify for the Red chip issuance, a firm must meet three criteria (Walter and 
Howie 2001): a) with at least 35% shareholding directly held by a mainland China 
entity which might be a SOE, or provincial or municipal authority; b) with at least 
35% shareholding directly held by a HK firm, listed or unlisted, which in turn is 
controlled by a mainland Chinese entity; c) with at least a 12 month trading record 
after meeting the criteria a and b.  
 
Note that the major difference between the H share issuing firm and the Red chip 
issuing firm is that the former is a registered mainland Chinese firm but listed 
overseas, while the latter is both registered and listed overseas, principally in HK. 
This is the main reason why we hesitate to group Red chip to our above classification, 
since the Red chip issuing firms from the legal basis are not Chinese companies. 
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Appendix B. Programming code with Matlab 6.5 
 
%Start working age:22,retirement age:60, mortality age:75, N1: no of contributary 
years; 
%years, c: contribution rate; 
clear 
N1=38 
c=0.2 
 
%beta:percentage of wages as transaction costs (Ae), wage; annual income; 
beta=0.02; 
Wage=[2921 3655 3603 4031 4690 5415 6331 8459 8848 9255
 9681 10127 10592 11080 11589 12122 12680 13263 13873 14512
 15179 15877 16608 17372 18171 19007 19881 20796 21752 22753
 23799 24894 26039 26820 27625 28454 29307 30187] 
Ae=beta*Wage; 
%investment type, bank deposit-Rt1, government bonds-Rt2; common stock-
Rt3,global investment-Rt4;  
%global portfolio 25-25-25-25-Rt5, SSF portfolio 40-50-10-0-Rt6,global portfolio 5-
23-45-27-Rt7; 
%portfolio 50-50-0-0 Rt8; 
Rt1=[-0.036 -0.036 -0.133 -0.059 -0.009 0.029 0.046 0.037 0.020 0.018
 0.027 0.008 -0.017 -0.003 0.125 -0.012 0.008 0.044 -0.008 -0.025
 0.068 -0.041 0.038 -0.024 0.035 0.040 -0.039 0.025 0.049 -0.050
 0.017 -0.002 -0.058 -0.013 -0.008 -0.051 -0.093 -0.043]; 
 
Rt2=[-0.007 -0.007 -0.104 -0.030 0.007 0.062 0.061 0.043 0.026 0.024
 0.036 0.016 -0.011 0.054 0.047 0.012 -0.031 0.005 -0.026 -0.065  
            -0.030 0.037 0.035 -0.008 0.013 0.031 0.019 0.022 0.104 -0.092
 0.025 0.023 0.040 -0.016 0.050 0.018 0.048 0.054] 
Rt3=[0.171 0.171 -0.438 -0.183 0.739 0.134 0.015 0.230 0.330 -0.243
 0.030 -0.128 -0.113 0.649 0.023 0.335 0.021 -0.201 0.141 0.370  
          -0.468 -0.291 -0.014 0.188 -0.239 -0.155 0.237 -0.366 0.368 0.311  
          -0.153 0.249 0.444 0.142 0.310 0.085 0.051 0.023]; 
Rt4=[0.431 0.202 0.151 0.090 0.127 0.141 0.130 -0.017 -0.058 -0.060
 0.126 0.072 0.142 0.189 0.434 0.496 0.243 -0.159 0.178 -0.004  
          -0.097 0.243 0.201 0.069 0.033 -0.066 -0.252 -0.210 -0.122 0.026
 0.141 0.151 -0.135 0.243 0.190 0.390 0.007 0.106] 
Rt5=[0.140 0.082 -0.131 -0.046 0.216 0.091 0.063 0.073 0.080 -0.065
 0.055 -0.008 0.000 0.222 0.157 0.208 0.060 -0.078 0.071 0.069  
          -0.132 -0.013 0.065 0.056 -0.040 -0.037 -0.009 -0.132 0.100 0.049
 0.008 0.105 0.073 0.089 0.136 0.110 0.003 0.035] 
Rt6=[-0.001 -0.001 -0.149 -0.057 0.074 0.056 0.050 0.059 0.054 -0.005
 0.032 -0.001 -0.023 0.090 0.076 0.035 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 -0.005  
            -0.035 -0.027 0.032 0.005 -0.003 0.016 0.018 -0.016 0.108 -0.035
 0.004 0.036 0.041 0.001 0.053 -0.003 -0.008 0.012] 
Rt7=[0.190 0.128 -0.187 -0.068 0.368 0.114 0.058 0.111 0.140 -0.119
 0.057 -0.034 -0.016 0.355 0.144 0.287 0.068 -0.130 0.105 0.149  
           -0.240 -0.059 0.058 0.100 -0.094 -0.078 0.041 -0.215 0.159 0.123  
            -0.024 0.158 0.170 0.125 0.202 0.145 0.031 0.049] 
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Rt8=[-0.022 -0.022 -0.118 -0.045 -0.001 0.045 0.053 0.040 0.023 0.021
 0.032 0.012 -0.014 0.025 0.086 0.000 -0.012 0.024 -0.017 -0.045
 0.019 -0.002 0.037 -0.016 0.024 0.035 -0.010 0.024 0.076 -0.071
 0.021 0.011 -0.009 -0.014 0.021 -0.017 -0.022 0.005] 
 
BA1=0; 
Temp1=0; 
for i=1:N1 
   Temp1=c*Wage(i)-Ae(i); 
    for j=i:N1 
        Temp1=Temp1*(1+Rt7(j)); 
    end      
    BA1=BA1+Temp1; 
end 
BA1 
%output=gama*Wage(N1) 
%Retirement age:A2,death age:A3, starting year:A2+1, N2:number of interval years; 
A3=75; 
A2=60; 
 
N2=A3-A2; 
%Inflation rate:normal distribution of inflation rate, delata:stardard deviation; 
%Mean:Im, obtained from historical data 1978-2004,ex.1988-89,1994-1995 
Im=3.51; 
delta=3.78; 
 
 
N3=1000; 
for kku=1:N3 
 
for i=1:N2 
    InflationRate(i)=31; 
    %InflationRate(i)=Im + delta*randn(1); 
    while abs(InflationRate(i)) >= 30 
        InflationRate(i)=Im + delta*randn(1); 
    end 
end 
InflationRate=InflationRate/100; 
 
Rto1=[0.000 -0.082 0.060 -0.028 -0.098 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.008 -0.001
 0.008 0.042 0.009 0.036 0.024 0.006]; 
Rto2=[0.070 0.007 0.069 0.020 -0.054 0.003 -0.013 -0.068 -0.009 -0.017
 0.043 0.025 0.050 0.023 0.004 0.006]; 
Rto3=[-0.261 -0.185 0.036 0.350 -0.139 0.501 -0.205 0.244 -0.358 -0.222  
            -0.101 0.114 0.622 0.079 -0.081 0.203]; 
Rto4=[0.004 0.247 0.319 0.204 0.647 0.076 0.190 -0.276 0.000 -0.261
 0.086 -0.150 -0.024 -0.069 0.077 0.291]; 
Rto5=[-0.047 -0.003 0.121 0.137 0.089 0.146 0.011 -0.024 -0.090 -0.125
 0.009 0.008 0.164 0.017 0.006 0.127]; 
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Rto6=[0.009 -0.048 0.062 0.034 -0.080 0.054 0.001 -0.008 -0.037 -0.031
 0.015 0.041 0.091 0.034 0.003 0.026]; 
Rto7=[-0.100 -0.019 0.121 0.216 0.095 0.247 -0.040 0.020 -0.163 -0.174  
          -0.012 0.019 0.285 0.024 -0.014 0.172] 
Rto8=[0.035 -0.037 0.065 -0.004 -0.076 0.004 0.029 -0.033 0.000 -0.009
 0.025 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.014 0.006] 
 
Br=zeros(1,N2); 
Br(1)=BA1; 
temp_Rto=zeros(1,N2); 
temp_Rto(N2)=1+Rto7(N2); 
for kk=N2-1:-1:1 
    temp_Rto(kk)=temp_Rto(kk+1)*(1+Rto7(kk)); 
end 
temp_inflation=zeros(1,N2); 
temp_inflation(1)=1+InflationRate(1); 
for kk=2:N2 
temp_inflation(kk)=temp_inflation(kk-1)*(1+InflationRate(kk)); 
end 
 
%compute the denominator; 
sumDeno=temp_inflation(N2); 
for kkj=1:N2-1 
    sumDeno=sumDeno+temp_Rto(kkj+1)*temp_inflation(kkj); 
end 
 
output=temp_Rto(1)*BA1/sumDeno 
 
gama(kku)=output/Wage(N1); 
 
 
end 
xx=1:N3 
figure; 
plot(xx,gama); 
 
figure; 
xx=linspace(0,max(gama),100); 
hist(gama,xx); 
hold on; 
mean_gama=sum(gama)/N3 
stand_devi_gama=std(gama) 
Y = normpdf(xx,mean_gama,stand_devi_gama); 
hold on; 
plot(xx,Y,'r'); 
 
Notes: The codes above relate to the computation of the basic model (see Section 6). 
For all other simulations, slight changes on relevant codes are involved.  
